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EDITORS NOTE
We are delighted to introduce you to the third volume of Paideia, a proud 
representation of past and present students' success. Student-authored aca-
demic papers provide just a taste of the vast amount of knowledge Cal Poly’s 
Political Science students have. Meanwhile, alumni spotlights provide a great 
representation of all the di"erent career paths present students can embark on. 
#is third edition represents the continuation of last year’s goal of maintaining 
Paideia as a tradition that all future Cal Poly students can have access to. #is 
year’s volume has made monumental steps forward in reaching new prestige 
for the journal. At the end of this year, Paideia can be accessed online through 
the Digital Commons database. #is allows students' academic papers to be 
accessed around the globe and be used in other researchers' work. 
It is our hope that throughout this journal you will $nd yourself looking 
at topics with a new perspective. In a continuously progressing world, it is 
our desire that this journal brings you at least one step closer to learning 
something you did not know before. 
We invite you to pioneer through this journal and step into just a little piece 
of the Political Science department’s outlooks and experiences that have 
shaped this year’s third volume of Paideia.
Katherine Spade
Executive Editor  
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ARTICLES
CONTRIBUTOR BIO 
CAITLYN MORRISON is an undergrad-
uate senior studying Political Science with 
an independent concentration centralized in 
Public Policy. Academically, she is primarily 
interested in international relations, speci$-
cally in Chinese politics and social policies on 
homelessness and poverty. Caitlyn’s inspiration 
for this paper came from two case studies she 
encountered in lecture, which followed two 
women’s personal struggles to a"ord patented 
healthcare testing with no ability alternative. 
#is illustration struck Caitlyn as an obvious 
and outright human rights violation, bring-
ing her to examine how access to medicine 
and treatment are viewed through a human 
rights perspective in the international realm. 
After she graduates, Caitlyn aims to pursue a 
career in public policy and public a"airs in 
Washington D.C.
THE HUMAN RIGHTS PERSPECTIVE BEHIND PATENT LAWS 
Caitlyn Morrison
Abstract 
#e reasons for the lack of access to essential healthcare policies and medicines 
are manifold, but in many cases the high prices of drugs create a barrier to 
needed treatments in developing countries.1 #ese prohibitive drug prices 
are often the result of corporations in industrialized nations holding patents 
on the technology to produce their recently discovered medicine. Strong 
intellectual property rights were developed for pharmaceutical companies 
who invested in the creation of new medicines to receive the maximum pro$t 
from their innovation. However, the monopolization of these medicines’ 
production gives the corporation the ability to sell their product at a high 
cost, often unreachable for poor countries to a"ord. Governments in these 
developing countries have attempted to bring down the prices of medicines 
yet been blocked by industrialized countries who formulated the World Trade 
Organization Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) 
Agreement to set strong standards for the protection of intellectual property, 
1  Ellen Hoen, “TRIPS, Pharmaceutical Patents and Access to Essential Medicines: Seattle, 
Doha and Beyond,” Chicago Journal for International Law, Vol. 3, no 1 (Spring 2002).
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including patents for pharmaceuticals.2 In addition, patents on genes, such 
as the case of Myriad Genetics’ ownership of the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes 
restrict diagnostics, therapies, drug development and identi$cation of related 
cancers to be done solely by Myriad preventing patients from obtaining a 
second diagnostic opinion from an independent laboratory. Article 25 in the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights states that “everyone has the right 
to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and 
his family including medical care and the right to security in the event of 
sickness and disability.”3 #erefore denying individuals access to available 
lifesaving medicine for the sake of maximizing corporations pro$t is causing 
citizens in developing countries to su"er from a lack of adequate standard 
of health. To understand why patent laws have been predominantly looked 
at as a political economy issue and remain disproportionately unexamined 
under the human rights scope leads me to ask the following research question: 
Why are human rights laws not being applied to the restrictions imposed 
by global patent law? 
Real-World Observation
On April 27, 2015 the Royal Society of Medicine held a conference in 
London and produced a report stating that $ve billion people do not have 
access to safe, a"ordable surgical and anesthesia care when needed.4 Access 
is the worst in low-income and lower-middle-income countries, where nine 
of ten people cannot access basic surgical care.5 #is conference was held to 
examine how global surgery will be shaped in the future, publishing their 
$ndings in #e Lancet journal in order to educate developed countries on 
the role they ought to play to help combat this issue.6 #eir research stated 
that progress in global health over the past 25 years has not been uniform 
internationally with mortality and morbidity from common conditions 
2  Ibid. 
3  #e United Nations, Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 1948
4  Donald Mcneil, “Routine Operations Could Save Millions of Lives, If #ey Were Avail-
able,” !e New York Times, April 27, 2015.
5  Meara John, “Global Surgery 2030: Evidence and Solutions for Achieving Health, Welfare, 
and Economic Development.” !e Lancet, 386.9993 (2015): 569-624. 
6  “Global Surgery, Anesthesia, and Obstetrics: Shifting Paradigms and Challenging Genera-
tions,” !e Royal Society of Medicine, 2015.
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needing surgery growing in the world’s poorest regions.7 In the absence of 
surgical care, fatality rates are high for common, easily treatable conditions 
including appendicitis, hernia, fractures, obstructed labor, congenital anom-
alies, and breast and cervical cancer.  
Low and middle income countries are facing the burden of infectious dis-
ease, maternal disease, non-communicable diseases, and injuries all of which 
surgical and an anesthesia care are essential for treatment. When viewing 
the large projected increase in the incidence of cancer, road tra!c injuries 
and cardiovascular diseases in these low and middle income countries, the 
need for surgical services in these regions will continue to rise substantially 
from now until 2030.8 Despite the growing need, surgery was considered 
too complicated and expensive to be an integral part of public health in 
developing countries. #erefore, the Royal Society of Medicine decided to 
bring light to this issue. #e World Bank estimates that universal access to 
44 procedures would prevent 6% to 7% of all preventable deaths in low and 
middle income countries.9 With surgeries new found recognition as a cost 
e"ective public health intervention, providing access to essential surgical 
services and safe and timely medical care can only be achieved by addressing 
the weaknesses within the health care system. 
#e reasons for the lack of access to essential healthcare policies and medi-
cines are manifold, but in many cases the high prices of drugs create a barrier 
to needed treatments in developing countries.10 #ese prohibitive drug prices 
are often the result of corporations in industrialized nations holding patents 
on the technology to produce their recently discovered medicine. Strong 
intellectual property rights were developed for pharmaceutical companies 
who invested in the creation of new medicines to receive the maximum 
pro$t from their innovation. However, the monopolization of medicines’ 
production a"ords corporations with the ability to sell their product at a 
high cost, often unreachable for poor countries to a"ord. Governments in 
7  Op. Cit., fn. 5
8  Op. Cit., fn. 5
9  #e World Bank, “Surgery Could Save Millions of Lives in Developing Countries,” March 
26, 2015. 
10  Ellen Hoen, “TRIPS, Pharmaceutical Patents and Access to Essential Medicines: Seattle, 
Doha and Beyond,” Chicago Journal for International Law, Vol. 3, no 1 (Spring 2002).
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these developing countries have attempted to bring these prices down, yet 
have been blocked by industrialized countries who formulated the World 
Trade Organization Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(TRIPS) Agreement, which set strong standards for the protection of intel-
lectual property, including patents for pharmaceuticals.11 Article 25 in the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights states that “everyone has the right 
to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and 
his family including medical care and the right to security in the event of 
sickness and disability.”12 #erefore, denying individuals access to available 
lifesaving medicine for the sake of maximizing corporations pro$t is causing 
citizens in developing countries to su"er from a lack of adequate standard 
of health. To understand why patent laws have been predominantly looked 
at as a political economy issue and remain disproportionately unexamined 
under the human rights scope leads me to ask the following research question: 
Why are human rights laws not being applied to the restrictions imposed 
by global patent law? 
Conventional Wisdom 
International conventional wisdom arrives at the same consensus, that people 
believe human rights should be a higher priority on the international agenda. 
#is consensus is displayed through the non-partisan poll conducted by 
World Public Opinion, which states that majorities in all nations surveyed 
express support for the United Nations playing an active role in promoting 
human rights and reject the argument that their intervention would be an 
improper interference in the internal a"airs of a country.13 Publics in most 
countries favor the UN playing a larger role than it presently does to promote 
human rights. In a second World Public Opinion survey, data suggests that a 
majority of individuals in 17 of the 21 nations polled say their government 
should abide by international law and reject the view that governments are 
not obliged to follow international laws when they con&ict with the national 
11  Ibid. 
12  #e United Nations, Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 1948.
13  “Polls Find Strong International Consensus on Human Rights,” World Public Opinion, 
December 7, 2010.
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interest.14 #is data proves an authoritative claim that the international 
community supports human rights laws as an international movement.
 However, current practices suggest that patent laws are restricting human 
rights through infringing on an individual’s right to health as stated in the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Patents allow for monopolistic 
control over substances that are essential to research, medicine and pa-
tients – all things crucial in human rights plans.15 #e last decade has seen 
a dramatic expansion of intellectual property protection standards, both in 
their subject matter and scope of economic interests they protect. Due to 
the TRIPS agreement, intellectual property rights have been an economic 
issue in the world trading system with unexamined implications in a public 
health, education, or human rights sectors.16  #e surge of the human rights 
movement during post-World War II placed international patent law inter-
ests in the shadows while other issues emerged to the movement’s forefront, 
leaving them relatively unexplored. #is paper brings light to pharmaceutical 
patent laws under the scope of international human rights to identify the 
restrictions imposed by these intellectual property interests and the global 
implications they create. 
Methodology and Evidence 
To illustrate the impact of patent laws on the $eld of international human 
rights, this paper will use qualitative methodology in the form of case study 
research. #ese case studies will examine two speci$c restrictions imposed 
by patent laws: access to medicine and access to healthcare. #is paper will 
mostly utilize primary sources in order to obtain non-bias evidence to support 
my research $ndings. Examples of primary sources that will be included in 
this paper will be government reports, United Nations’ reports, World Bank 
reports and World Health Organization reports. My secondary evidence will 
be drawn from sources including the New York Times, #e Washington Post 
and scholarly journals.  
14  “People in 17 of 21 Nations Say Governments Should Put International Law Ahead of 
National Interest,” World Public Opinion, November 2, 2009.
15  Daniel Kevles, “Can #ey Patent Your Genes?,” !e New York Review, March 7, 2013.
16  Laurence Helfer, “Toward a Human Rights Framework for Intellectual Property,” UC 
Davis L. Rev, Vol. 40 (2006): 975.
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"eoretical Paradigm 
#e theory that best explains and frames my research question is international 
legal realism. In international law, legal realism’s core assumption is that rules 
and law that govern interstate behavior are based on the distribution of power 
between states.17 #is paradigm emphasizes that world politics are driven by 
the relative power positions of states and the laws they create.18 According to 
the theory’s founder Hans Morgenthau, “universal moral principles cannot 
be applied to the actions of states in their abstract universal formulation, but 
they must be $ltered through the concrete circumstances of time and place.”19 
#is analysis of the relationship between legal realism and ethics explains 
that realists are aware of the moral signi$cance of political action but are also 
aware of the tension between morality and the requirements of successful 
political action. Morgenthau introduces rationality to this theory de$ning 
rationality as a process of calculating the costs and bene$ts of all alternative 
policies in order to determine their utility and ability to maximize power.   
Given these assumptions, international legal realism will help explain my 
research question and research $ndings. #e primary assumption of interna-
tional legal realism being that politics are driven by the relative power of states 
frames the dynamic of developed nations’ power over developing nations in 
creating international patent laws. Realism’s assumption of states political 
power as the driving force for all outcomes in world politics helps to frame 
this papers examination of states laws e"ect on international human rights. 
#e theory’s aspect of rationality helps to examine international patent law 
as a political economy issue due to its innate relation to cost-bene$t analysis.
Conventional wisdom thinkers use the theoretical paradigm of liberalism 
to frame and explain their opinion on human rights issues and international 
intervention. #e fundamental principle of liberalism is that special interests 
rather than state interests prevail and that peace and cooperation are in the 
best interest of every state.20 #e founders of liberalism, Immanuel Kant and 
17  Professor Shelley L. Hurt, “#eoretical Paradigms of International Law,” POLS 426-01 
course reader (Spring 2015).
18  Ibid.
19  Julian Korab-Karpowicz, “Political Realism in International Relations”, !e Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2013 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.).
20  Op. Cit., fn. 16
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Adam Smith, emphasize the importance of interdependence of states and 
non-state actors in implementing international institutions and reform.21 #is 
theory explains the conventional wisdoms rational of believing that human 
rights should be put before the states own interest. #e theory’s belief in 
interdependence between states frames these thinkers’ desire for increased 
action for human rights and United Nations intervention. Liberalism helps 
explain an ideal way of handling human rights issues while international 
legal realism frames the actual situation occurring due to the restrictions 
imposed by patent laws. 
Restrictions Imposed: Access to Medicine 
#e O!ce of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights 
convened an expert conference on October 11, 2010 in Geneva, Switzerland 
to “exchange views on human rights considerations relating to the realization 
of access to medicines as one of the fundamental elements in achieving the 
full realization of the right of everyone to the highest attainable standard 
of physical and mental health.”22 During this conference Craig Mokhiber, 
speaking on behalf of the UN Human Rights o!ce, stated that “human rights 
law provides standards for access to medicine requiring that they are safe, 
a"ordable, of appropriate quality, and made available without discrimina-
tion.”23 He listed a number of steps that could be taken to achieve health as 
a fundamental human right including expanding access to o"-patent drugs 
and price control.
#e acknowledgement of patent protections as impeding access to med-
icine and therefore human rights standards is a central issue initially im-
posed by the 1994 TRIPS agreement. #e agreement states that all World 
Trade Organization (WTO) member states are obliged to grant patents to 
medical inventions to encourage innovation by assuring compensation to 
21  Juliet Kaarbo and James Ray, Global Politics (Boston: Cengage Learning, 2010).
22  United Nations Human Rights Council, “Promotion and Protection of All Human 
Rights, Civil Political, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Including the Right to Devel-
opment,” 12th Session. October 12, 2009. 
23  United Nations Human Rights, “Access to Medicines – Fundamental to the Right to 
Health,” November 5, 2010. 
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recoup the high cost of developing new medicines.24 #ese patents on med-
icines give drug companies the right to prevent others from manufacturing 
their innovation, meaning that only brand name drugs are available for 20 
years from the $ling date. #erefore during these 20 years, arti$cially high 
prices can be charged.25 Some developing countries have viewed the TRIPS 
agreement as a barrier in their attempt to combat public health problems 
by restricting drug availability due to high cost of una"ordable medicine in 
countries whose health-care systems are often overwhelmed by HIV/AIDS 
and other infectious diseases.26 Without patent protection, the production 
of generic drugs drives the prices of medicines down to a"ordable levels. 
For example, Prozac which during its patent period sold for $2.50 per pill 
was produced by a generic manufacturer for only $0.25 a pill after its patent 
ended.27 #is large increase in the price of medicines due to patent law has 
a large e"ect on people in developing countries who cannot a"ord to buy 
these drugs, leaving many su"ering from treatable diseases. #is displays the 
con&ict between patent law and human rights due to restrictions on access 
to medicine through heavily increased prices, leaving millions of people 
in developing countries unable to achieve their right to health. #e Doha 
Declaration was intended to be a shield for developing countries against the 
repercussions of universalized intellectual property standards to drug access 
however; pharmaceutical patents are still creating a barrier. 
#e Doha Declaration was a 2005 amendment to the TRIPS agreement 
stating that developing countries could use compulsory licenses in situations 
of a national emergency to access life-sustaining medicines.28 Compulsory 
licenses are issued by governments to authorize the use or production of a 
24  Ian F. Fergusson, “#e WTO, Intellectual Property Rights, and the Access to Medicine 
Controversy,” (online report, U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, 
December 12, 2006).
25  Wendy H. Schacht and John R. #omas, “Patent Law and Its Application to the Phar-
maceutical Industry: An Examination of the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term 
Restoration Act of 1984,” (online report, U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research 
Service, January 10, 2005). 
26  Op. Cit., fn. 22
27  Barry Robson and O.K. Baek, “#e Engines of Hippocrates: From the Dawn of Medicine 
to Medical and Pharmaceutical Information,” (Wiley, 1 edition, 2009): 475. 
28  Op. Cit., fn. 22
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patented item by a domestic party other than a patent holder in cases of 
extreme urgency or national emergency.29 Article 31 of the agreement limits 
the scope and duration of a compulsory license to address the circumstanc-
es for which the license is authorized and restricts production authorized 
by the compulsory license to the domestic market.30 According to former 
European Union trade negotiator Pascal Lamy “we have solved about 10% 
of the problem of access to medicines in developing countries through the 
WTO’s action.”31 Even with this amendment in place, developing nations 
have seldom made use of the &exibility of the TRIPS agreement. Even though 
a developing country with no manufacturing capability may use a compulsory 
license to obtain a product for a generic manufacturer in another country, 
the generic manufacturer in the second country may have no incentive to 
produce such limited quantities to poor countries. In addition, under many 
of the proposals the product would have to use distinguishable packaging 
with identi$able characteristics to avoid trade diversion to other markets.32 
Under such restrictions, it is not certain that a generic producer would un-
dertake the development and formulation costs for such a limited market.33 
#us, even though a compulsory license may be issued, the drugs may never 
be manufactured.  
#ailand provides an excellent example of why other countries have been 
reluctant to utilize compulsory licensing. When the country issued a number 
of compulsory licenses for antiretroviral drugs by Abbott’s Kaletra, the large 
pharmaceutical company was angered at #ailand for ‘ignoring the patent 
system.’ In response, Abbott Kaletra announced it would not be applying 
for license to sell seven of its newest products in #ailand.34 #ailand has 
since been repeatedly placed on a U.S. Trade Representative ‘priority watch 
29  Op. Cit., fn. 22
30  World Trade Organization, “Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property,” 2015, p. 333. 
31  “WTO Drug Pact Lifts Trade Talks,” Wall Street Journal, September 2, 2003.
32  Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and 
Public Health, Note from the Chairman, Paragraph 2(b)(ii), December 16, 2002.
33  UK Commission on Intellectual Property, “Integrating Intellectual Property and Devel-
opment Policy,” September 2002, p. 45-46.
34  “Abbott to Withhold New Drugs from #ailand in Retaliation for Kaletra Compulsory 
License,” Aidsmap, March 15, 2007.
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list’ of countries seen to be committing intellectual property piracy.35 Due 
to the repercussions larger developed nations have the potential to impose; 
compulsory licensing has had little e"ect on widening developing countries 
access to medicine.
Even with a compulsory license provision in place, patents are still placing 
restrictions on international access to medicine. Although patents have ex-
pired on a number of $rst-line AIDS drugs making them available cheaply 
from generic makers, patents still exist on most new and second-line med-
icines complicating the provision of HIV treatment. #is is problematic as 
newer antiretroviral drugs are generally less toxic, making it easier to take 
and more e"ective at $ghting HIV.36 Drugs used to combat resistance are 
called second-line drugs and although the number of people in need of these 
drugs is expected to increase, the price of second-line drugs remains on av-
erage six times higher than drugs commonly used for $rst-line regimens.37 
One limitation of TRIPS is that the new, better drugs are only available in 
countries that have the capacity to cover the high cost, widening the access 
to treatment gap due to pro$t margins of large pharmaceuticals being put 
before public health.  
In February 2009, a shipment of second-line generic antiretroviral drugs 
was con$scated by Dutch customs authorities. #e 49kg of Abacavir sul-
fate tablets produced by an Indian company, Aurobindo, were bound for a 
treatment program in Nigeria.38 #e tablets were later released but the seizure 
highlights the tensions between the European Union’s rules on intellectual 
property rights and World Trade Organization rules concerning the produc-
tion of generic medicines.  
Legal showdowns have begun to arise against the drug industry in recent 
years highlighting the struggle for global health equity in this patent war. 
#is is highlighted in the 2013 landmark decision by the Indian Supreme 
Court whose ruling blocked global pharmaceutical giant Novaritis’ e"ort 
35  “U.S. Trade Representative Places #ailand on Priority Watch List in Annual Report,” 
Kaiser Health News, May 1, 2007.
36  “HIV/AIDS, TRIPS and Second-Line #erapy,” AVERT, 2014.
37  World Health Organization,“HIV Drug Resistance Fact Sheet,” April 2011.
38  “NIGERIA: Seizure of Drug Shipments #reatens ARV Access,” IRIN PlusNews, March 
13, 2009.
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to patent an updated version of its leukemia-treating drug.39 #is decision 
cleared the way for mass production of a much cheaper generic version to 
supply lifesaving medicines for much of the developing world. However, 
larger currently pending agreements such as the Trans-Paci$c Partnership 
Agreement (TTP), a free trade agreement involving the U.S. and 11 other 
Paci$c-Rim countries, contains intellectual property provisions designed to 
preempt trade barriers that protect access to medicine.40 If signed, the TPP 
would force all countries to grant additional drug patents, extending monopo-
lies on medicines beyond 20 years which will delay lower-cost versions of these 
medicines from entering the market.41 According to Rohit Malpani, Director 
of Policy and Analysis at Doctors Without Borders Access Campaign, “the 
intellectual property provisions of the TPP completely undermine the Obama 
Administration’s stated public health goals.”42 In addition, this would pave the 
way for drug industry giants to avoid the kind of public interest challenges 
at issue in the Indian court.43 Today, 26 million people worldwide are still 
without access to proper treatment, and the World Health Organization has 
recently pressed wealthy donor states for a major infusion of aid for medical 
treatment programs to meet their right to health.44 Yet, those same programs 
are sliding on a collision course with powerful pharmaceutical monopolies 
from patents. Under the global intellectual property protections, the world’s 
poorest patients, who line up to vaccinate their children from diseases that 
better-o" countries eradicated generations ago, are priced out of a medical 
market that thrives on the desire for wealth.
Restrictions Imposed: Access to Healthcare 
According to a 2005 study by the National Center for Biotechnology 
Information, nearly 20 percent of our approximately 23,000 human genes 
39  Rama Lakshmi, “India Rejects Novartis Drug Patent,” !e Washington Post, April 1, 2013.
40  “TPP Trade Deal Will Be Devastating for Access to A"ordable Medicines,” Doctors With-
out Borders, January 26, 2015. 
41  Ibid.
42  Ibid.
43  Michelle Chen, “Patents Against People: How Drug Companies Price Patients out of 
Survival,” Dissent Magazine, Fall 2013.  
44  Ibid. 
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have been patented.45 One particularly famous case involves Myriad Genetics 
patent ownership of two genes, BRCA1 and BRCA2, whose mutations can 
dramatically increase a woman’s chance of developing breast or ovarian can-
cer.46 Myriad was granted seven patents in 1997 over the sequenced BRCA1 
and BRCA2 genes, associated mutations and associated diagnostic tests to 
detect their presence. 47 #ese patents allowed Myriad to monopolize the 
diagnostic tests to look for such mutations as well as give the company a 
virtual lock on research and diagnostics of the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes. 
Since the patent system was designed to grant certain rights to inventors in 
order to reward and encourage human inventiveness, existing law during 
this patents enactment allowed this infringement upon people’s access to 
healthcare solely because this was being looked at as an economic issue 
versus an ethical issue.  
In order to clarify and simplify U.S. law, the Patent Act of 1952 was created. 
#is act states that in order to qualify for a patent, an inventor must show 
that their innovation is useful, novel and nonobvious and something that is 
a process, machine, manufacture or composition of matter.48 In 1980, the 
Supreme Court of the United States decision in Diamond v. Chakrabarty 
set an important precedent for areas of patentability by ruling that laws of 
nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas are not patentable however, 
“manifestations of nature” are.49  Following this ruling’s guidelines, the Patent 
and Trademark O!ce (PTO) was able to begin issuing patents on three dif-
ferent versions of DNA isolated from the body to meet this manifestation of 
nature requirement. #e $rst is “complementary DNA” or cDNA which is 
constructed of only the gene’s base pairs which produce some of the amino 
acids that assemble into the body’s proteins placed in the same order as they 
occur in the native gene omitting the other gene’s base pairs.50 #e other two 
45  Kyle Jensen and Fiona Murray, “Intellectual Property Landscape of the Human Genome,” 
Science 310(5746):239-240 (October 14, 2005).
46  Wendy H. Schacht and John R. #omas, “Gene Patents: A Brief Overview of Intellectual 
Property Issues,” (online report, U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, 
July 18, 2013).
47  Op. Cit., fn. 15
48  Op. Cit., fn. 46
49  Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 417 U.S. 303 (1980). 
50  Op. Cit., fn. 46
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patented versions of DNA comprised isolated fragments or the whole of the 
raw DNA in a gene. Myriad was granted patents meeting the “composition 
of nature” requirement due to its $ndings of the chemical structure of the 
BRCA genes as well as “method” claims covering processes for diagnosing 
breast cancer.51 Myriad’s patents encompass every conceivable use of the 
three types of DNA, including diagnostics, therapies, drug development and 
the identi$cation of other cancers involving either of the genes.52 However, 
these patents soon developed controversy over the ethical issue that Myriad’s 
monopolization on all aspects of research and diagnostic testing interfered 
with the progress of science and the delivery of healthcare services.  
In May 2009, the Association for Molecular Pathology (AMP) along with 
the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and nineteen other plainti"s 
$led a lawsuit against Myriad Genetics Corporation seeking to overturn the 
patents on DNA isolated from two human genes, BRCA 1 and BRCA 2.53 
#e plainti"’s lawyers approached the suit as though it were a civil rights case, 
reaching beyond the technicalities of patent law to emphasize the human 
rights issue that the patents created which enabled Myriad to infringe the 
rights of biomedical scientists, physicians and patients. #ey contended that 
BRCA DNA, and by implication all human DNA, should not be eligible 
for patents as a matter of law since patients had su"ered harm from Myriad 
enforcing its BRCA patent in clinics and laboratories stopping others from 
using the genes for cancer research.54 Myriad’s monopolization prevented 
patients from obtaining a second diagnostic opinion from an independent 
laboratory and enabled it to charge a list price of almost $4,000 for a BRCA 
gene evaluation test, a price that many women can’t a"ord.55 Women were 
forced to trust one laboratory performing a single test to secure a diagnostic 
and inform treatment. Additionally, limiting gene-sequence based test services 
51  Timothy B. Lee, “You Can’t Patent Human Genes. So Why Are Genetic Testing Compa-
nies Getting Sued?” !e Washington Post, July 12, 2013. 
52  Op. Cit., fn. 15
53  John R. #omas, “Mayo v. Prometheus: Implications for Patents, Biotechnology, and 
Personalized Medicine,” (online report, U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research 
Service, November 6, 2012).
54  Op. Cit., fn. 15
55  Andrew Pollack, “After Patent Ruling, Availability of Gene Tests Could Broaden,” !e 
New York Times, June 13, 2013. 
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to a single provider interferes with medical training, practice, research, the 
advancement of medical knowledge and enhancement of public’s health.56 
#is was not in the public interest since no other laboratory could assess 
the reliability of its tests, improve upon their speed or cost reducing the 
quality of genetic testing.57 #e e"ects of this patent law blocked people’s 
ability to utilize the health care service that was developed by Myriad in the 
$rst place, leaving it unavailable to many patients and unable to be further 
developed by outside research.
Once the result of these patent’s human rights violations against peo-
ple’s ability to receive health care were brought to the forefront, the court 
reconsidered its rational for allowing human genetics to be patented. #e 
Department of Justice backed the plainti"’s argument by $lling a friend-of-
the-court brief pointing out that DNA extracted from the body was no more 
patent-eligible than any of the natural elements in the periodic table that had 
to be separated chemically from the compounds in which they occur in the 
earth.58 #e case was brought to the Supreme Court who decided in June 
2013 that genomic DNA is ineligible for patenting under the “product of 
nature” doctrine holding that preexisting substances found in the wild may 
not be patented and that Myriad had “not created anything.”59 #e court 
took a more favorable view of cDNA observing that it is a distinct form 
of DNA from which it was derived and could therefore be patented. #is 
decision against the patenting of human genes ruled that $ve out of Myriad’s 
seven patents were not eligible. Additionally, more than 8,000 genes patents 
have the potential to be at risk due to this decision.60 #is ruling is expected 
to make it di!cult for inventors to protect early, gene-related discoveries 
through the patent system. In particular, how the courts will apply this 
decision to other biologic products. #is ruling is a win for patients now 
having greater access to genetic testing and bene$ting from scientists ability 
56  Michelle K. Lee, “Guidance for Determining Subject Matter Eligibility of Claims Re-
citing or Involving Laws of Nature, Natural Phenomena and Natural Products,” College of 
American Pathologists, June 22, 2014.
57  Op. Cit., fn. 51
58  Op. Cit., fn. 46
59  Ibid.  
60  Op. Cit., fn. 55
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to now engage in research on these genes without fear of being sued.61 #is 
was the $rst case to examine patent laws under a human rights scope and 
once the restrictions that these laws created were brought to court, the court 
unanimously decided against the ability to patent human genetic material. 
#e Myriad holding will have far-reaching and long-term implications for 
international patent law. #e United States being a global hegemon, espe-
cially in holding patent laws, means that its Supreme Court decision on the 
Myriad matter is likely to be a leader for other jurisdictions to follow similar 
standards. #is decision sets the United States apart from economic rivals 
when it comes to rules on patenting genes. For example, the European Patent 
O!ce (EPO) grants patents for inventions related to gene sequencing as long 
as applicants can demonstrate the industrial application of the sequence.62 
Australia, Canada and Japan have similar rules, allowing the patenting of 
human genes as long as they are isolated and the patent application explains 
how the genes are useful.63 #ese jurisdictional di"erences means that the 
U.S. Supreme court decision does not directly impact patents in these ju-
risdictions, however the ruling has already made other countries reconsider 
their patent standards. In 2014, a Canadian Children’s Hospital of Eastern 
Ontario $led a court challenge with the ultimate goal of invalidating patents 
on human genes, the $rst court challenge to the country’s Patent Act, which 
is hoping to follow the U.S. Supreme Court’s case rational for striking down 
these patents.64 #e global implications of the Myriad decision create a new 
revelation of viewing patent laws as having the potential to be viewed as a 
human rights issue which could greatly a"ect the way all patents are seen. 
So What? Research Implications 
#e implications of my research $ndings display that there is a crucial 
need to re-evaluate the e"ects that intellectual property rights impose. #e 
technology is available to provide developed and developing nations with 
access to medicines and treatments that could save millions of su"ering 
61  Emma Barraclough, “What Myriad Means for Biotech,” World Intellectual Property Orga-
nization, August 2013.
62  Ibid.
63  Ibid. 
64  Sheryl Ubelacker, “Human DNA Patents Challenged By Canadian Hospital,” !e Hu"-
ington Post, November 3, 2014.
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lives, yet it is unutilized to its full extent due to intellectual property laws 
giving corporations the right to maximize its pro$t. #e ability to invalidate 
patents, as well as their human rights restrictions, when examining the e"ects 
they impose on peoples access to treatment displays that this new method of 
evaluation could have a large in&uence on what is patentable internationally. 
#e development of a human rights framework for intellectual property can 
provide government o!cials, international jurists, and states an opportunity 
to in&uence the framework’s substantive content and the procedural rules 
that mediate relationships between these two components. 
#e International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(ICESCR) has been a major international human rights instrument ad-
dressing the issue that patent laws should allow everyone to both “enjoy the 
bene$ts of scienti$c progress and its applications” and “enjoy the bene$t 
from the protection of the moral and material interests resulting from any 
scienti$c, literary or artistic production.”65 #is research brings to light how 
patent laws are beginning to be looked at as human rights issues yet, still 
have a ways to go to ensure that access to health is achieved for everyone. 
#e trend of examining the importance of human rights has been on the rise 
since World War II. With increased knowledge from globalization on these 
issues coupled with this research’s implications of restrictions on health, these 
$ndings have the ability to reshape international law and increase access to 
the bene$ts of scienti$c innovations. 
65  International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, adopted 16 December 
1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force 3 January 1976), G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), 21 U.N. 
GAOR Supp. (No. 16), p. 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966).
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James Weber
#ough James began his college career as a Natural Resource major, his 
interest in international a"airs, economics, and the environment kept him 
engrossed in political science. In addition to political science, James kept 
his General Education courses centered around those that challenged him, 
such as business law, economics, and entrepreneurship. After graduating 
from Cal Poly, James attended graduate school at Notre Dame from 2008 
to 2010 to earn an MBA. Not wanting to stop at an MBA, James has now 
decided to add another degree and will accomplish this at the University of 
Cambridge’s International Relations program. 
Currently, James works as an advisor for $rms and governments through 
a small private Limited Liability Company (LLC) in the international de-
velopment sphere. In February, James’s latest project brought him to the 
Equatorial Guinea where he worked to analyze the economic landscape on 
the Bioko Island with the goal of recommending economic policy initia-
tives for the area. #e project was successful and gave James and his team 
the opportunity to advise the Minister of Agriculture of their economic 
diversi$cation strategy. In terms of accomplishments, James is proud of the 
research he has done. In 2012, James developed a strategy for the United 
Nations, which was presented at Davos and became a central part of current 
UN mainstream humanitarian strategy. #is strategy will in&uence the World 
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Humanitarian Summit in Istanbul in July 2016. For James, participating in 
a project that began before 2012 and is continuing to have an impact four 
years later illustrates that the hard work a person places in their research 
now will have a lasting impact. 
For students who have an interest in working in the realm of internation-
al development, James has a few pieces of advice. First, it is important to 
consider the career path. #is line of work has been very rewarding and has 
provided James with numerous opportunities to see the world. However, a 
career such as this does come with the internationality aspect. Jobs in in-
ternational development are found in either Washington, D.C. or abroad. 
Moreover, in order to embark on a career in international development, it 
is important to $nd a niche within the career that draws passion. Outside of 
school, do something of interest – start a club, study abroad, or participate 
in ASI. To all Cal Poly Students who are graduating and might be unsure of 
what direction to head in, take challenges as they come, learn how to speak 
publicly, seek out mentors, and push yourself to grow.
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THE AGE OF PUTIN: GLOBAL IMPLICATIONS OF RUSSIA’S 
DOMESTIC POLICY
Stephen Richardson
Vladimir Putin, a little known name when he was $rst appointed Prime Minister 
by his superior and later, predecessor, Boris Yeltsin in 1999 has embarked on an 
aggressive campaign to restore Russia to prominence.1 Many have noted that 
he seeks to rebuild Soviet Russia – a fair assessment given his youth the Soviet 
golden era, and with statements such as “[t]he collapse of the Soviet Union 
was a major geopolitical disaster of the century.”2 Some of his recent actions, 
such as restoring Soviet symbols including the iconic Soviet $ve-pointed star 
and hammer & sickle, are further signs of his a"ections.3 President Putin has 
created a “strongman” image for himself that inspires the trust, respect and pride 
1  “Vladimir Putin: #e Rebuilding of ‘Soviet’ Russia.” BBC News., March 27, 2014, http://
www.bbc.com/news/magazine-26769481.
2  Ibid. 
3  Ibid. 
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Russians have in themselves and in their country.4 Con$dence in leadership and 
pride in country at home is arguably what Putin is seeking5, but he certainly 
wishes to undermine the U.S.-led global order and reframe it so Russia is 
respected and treated as an equal to other great powers.6 Projecting power 
abroad solidi$es President Putin’s position at home, and creates a sense of 
patriotism and pride among the “remasculinized” Russian people.7 President 
Putin’s assertive actions and rhetoric in Foreign Policy are certainly calcu-
lated for his domestic audience8 with the end-goal of Russian prominence.9 
#us it becomes apparent that Russia’s Foreign Policy is an extension of her 
Domestic Policy.10
Many commentators – especially western, seem to see Putin as a mysterious 
$gure who is somewhat unpredictable.11 #is however is a foolish and lazy 
pro$ling, because Putin is very clear in what he wants, states it plainly and 
follows through with what he says.12 Much of the mystery around him will 
disappear if commentators pay notice to what he says and follow his actions.13 
Putin reveals a lot of insight into his thinking in a speech he gave before the 
State Duma (Russia’s Parliament) in August, 1999 while being appointed 
Prime Minister by Yeltsin. In that speech, he laid out the groundwork for 
his entire tenure in o!ce by saying, “[w]e need to put an end to revolutions, 
4  “Vladimir unbound: Russia’s President is impervious to the woes that a'ict nor-
mal leaders.” !e Economist, January 27, 2016, http://www.economist.com/news/eu-
rope/21689626-russias-president-impervious-woes-a'ict-normal-leaders-vladimir-unbound.
5  Valerie Sperling, “A Case of Putin Envy: Behind the Obsession with Russia’s Leader.” 
Foreign A"airs, 5  Nov, 2015, https://www.foreigna"airs.com/articles/russian-federa-
tion/2015-11-05/case-putin-envy.
6  Angela Stent, “Putin’s Power Play in Syria: How to Respond to Russia’s Intervention.” 
Foreign A"airs, January 1, 2016,  106-108. 
7  Op. Cit., fn. 5
8   Ibid. 
9  Op. Cit., fn. 1
10  Markian Dobczansky, “Russia’s Domestic and Foreign Policy Challenges.” Wilson Center, 
July 7, 2011, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/russias-domestic-and-foreign-poli-
cy-challenges.
11  Op. Cit., fn. 1
12  Op. Cit., fn. 6
13  Op. Cit., fn. 1
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these are staged so that nobody can be rich. But at the moment the country 
needs reforms so that nobody can be poor. Although this task, unfortunately, 
is becoming harder by the day. #ere is no such thing as a thriving state with 
an impoverished population… Russia’s Territorial integrity is not subject to 
negotiation. Or, especially to horse trading or blackmail. We will take tough 
action against anyone who infringes upon our territorial integrity, using all 
the legal means available to us. Russia has been a great power for centuries, 
and remains so. It has always had and still has legitimate zones of interest 
abroad in both the former Soviet lands and elsewhere. We should not drop our 
guard in this respect, neither should we allow our opinion to be ignored.”14
#is makes it clear that he was aiming to launch a two-prong campaign 
to rebuild and reestablish Russia as a global power and one to be reckoned 
with. #is campaign has had two clear fronts (prongs): the $rst of which, is 
a domestic policy to restore stability to the country to end “revolutions” that 
had previously diminished Russia’s capabilities while the second, is his foreign 
policy where he seeks to regain Russia’s place as a dominate world power 
that has a seat the highest levels in the international order and commands 
respect.15 On both of these fronts, Putin has proven to be rather successful, 
and in doing so has become immensely popular with his own people.16  He 
has been so successful at this that he is even admired by some abroad – par-
ticularly among Americans who are critical of President Obama.17
For three years in a row – 2013-2015, Vladimir Putin was ranked by Forbes 
as the most powerful man in the world, a statement that is as understandable 
as it is controversial.18 #is may come as a surprise given the dire economic 
situation Russia is in – largely at the hands of Putin, as well the widespread 
reporting of corruption and incompetence of the country’s political sys-
tem, shrinking and stagnating work force due to the falling oil prices, and 
14  Ibid. 
15  Ibid. 
16  Op. Cit., fn. 5
17  Ibid.
18  David M. Ewalt, “#e World’s Most Powerful People.” Forbes, November 4, 2015, 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/davidewalt/2015/11/04/the-worlds-most-powerful-people-
2015/#47dde7221868.
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crumbling infrastructure, namely in the periphery.19 On the &ipside how-
ever, it may seem like common sense given his successful consolidation of 
power, impeccable military record, soaring popularity, and a foreign policy 
that has inspired admiration at home and awe abroad.20 Immediately upon 
taking power, Putin sought to reverse Yeltsin’s policy of autonomy towards 
the regional governments in favor of a strong centralized state.21 Putin has 
relentlessly pursued these goals, e"ectively gaining this power consolida-
tion that he has strived for.22 #is accomplishment is impressive given the 
opposition he receives, much of which is predictably from the periphery 
(regional governments) whom feel they are either being neglected, having 
their toes stepped on, or both.23 Russia’s corruption level is unusually high for 
a developed, wealthy country and ranks similarly to notoriously corrupt states 
such as Mali and Madagascar, coming in at 127th in 2013 on the Corruption 
Perception Index.24 #is and the economic di!culties faced by Russia due to 
economic sanctions that were brought on by Putin’s aggressive foreign policy 
may make it seem odd to rank him the most powerful man in the world, when 
he is seemingly undoing his country that is already crumbling.25 Nevertheless, 
this may be masked by Putin’s impressive popularity that has been consistently 
&oating between 60-90% for his entire 15-year career26 - considerably higher 
than that of many western leaders, especially American Presidents.27  Even 
19  “Putin’s War on the West.” !e Economist, February 14, 2015, http://www.economist.
com/news/leaders/21643189-ukraine-su"ers-it-time-recognise-gravity-russian-threatand-
counter.
20  Bingham G. Powell, Russell J. Dalton, and Kaaren Strom. Comparative Politics Today: A 
World View. Boston, MA: Longman, 2012, 348. 
21  Ibid. 
22  Ibid. 
23  Ibid. 
24   Op. Cit., fn. 1
25  Evgenia Pismennaya and Anna Andrianova, “Russia’s Economy Is Tanking, So Why Is 
Putin Smiling?” Bloomberg News, February 29, 2016, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/arti-
cles/2016-03-01/as-russia-s-economy-contracts-putin-s-preferred-indicator-is-up.
26  Op. Cit., fn. 4
27  George Gao and Samantha Smith, “Presidential job approval ratings from Ike to Obama.” 
Pew Research Center. January 12, 2016, http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/01/12/
presidential-job-approval-ratings-from-ike-to-obama/.
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more important is how Putin has consolidated power in this dysfunctional 
system, and how much in&uence he exerts today, which as will be shown, 
knows few limits. 
Immediately upon taking o!ce, Putin sought to launch his assertive cam-
paign to rebuild Russia to its former glory, seizing every opportunity a"orded 
him and never backing down from a challenge that served his interests. If 
Sulla, Rome’s $rst unlawful Dictator had the cunning of a fox and courage of 
a lion, then Putin has the cunning of a fox and formidability of a bear.  He 
proved this immediately by launching the Second Chechen War in the same 
month he took o!ce, in response to the separatist movement and humiliating 
defeat (stalemate) those ill-equip and poorly trained Chechen insurgents had 
in&icted on the once proud Russia, several years prior under the leadership 
of Yeltsin.28 In less than a year Chechnya was subjugated, restoring Russian 
pride, and Putin set a red line forever forbidding compromise over the small 
republics place in the Russian Federation.29 #is made Putin a household 
name in Russia, whereas when he took o!ce very few members of the State 
Duma had even heard of him, with some even pronouncing his name wrong.30 
#e next focus of his campaign, now that he attained gravitas, was crushing 
the Oligarchs, which he saw as parasitic towards Russia’s economy and social 
vibrancy. A week before being elected President, Putin warned the Oligarchs 
that their reign was coming to an end – a threat he followed through with 
- and is one of his lasting legacies.31 Putin, in spirit of the gangsterism that 
had gripped Russia during the 1990’s, gave the Oligarchs an o"er they 
couldn’t refuse – surrender power and a portion of your wealth in exchange 
for security and prosperity, or lose everything - most of whom refused.32 #us 
the wrath of Putin was inspired, and the $rst targets he had in mind, were 
the media moguls, starting with Vladimir Gusinsky, owner of NTV the only 
independent national television station and the richest, most powerful man in 
28  Op. Cit., fn. 1
29  Ibid. 
30  Ibid. 
31  “Putin versus the Oligarchs?” !e Economist, June 17, 2000, http://www.economist.com/
node/82208.
32  Masha Gessen, “#e Myth of the Russian Oligarchs.” !e New York Times, December 11, 
2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/11/opinion/masha-gessen-the-myth-of-the-rus-
sian-oligarchs.html.
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Russian media.33 He was forced into exile, and later arrested in Spain under 
charges of Fraud.34 #en Putin proceeded to eviscerate his media empire, or 
rather reorganized to $t the needs of the State.35 After this, non-state media 
at the federal level was e"ectively eradicated, and continuing to this day, all 
federal media outlets in Russia are either state owned or sponsored.36 #e 
next major sacking, was that of Mikhail Khodorkovsky, the head of the oil 
group Yukos and one of the world’s richest men.37 #rown in jail under 
charges of tax evasion in 2004, his empire was seized by the state or more 
appropriately by Putin in a move that was seen by many as a war declared 
on the so called Oligarchs.38 #is view was not unrealistic, as Putin would 
in fact seek to continue eradicating the Oligarchs, until they were essentially 
either of no concern to him, or $rmly in his pocket.39 
Putin’s calculations have proven to be impeccable, he knew that in order 
to achieve his objectives he must $rst uproot corruption and consolidate 
sources of power.40 #e sources of power he needed were in the grip of the 
Oligarchs, who would make his agenda di!cult if it didn’t suit their in-
terests.41 Presumably then, this is the real reason that Putin declared “war” 
on them, a “war” which he has clearly won.42 #is is signi$cant, given that 
conventional wisdom in the West that Putin may be shooting himself in 
the foot by continuing aggressive foreign policies that get Russia slapped 
with more western-formed sanctions, because a slumping economy would 
surely provoke the Oligarchs.43 #e problem with this analysis however, is 
that the “Oligarchs” being spoken of in popular consciousness have been 
33  Ibid. 
34  Ibid. 
35  Ibid. 
36  Ibid. 
37  Marshall Goldman, “Putin and the Oligarchs.” Foreign A"airs, November 1, 2004, 
https://www.foreigna"airs.com/articles/russia-fsu/2004-11-01/putin-and-oligarchs.
38  Ibid. 
39  Op. Cit., fn. 32
40  Ibid. 
41  Ibid. 
42  Ibid. 
43  Ibid. 
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all but snu"ed out by Putin already.44 It’s been years since Putin has ended 
the Oligarchy, and since 2004 he has consolidated power to a remarkable 
degree.45 Political Scientist Karen Dawisha calls the product of this con-
solidation “Kleptocratic Authoritarianism,” an all-encompassing system of 
interlocking dependencies between various Russian elites and the Russian 
State.46 In this system there are three conditions for the new elite; $rst - they 
must pay to get into political o!ce, second – they can use their o!ce to 
accumulate greater wealth (as long as they stay in the good graces of Putin) 
and third – they may not use their o!ces to acquire greater political power.47 
#us the highest and most important positions in Russian society are little 
more than puppets to Putin, who essentially can exercise no independent 
political power outside the parameters he sets. In 2011, Mikhail Prokhorov, 
a billionaire tried to test the boundary of these new conditions by reshaping 
a pro-Kremlin political party and was immediately smacked down by Putin. 
When Prokhorov was threatened with having all his assets seized, he fell back 
in line and still remains loyal through this new economic hardship.48 In setting 
up this system, Putin has created a relationship where the new elite vies for 
power amongst each other, by kicking each other out or swallowing up smaller 
members, instead of pursing independent political agendas.49 #is creates a safe 
guard for Putin himself, where he no longer has to worry about the elites trying 
to undo his power, as they don’t have the means to challenge him without being 
eradicated and are too busy squabbling over each other.50 #us Putin is the only 
one in this equation who is secure, and has created for himself a self-serving 
system that enables him to watch over his newly consolidated power, and keep 
his thumb on those who try to break out of it. 
However, Putin’s consolidation of power is not completely secure and is gar-
nering resistance from di"erent fronts– social and political resistance and an 
44  Ibid. 
45  Bingham G. Powell, Russell J. Dalton, and Kaaren Strom. Comparative Politics Today: A 
World View. Boston, MA: Longman, 2012, 348-349. 
46   Op. Cit., fn. 32
47  Ibid. 
48  Ibid. 
49  Ibid. 
50  Ibid. 
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overall lack of social cohesion.51 #e most famous examples of the resistance Putin 
faces are from the pro-LBGT community, spearheaded by the all-female punk band, 
“Pussy Riot.”52 #ese critics assert that Putin is setting up witch-hunts of gays to 
distract the population and turn them against themselves.53 #is criticism is not 
unfounded - historically this type of scapegoating has been used in such a manner, 
as a mask to cover failing polices.54 Even more troubling to these proponents is 
the inhumane treatment jailed activists and innocent gays have been receiving.55 
In response to this, Pussy Riot has set up a new organization to investigate and 
bring these troubles to light.56 Such investigations and corresponding activism have 
raised much awareness to the issue and has put immense pressure on Putin from 
outside sources, namely international humanitarian organizations. Before this, 
as late as 2013 most outsiders were more or less silent on the issue, or simply 
unaware.57 #is has undoubtedly acted as a speed bump for Putin who wants 
a smooth sailing path to reform, and only further ads to the lack of trust in 
the government as a whole among the Russian population.58 
Putin’s arrangement with the new elites has sparked dismay from non-con-
nected professionals and businessmen, as well as much of the domestic working 
class that is not in the immediate sphere of Moscow.59 Many have had enough 
of it, and are &eeing the country in great numbers.60 In some segments of the 
private sector, as much as 50% of professionals are either leaving or seek-
ing to leave Russia in hopes of $nding a better life, along with their fellow 
51  Kenneth Rapoza, “Russia’s three biggest Problems.” Forbes, January 24, 2013, http://www.
forbes.com/sites/kenrapoza/2013/01/24/russias-three-biggest-problems/#3454e9ea6e55.
52  Nikita Sologub, “Under Suspicion: Death in a Siberian Cell.” !e Guardian, March 9, 2015, 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/mar/09/russia-siberian-cell-death-pussy-riot.
53  Harvey Fierstein, “Russia’s Anti-Gay Crackdown.” !e New York Times, July 21, 2013, http://
www.nytimes.com/2013/07/22/opinion/russias-anti-gay-crackdown.html.
54  Ibid. 
55  Op. Cit., fn. 52
56  Ibid. 
57  Op. Cit., fn. 53
58  Op. Cit., fn. 51
59  Ibid.
60  Ibid. 
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disenfranchised homosexual citizens.61 #is leads to a “brain drain” that 
not only drives away talent, but also inhibits the country’s ability to attract 
foreign talent.62 Putin faces other problems with the workforce among those 
who choose to stay – he cannot a"ord to pay all his public employees and 
they are starting to protest his policies openly- placing direct blame on 
Moscow, if not Putin himself.63 #ese are problems that Putin is struggling 
with, and whether or not he has calculated for this particular development 
is unknown, but it certainly seems that he has no real plan to deal with it.64 
Similar to these issues, Putin displays a lack of action in another weak area 
of Russian Society – corruption and incompetent political institutions on 
the periphery. 
One of the most visible issues that is a"ecting the prosperity of Russia, 
is the rampant corruption that is extreme by the standards of developed 
countries, and a major hindrance towards stability and growth.65 Russia 
today is in a dire economic situation for the third time since the collapse 
of the Soviet Union – yet Putin is able to con$dently address his people 
and say not to worry about the tough times ahead, out of a sense of patri-
otism – while scapegoating the West.66 Few leaders have the gal or ability 
to take this position or carry it out67– but Putin remains steadfast, living up 
to his reputation of a “strongman President.”68 Putin conveniently blames 
western sanctions placed on Russia, in retaliation to his forceful annexation 
of Crimea, but this is really a symptom of a larger problem; Russia’s status 
as a “rentier state” who’s economy is almost entirely dependent on its oil 
exports.69 Putin has understood this for a very long time and it is an issue he 
61  Ibid. 
62  Ibid. 
63  Shellie Karabell, “Putin’s Problem: Corruption, Not Just Sanctions.” Forbes, December 
22, 2014, http://www.forbes.com/sites/shelliekarabell/2014/12/22/putins-problems-corrup-
tion-not-just-sanctions/#1051e426f9cd.
64  Ibid. 
65  Op. Cit., fn. 1
66  Op. Cit., fn. 63
67  Ibid. 
68  Op. Cit., fn. 5
69  Op. Cit., fn. 63
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has attempted to address for many years, however this sti&ing corruption is 
an underlying hick-up and road block he continues to run into.70
#e problem rests with an immensely large and complicated, if not con-
tradictory set of business laws and regulations that enables courts, prosecu-
tors and tax o!cials to pick and choose which regulations they uphold.71 
#is allows them great amounts of freedom in helping or hurting business 
– whichever is to their advantage.72 Natalya Volchkova of Moscow’s New 
Economic School states that, “Regulation is about punishing business, not 
helping business to behave properly,” and continues to insist that it is very 
easy for government o!cials to imprison business owners for the smallest 
infractions.73 She states that the tax inspector today is as feared as the KGB 
once was – they come regularly to inspect businesses and can easily spot 
“wrong doings” then slap the owner with a $ne - which can be appealed in 
court, but in the meantime if that option is chosen, their accounts may be 
seized.74 #is kind of regulatory practice is essentially a new kind of extortion 
reminiscent of the Russian Ma$a’s free reign in the 1990’s.75 Putin has tried 
to address this issue (to what extent is unknown) but he faces resistance 
from tax o!cials across the board, and they promise to resist even more 
$rmly if he persists, because they see reform as a threat to their livelihood.76 
It would appear that this is one of the few areas where Putin’s consolidated 
powers have been checked. Why exactly that is remains unclear, but one 
can deduce that Putin simply cannot a"ord to alienate these allies, as he 
already goes through great pains to ensure the loyalty of many other state 
o!cials that make such consolidations of power possible in the $rst place.77 
#e fact that Putin seemingly cannot address this issue is a challenge to his 
“strong man presidency” so he is therefore forced to cover it up.78 He does 
70  Ibid. 
71  Ibid. 
72  Ibid. 
73  Ibid. 
74  Ibid. 
75  Ibid. 
76  Ibid. 
77  Ibid. 
78  Op. Cit., fn. 78
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this by ensuring these issues are not brought to light in the media and by 
using the West as a scapegoat, in order to mask his own inability to address 
the issue.79 To this end, Putin’s initiatives are a &ying success, part of his 
genius, and partially why he has proven to be so successful in accomplishing 
his broader agendas. 
To further add to the complication, Putin has sought to divert attention 
from domestic a"airs altogether through his actions in Ukraine80, thus his 
foreign policy becomes an extension of his domestic policy.81 He attempts 
to snu" out dissidence at home by stoking patriotism from actions abroad, 
and by successfully framing such actions as defensive against western in-
roads.82 With this understood, it’s easier to understand his persistent actions 
in the Ukraine despite the hardships the entire country faces because of his 
seemingly sel$sh actions. #e annexation of Crimea and barring Ukraine 
from entering the EU can partially be understood at the systemic level of 
analysis, as a matter of power given that Russia’s “sphere of in&uence” has 
been gradually shrinking as the EU has been growing eastward since the end 
of the Cold War.83 #is is problematic to Russian power because it limits 
the number of states who are in her sphere of in&uence.84 Further, it poses 
a challenge to Russia’s preferred diplomatic and economic relations with 
Eastern European countries, especially Ukraine given its deep historic ties, 
strategic trade value and access to warm water in the Black Sea.85 At the State 
level, EU expansion can be seen as an encroachment on intangible power, 
as Ukraine is the homeland of the Russian people, giving it symbolic and 
79  Ibid. 
80  Op. Cit., fn. 19
81  Op. Cit., fn. 10
82  Op. Cit., fn. 5.
83  Roland Oliphant, “Vladimir Putin blames Nato expansion for rising tension with Eu-
rope.” !e Telegraph, January 11, 2016, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/vlad-
imir-putin/12093042/Vladimir-Putin-blames-Nato-expansion-for-rising-tension-with-Eu-
rope.html.
84 Ibid. 
85  “Putin the Uniter: #e war has made most Ukrainians see Russians as enemies, 
not Friends.” !e Economist, June 20, 2015, http://www.economist.com/news/eu-
rope/21654663-war-has-made-most-ukrainians-see-russians-enemies-not-friends-putin-
uniter.
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social importance to Russians.86 #is is signi$cant given that the majority of 
those in eastern parts of Ukraine, who are ethnic Russians, support Putin and 
want closer ties with Russia, while the Russians themselves overwhelmingly 
support the actions of Putin and his image.87 Such actions, completely in 
de$ance of the West, have increased Russian power in the eyes of Russians 
themselves, and created a sense of “Russian Machoism” that centers on Putin 
himself.88 #e Russian Bear has convinced his countrymen at home that his 
actions abroad are for the preservation, power and security of the Russian 
Federation itself, quieting concerns over the troubled economy and sti&ing 
corruption.89 Putin has ingeniously gone about this campaign in a way that 
bene$ts both the state and himself, largely by stoking a stronger sense of 
patriotism – echoing the iconic phrase, “For the Motherland!” 
In Syria we again see both systemic and individual level actions, where 
both the Russian Government and Putin himself bene$ts. #anks to Putin, 
Russia bene$ts by embarrassing the United States, undermining her author-
ity in the Middle East, and taking a larger seat at the negotiating table.90 
#us Russia now has a larger say in International A"airs, where it seems 
few issues concerning Europe and the Middle East can be addressed without 
her input.91 Putin bene$ts in that it is he himself who e"ectively wields this 
in&uence – where he continually stumps Washington, increases gravitas in 
the International Community, and improves his image at home.92 It is clear 
that the conduct of this crisis is dictated by, and done on behalf of Putin.93 
It is his goals that are being sought, his power consolidation at home which 
makes it possible, and his diplomacy that routinely outfoxes the West.
In adopting this course of action, Putin has engineered a unique unitary 
autocracy that is centered on one person, rather than a series of institutions 
86  Ibid. 
87  Op. Cit., fn. 1
88  Op. Cit., fn. 5
89  Ibid. 
90  Op. Cit., fn. 6
91  Ibid. 
92  Ibid. 
93  Op. Cit., fn. 19
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as in Iran, or a political party such as in China.94 His hybrid Presidential-
Parliamentary Government has become unrecognizable and incomparable 
to its model, the French Government.95 While he has enjoyed the power of 
vast consolidation, and a State Duma that essentially does as he orders, he 
faces an insurmountable problem of corruption and failing institutions that 
he cannot personally supervise on the periphery.96 #e leaders of these insti-
tutions don’t have the free range of movement in order to increase e!ciency, 
and even if they did – corruption and bribery seems to hinder those e"orts.97 
His inability to diversify the economy is starting to sting badly, although his 
puppets and he seem to be detached from these economic hardships due to 
their plundering of the economy and amassing wealth for themselves, much 
of which is stored in foreign bank accounts.98 
While the policies, actions and successes of the mighty Russian bear are 
impressive, they are not absolute and not without consequence. For all its 
promises, Putin’s reforms have created some major kinks that need address-
ing. While his foreign policy has created an immensely popular image of 
himself domestically, globally his image is shaky at best. #e same can be 
said of the Russian Federation which is indeed, respected, feared and pow-
erful, but seemingly heading towards a weaker position. Despite his shaky 
image, Putin is arguably the most powerful man in the world – certainly the 
most dangerous, therefore he ought to be feared, not respected. His policies 
at home and actions abroad have far reaching consequences that a"ect the 
globe and the entire American-led international order. His interests domi-
nate conversations on International A"airs, and have implications for us all, 
which is precisely what he wants and why we are living in the Age of Putin.
94  Bingham G. Powell, Russell J. Dalton, and Kaaren Strom. Comparative Politics Today: A 
World View. Boston, MA: Longman, 2012, 347-349. 
95  Ibid. 
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From his $rst class at Cal Poly to graduation, Kayvan was always commit-
ted to the Political Science discipline. #ough Kayvan did consider double 
majoring in either Economics or Business, ultimately the passion for politics 
and international relations (IR), coupled with a desire to put his coursework 
into action, outweighed the decision to have an additional major. Kayvan 
took up various opportunities o"ered by the College of Liberal Arts and 
the University to make the classroom come alive. He was involved in both 
Model United Nations (UN) and Mock Trial, and was an active member 
of the Persian Students of Cal Poly, where he and a small group of students 
raised the necessary funds to bring Nobel Peace Prize laureate and Iranian 
human rights advocate, Shirin Ebadi to speak at Cal Poly in 2007. In addi-
tion to that, Kayvan also was elected to the Board of Directors for ASI as a 
representative for the College of Liberal Arts. 
After graduating from Cal Poly in 2009, Kayvan relocated to Washington, 
D.C. to pursue his passion for politics. Kayvan began his career, $rst as a 
translator, and then as a researcher for a variety of organizations includ-
ing advocacy groups and think tanks in Washington, D.C. It was in the 
realm of think tanks that Kayvan felt his calling. Kayvan started with the 
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Washington Institute for Near East Policy in 2009 and had a variety of 
positions that were both on the research side and on the non-pro$t man-
agement side. Before his time at that think tank ended, Kayvan was pro-
moted to a Development Operations O!cer. Kayvan spent $ve years at 
the Institute, and during that time, went to graduate school at the George 
Washington University Elliot School of International A"airs for a Master 
of Arts in Middle East Studies with a certi$cate in Political Management. 
One of Kayvan’s proudest accomplishments at the Washington Institute 
included organizing conferences to discuss various policy issues important 
to Middle East peace and security. #e programs initially were expensive 
and aimless in terms of objectives, but over time and through dedicated 
management, these programs became lucrative for fundraising purposes and 
the conversations became more dynamic and fruitful for policy attendees.
Last year, Kayvan moved to another peer institution, the Atlantic Council, 
which was re-launching its membership program. Kayvan was enticed 
to take the opportunity because he wanted to take what he had learned 
from his previous positions and apply it to an entirely new program be-
ing built from the ground up. Working at the Atlantic Council provides 
Kayvan a signi$cant amount of creative space to develop and grow his 
own program. Kayvan’s current emphasis is to build a community of like-
minded individuals who are committed to the work and mission of the 
Atlantic Council, while also raising critical $nancial resources to support 
the Council. #e tagline for the Members Program that Kayvan manages 
is a “Global Network with a Global Purpose,” and Kayvan continues to 
put a premium on making sure that this is truly a ‘global’ community 
he is helping to build. In addition to the Atlantic Council, Kayvan has 
also developed a passion for helping non-pro$ts become successful in 
their e"orts, and has been of assistance to organizations like the Nowruz 
Commission and the Turkish Policy Center. 
For Political Science students who aspire to work in the non-pro$t 
space, Kayvan’s most important recommendation is understanding the 
mission statement as well as the organization’s objectives. Moreover, aspir-
ing students interested in this space should understand that non-pro$ts, 
like their peers in the for-pro$t space, provide opportunities for a whole 
host of skill sets. Understanding that aspect is important and should make 
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the applicant be creative in how they present themselves to prospective em-
ployers. An additional recommendation by Kayvan is that students should 
not put too much of an emphasis on their research skills. Strong research 
skills are important, but ultimately employers are looking for other skills 
from job candidates. Finally, Kayvan stresses the importance of pursuing 
internships as they provide clarity and are an inexpensive tool to discovering 
a potential career path. Moreover, internships themselves become a vehicle 
for networking, which is crucial in today’s job market and should not be 
taken for granted. 
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NEW AND CHANGING IMPLICATIONS OF EXPLORING THE FINAL 
FRONTIER: WHAT DOES U.S. DOMINANCE SIGNIFY FOR GLOBAL 
POLITICS? 
Emily J. Gaunt
Abstract
#e rapid boom in technological advances during the 20th century trans-
formed the dream of further space exploration from a dream to stark reality. 
#e hostile relations of the Cold War that spurred the so-called “space race” 
gave way to international cooperation in space investigation. However, 
the cooperative tone experienced over the past few decades is not entirely 
indicative of the global political landscape. International space relations 
are still developing, as is the international space law. Without any formal 
authority over the regulation of space ventures, the possibility of dissension 
remains. #is paper explores the potential for international con&ict over the 
resources, control, and even military presence in outer space. #e United 
States’ dominance as the acting authority over outer space enterprises will 
result in a great impact global politics in both the near and distant future.
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Real World Observation
On April 17, 2015, the 31st annual Space Symposium was held in Colorado 
Springs, Colorado, at which, the secretary of the Air Force, Deborah Lee 
James, spoke about the importance of space utilization as well as maintaining 
U.S. dominance in the area of space technology.1 According to the O!cial 
Air Force Space Command website, the Secretary stated outright on the issue 
of competition in space that “the United States of America working shoulder 
to shoulder with our allies and partners, will not be bested.”2 Secretary James 
discussed the top three issues that impact the future of the space domain. 
One of the Secretary’s main priorities involves spreading awareness about 
the importance of space in everyday functioning, including satellite commu-
nications and international banking. #e second point concerns the rapidly 
changing space environment. Outer space faces new threats such as excessive 
amounts of space debris, as well as the potential for hostile actions from 
competing nations through the use of anti-satellite technology, namely from 
China. Lastly, the secretary spoke about the importance of being prepared for 
the day that space is no longer a peaceful resource.3 #e Secretary’s message 
was clear, the United States will not relinquish any power from the domain 
of space. U.S. o!cials are adamant that military strategies must be adjusted 
to the demands of the political atmosphere of space. 
Since the time of the initial Space Race during the Cold War, competing 
nations have had to interact in an under-regulated space, but U.S. dom-
inance has always been present. Although there are several international 
treaties declaring the rights and responsibilities of countries, namely the 
requirement of the peaceful use of outer space, much activity is under the 
honor system of conduct.4 #e lack of international regulation in outer 
space, combined with increased interest in space development, will likely 
have far-reaching implications here on earth. Many of the new areas of 
space remain unresolved areas of disagreement, including the advancement 
of pro$table enterprises in outer space. Examples of the commercialization 
1  Tech. Sgt. Mike Slater, “Secretary of the Air Force James delivers message of con$dence,” 
Air Force Space Command Public A"airs (April 17, 2015). 
2  Ibid.
3  Ibid. 
4  Benjamin Soloway, “Lawyers In Space,” Foreign Policy (April 15, 2015).
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of space involve tourism and asteroid mining. Soon, companies will o"er 
commercial &ights into space, provided that passengers are willing to pay a 
hefty fee.5 #e possibility for con&ict over space enterprises could become a 
reality faster that anyone can imagine. #e United States is one step closer 
to preparing for a war in space, as illustrated by the insistence on defensive 
space technologies. #e United States government simultaneously asserts 
dominance and claims space is a global utility. What many once thought 
was science $ction is now becoming a scienti$c reality. 
Space has become the newest market of expansion and governments, as 
well as private companies, are changing the way the world looks at what 
was once declared a peaceful resource of shared human culture.6 Today, as 
countries continue to expand the knowledge of space and the bene$ts that 
earth can earn from expanding to the stars, nations are now required to in-
teract in new ways that re&ect modern interests. #e scenarios that the U.S. 
presents are mostly hypothetical right now, aside from Chinese attempts at 
anti-satellite technology, but the possibility that con&ict could occur over 
resources or access to satellites is a growing concern. #e lack of international 
regulation in outer space could make this new era of space exploration a 
volatile one. #is research argues that the U.S. will continue to maintain a 
unipolar space and seeks to explore the impact this dominance will have on 
global politics in the 21st century.
Conventional Wisdom
It is the conventional wisdom that space is a peaceful resource for mankind 
to share as opposed to a potential con&ict area. Generally, Americans are 
optimistic about the use and exploration of space. While the age of initial 
exploration into outer space was deemed a race during the Cold War, it 
was almost always considered to be a peaceful endeavor that could one-day 
bene$t mankind. A Gallup poll from 2004 on the issue of public support for 
the space program re&ects the conventional wisdom of space as a peaceful 
resource. In 2004, 67% of Americans had at least some interest in the space 
5  Alan Boyle, “After Accident, Virgin Galactic Takes a Cautious Path to Space&ight,” NBC 
News (March 31, 2015). 
6  Soloway, “Lawyers In Space.” 
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program and space exploration.7 #e poll con$rmed that most Americans 
believe that space should be a peaceful enterprise. When asked why they 
think governments explore space, most Americans believe it is for knowledge, 
global reputation as a leader in space, or that it bene$ts earth in some way. A 
mere 12% responded that the reason is “keeping the nation safe,” by using 
space as some sort of defensive tactic.8 In a poll by the Pew Research Center 
in 2014, it was reported that the majority of Americans supported space 
travel and international cooperation of a space program. #e support for 
technological advancement is overwhelming, with most Americans saying 
that these developments “will have a net positive impact on society” while 
59% believe that innovations will improve the quality of life in the future.9 
#e conventional wisdom on the exploration of space and the advancement 
of technology is overwhelmingly positive and most of the public thinks 
of space as a bene$cial resource for the world to share, not as a source of 
con&ict in global politics. 
#e conventional wisdom concerning the advancement of space explora-
tion and its implications on international relations is incomplete. Currently, 
the international community continues to cooperate in outer space. #e 
expansion of space enterprises, however, presents opportunities for both 
growth and con&ict. Ownership of mining resources, commercial space 
&ight, and control over satellites are all areas of potential con&ict. #ese new 
areas of con&ict in outer space are missing from the conventional wisdom. 
It is the impact of these con&ict areas, including satellites, resources, and 
the development of weapons, on global politics that this research explores.
"eoretical Paradigm
To investigate these con&ict areas, this paper uses the theory of realism. 
Realism helps to explain and frame this research due to the theory’s as-
sumptions about the relative power of states being the primary cause of 
change in international politics. As realists assume that human nature is 
con&ictual, the process by which space will become the new war zone can 
7  Darren Carlson, “Space: To In$nity and Beyond on a Budget,” Gallup (August 17, 2004).
8  Ibid.
9  Aaron Smith, “U.S. Views of Technology and the Future,” Pew Research Center (April 17, 
2014).
55
Emily Gaunt
be explained using principles of realism. As anarchy is the guiding force in 
global politics, international legal relations re&ect the self-interest of states. 
#ese same principles can be applied to the utilization and expansion of 
space technologies. #ough the United States is claiming that its system of 
satellites is a global utility, the government is ensuring that the control and 
bene$ts remain the right of the U.S. 
#e United States’ insistence on remaining the only real power in outer 
space is re&ective of the realist notions of state-centered interests. #e U.S. 
is acting in such a way that re&ects realist principles of international rela-
tions. By de$nition, realist countries cannot trust another nation. By stating 
that U.S. dominance will not be relinquished and demonstrating that the 
government has the ability to defend itself if need be, the United States is 
illustrating realism in action. #e U.S. also understands that in asserting 
their dominance in space, a zero-sum game is being played, in which there 
will likely be multiple losers. Realist principles of self-interest set the stage 
for the U.S. to demand ownership of any resource found in space, which 
includes unique mining opportunities of rare materials from asteroids. 
#e conventional wisdom is better aligned with liberalism, and proponents 
would argue that the International Space Station (ISS) is evidence that the 
international community is capable of cooperation in space. However, most 
states have been shown to follow the realist pattern of behavior in internation-
al relations more so than expected liberal patterns. #e driving force behind 
the initial exploration into space was con&ict. Now that space technology 
has become essential to daily operations on earth, states will begin to wrestle 
with others over the possibility of gaining power at the level of outer space. 
Nations have already begun looking for chinks in the armor of the United 
States’ technology in space. Recent testing of anti-satellite missiles indicates 
that the world may soon experience a higher form of warfare only seen before 
in $ctional accounts of the future.
U.S. Dominance Over Control of Satellites
According to a 60 Minutes piece from April 26, 2015, the United States 
military is preparing for a potential all-out war in space.10 Much of the world 
relies on satellites for communication and Internet access, but the United 
10  David Martin, host, Andy Court, producer, “#e Battle Above,” 60 Minutes, CBS News 
(April 26, 2015).
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States in particular depends on satellites for national defense and military 
missions. #e 60 Minutes script states that there is a new concern that vi-
tal “satellites are vulnerable to attack” from anti-satellite missiles, namely 
from China and Russia.11 #e report from 60 Minutes claims that China 
has launched several anti-satellite missiles, creating U.S. concern. In 2007, 
a Chinese missile hit a Chinese satellite and created enormous amounts of 
space debris, which added about 3,000 pieces to the growing collection.12 
According to NASA, there are over 500,000 pieces of space debris that are 
currently being tracked.13 Both man-made objects and naturally occurring 
objects, such as meteors, are considered debris. A single piece of rubble, 
traveling at over 17,000 mph, has the potential to do signi$cant damage if it 
collides with satellites or spacecraft.14 In 2013, another Chinese anti-satellite 
missile reached an unprecedented height for such technology. Both China 
and Russia have been testing anti-satellite capabilities for decades. It is the 
occurrences of these tests that are motivating the U.S. military to reassert 
their dominance for the world to see in order to maintain a unipolar space.15 
General Hyten, a military o!cial interviewed by 60 Minutes, is clear that 
his mission allows for the use of force in the “defense” of space. #e U.S. 
military can and will use military force to continue its reign in space.
The largely unknown branch of the U.S. Air Force known as Space 
Command is in charge of monitoring threats and preparing to respond to 
the potential for a war in space. According to General John Hyten of Space 
Command, the United States military relies heavily upon space technology, 
particularly satellites, to operate. #e U.S. military has over 500 satellites 
and spends more than $25 billion on space annually and will only continue 
to expand its capabilities. #e actual costs of the program, however, continue 
to be di!cult to pin down.16 A report from the Government Accountability 
O!ce on government funding found that between 2014 and 2018, the 
U.S. government will spend approximately $44 billion on launch related 
11  Ibid.
12  Ibid.
13  Mark Garcia, “Space Debris and Human Spacecraft,” NASA. (September 26, 2013).
14  Ibid.
15  David Martin, host, Andy Court, producer, “#e Battle Above.”
16  Ibid.
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activities alone.17 While the U.S. frames its satellite system as a global utility, 
the message that the Air Force wishes to put forth is clear, the U.S. controls 
that utility as they see $t. #e U.S. government has strategically designed its 
position of dominance in space technology. #e existence of programs like 
space command implicates that governments are preparing for a new form of 
warfare. As General Hyten declared himself, Space Command is “not NASA” 
and the purpose of the military is to use force. #rough the preparations 
to defend space, the U.S. may be creating its own self-ful$lling prophecy.
As early as 1997, the United States Air Force Space Command has seen 
the need for a long-range plan to ensure U.S. dominance. A report published 
by Space Command entitled “Vision for 2020” describes this plan.18 #e 
report begins with an explanation of Space Command’s mission to dominate 
military operations in outer space in order to preserve U.S. interests “by inte-
grating space forces into war $ghting capabilities across the full spectrum of 
con&ict.”19 #e report illustrates the evolution of warfare and technology to 
explain how the military has risen to the occasion of land, sea and air threats 
and is now tasked with responding to the economic and military interests 
in space. #e report refers to space as “the fourth medium of warfare,” im-
plicating the U.S. is preparing for combat in space.20 #e report also details 
how the U.S. will attain what the report calls “Full Spectrum Dominance” 
in an e"ort to deny any adversaries’ attempt to gather information, as the 
military depends on space technology for communications and remaining 
the eminent leader in gathering intel.21 Full spectrum dominance entails 
“concepts of dominant maneuver, precision engagement, full-dimensional 
protection, and focused logistics” in order to maintain space dominance and 
protect American interest in space.22
By 2010, Space Command expected to attain this dominance in order 
17  Carl Levin, John McCain, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental A"airs, 
“Space: Defense and Civilian Agencies Request Signi$cant Funding for Launch-Related 
Activities,” United States Government Accountability O!ce, (September 9, 2013).
18  Howell M. Estes, General USAF Commander In Chief, “United States Space Command 
Vision For 2020,” (February 1997).
19  Ibid.
20  Ibid.
21  Ibid.
22  Ibid.
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to gather information during peacetime, deter any sort of con&ict, and ul-
timately be able to win any sort of con&ict in space. #e report accurately 
predicted that the future of technological developments would occur largely 
in the private sector, and anticipated that this shift would contribute to the 
widening wealth gap associated with globalization. #e importance of space 
enterprises in the global economy is prioritized. #is that concern over space 
technologies being attacked exists. To minimize the threat to space resources, 
military strategy has been adapted to the new trends in space development.23 
#e overall theme of the report is that space superiority is essential as the 
world becomes increasingly dependent upon satellites. #e ability to maintain 
dominance as the global space power is the vision of Space Command and 
has been its mission since the 90s.
#e Department of Defense issued a press release on January 7, 2014 
emphasizing the importance of space defense as an asset to the day-to-day 
functioning of military and civilian lives.24 General William Shelton of 
Space Command spoke of the concern over the threat to necessary satellites 
to students at George Washington University. General Shelton stated that 
although space technology provides the opportunity to prevent and aid 
in disasters around the world, societies’ dependence on successful satellite 
operation presents new challenges for the military in the 21st century.25 His 
main concern is that opponents are rapidly approaching the day when they 
can challenge U.S. dominance. General Shelton insists that military strategy 
must change to anticipate threats. Emphasizing that new crucial satellite 
construction must stay ahead of other nations. Additionally, the military 
should aim to complicate the targeting systems of competing forces.26
#e evidence presented in this case study illustrates the United States’ 
dominance over the control of space could create con&ict on the world stage. 
#e U.S. military has issued reports on their impression of the threats that 
space faces as well as the defense procedures necessary for protection. #e 
insistence on U.S. dominance in space technology is re&ective of realist 
23  Ibid.
24  Jim Garamone, “Shelton Discusses Importance of Space Defense,” Department of De-
fense American Forces Press Service, (January 7, 2014).
25  Ibid.
26  Ibid.
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principles of state actions.27 Nations must now $gure out what their reac-
tion to this U.S. assertion in space dominance will be. #e U.S. has been 
instituting its dominance for several decades, and now wants the world to 
comprehend that the U.S. military will defend its position as the world leader 
in space ventures. #e sector of outer space is now at the forefront of global 
politics, and the U.S. is attempting to maintain the similar unipolar system 
that it currently has on earth. As nations develop new technologies, global 
politics will be impacted by the possibility of the $ght over the control of 
valuable space enterprises.
Con#ict Over Resources
#e world constantly struggles to agree on the distribution of resources, such 
as food, water and precious products. With dwindling supplies of non-re-
newable resources, humanity is looking for new possibilities. #e possibility 
that nations will begin to look at outer space for resources signi$es another 
area for con&ict in global politics as humankind moves into the twenty-$rst 
century. #ere are several di"erent opportunities to seize as far as space re-
sources go, including rare and valuable materials, expansion of agriculture 
and possibilities for new territories. For years, the human race has toyed with 
the idea of colonizing another planet and now science is starting to catch 
up with humanity’s propensity for expansion. Private companies are now 
o"ering commercial &ights into space, the price tag of which illustrates that 
space opportunities are not going to bene$t all nations, but simply those 
with enough wealth.28 
#e ISS represents humanity’s $rst steps toward colonizing space, in ad-
dition to earlier launches of manned rockets and the moon landings. Many 
believe that the ISS is just the beginning of the colonization of space.29 For 
more than twenty years, NASA has held the NASA Ames Space Settlement 
Contest for students under the age of eighteen to design a colony for humans 
to inhabit space.30 While this competition directly states that any design must 
27  Tech. Sgt. Mike Slater, “Secretary of the Air Force James delivers message of con$dence.”
28  Boyle, “After Accident, Virgin Galactic Takes a Cautious Path to Space&ight.”
29  W. H. Siegfried, “Space Colonization—Bene$ts for the World,” Space Technology and 
Applications International Forum, vol. 654, (February 2, 2003): 1270-1278.
30  Al Globus, “NASA Ames Space Settlement Contest,” NASA.gov, (June 9, 2015).
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not be on any speci$c planet or space body, it involves a plan for humans 
to leave earth and live in a new space age with cutting-edge technology. 
According to the competition’s web page, the result of mining one asteroid 
for materials “can build space colonies with living space equal to about 500 
times the surface area of the Earth.”31 #is statement signi$es that colonizing 
planets could be made possible with mining asteroids of valuable material. 
With further advancement of technology and motivation to leave what some 
fear is a dying earth, humans may be closer to colonizing space than solving 
the climate and population problems that earth faces.
While the potential for actually colonizing space may yet be several years 
o", the reality of space mining is not far o" at all and is currently a major 
debate on the global stage. On May 22, 2015, the United States House of 
Representatives passed the SPACE Act a bill that gives businesses the right 
to any material that is mined out of asteroids.32 At this point, no company 
has actually announced realistic plans to mine asteroids, but the possibility 
has been &oating around for years and the international community is faced 
with the issues of space commercialization.33 For a while now, the U.S. has 
been advocating for the ownership of mining resources in space to belong 
to the company that extracted them and the passage of the property rights 
bill signi$es the transition from talking about the possibility of mining to a 
step forward in actual commercial space exploitation.34 Although the SPACE 
Act is concerning the privatization of asteroid mining resources, it still shows 
how the U.S. is grasping onto much of its power and even gaining more. 
#e United States government has long endorsed the privatization of space 
as it frees up the federal budget for things like military space defense, which 
will ensure a stable market for American companies who work closely with 
government agencies.35 36 
31  Ibid.
32  Brian Fung, “#e House just passed a bill about space mining. #e future is here,” Wash-
ington Post (May 22,  2015).
33  Soloway, “Lawyers In Space.”
34  Fung, “#e House just passed a bill about space mining. #e future is here.”
35  Ibid.
36  Estes, General USAF Commander In Chief, “United States Space Command Vision For 
2020.”
61
Emily Gaunt
Mining asteroids for valuable material is no new concept, but technology 
has now reached a point where mining is an actual possibility. Asteroid 
mining can be done in a variety of ways and could provide the earth with 
valuable materials that nations now desperately need.37 #ese materials in-
clude platinum, a precious metal used in electronics, palladium, which has 
a similar range of uses as platinum, and the highly useful resource of water. 
Asteroid mining could occur several di"erent ways from onsite robotic ex-
traction methods to towing and retrieval methods.38 Companies have long 
been working up ideas to mine near earth asteroids and now the technology 
to mine deep space asteroids is also becoming a reality.39 #ese companies 
include Deep Space Industries, Planetary Resources, and Bigelow Aerospace, 
all of which are eager to explore all that commercialized space has to o"er, 
including space tourism and mining ventures.40
Passing the SPACE Act ensures that control over revenue from space min-
ing practices remains partially in the hands of the United States. However, 
this bill is not mean that international organizations accept these property 
rights. International law on the ownership rights of mining resources does 
not yet exist and asteroid mining is still hypothetical.41 #e passage of the 
SPACE Act signi$es that the United States has both the intent and capacity 
to begin exploiting space resources for all that they are worth. A Department 
of Defense report from 2001 lays out the objectives for the future of the 
United States’ involvement in space. #e detailed report calls for an adequate 
understanding of the transforming way that space is used.42 One of the most 
important areas that the report stresses is the necessity to develop new tech-
nologies to maintain superiority and foresee threats and emerging industries. 
In order to accomplish this task, the U.S. would need “a healthy industrial 
base, improved science and technology resources, an attitude of risk-taking 
37  Kate Tate, “How Asteroid Mining Could Work,” SPACE.com, (January 22, 2013).
38  Ibid.
39  Ibid.
40  Ibid.
41  Soloway, “Lawyers In Space.”
42  Department of Defense Space Commission, “Report of the Commission to Assess United 
States National Security Space Management and Organization Pursuant to Public Law 106-
65,” Department of Defense, (January 11, 2001).
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and innovation, and government policies that support international com-
petitiveness.”43 #e SPACE Act is one of the ways these goals have come to 
fruition. #e privatization of commercial space by the U.S. has furthered a 
unipolar control of space. Although the mining of asteroids has the potential 
to help all nations and peoples, the United States has come one step closer 
to assuring that it will control how these resources are dispersed, echoing the 
insistence that the satellite network is a global utility. While the U.S. claims 
that both satellites and resources are a global resource, there is a sector of 
space that is not remotely peaceful. In violation of international treaties, the 
U.S. has been quietly increasing weapons technology.
Development of Space Weaponry
In addition to con&ict over U.S dominance over the $elds of satellites and 
space resources, another potential area for global dissension involves the 
advancement of the weaponization of space. While science $ction writers 
have been using space warfare as a plot device for decades, space and weapons 
programs have had the intent and have been trying to attain the capacity 
to create the required technology to prepare for the day when space is no 
longer peaceful. In fact, there is signi$cant evidence that the development 
of space weapons has now become a scienti$c reality. #e $eld of weapons 
development is vast and varied, and the United States has shown that it is 
prepared to defend itself in space.44 #e range of options for defense in outer 
space includes ground-to-space anti-satellite missiles, such as those that the 
Chinese have, ground-based lasers, airborne lasers, space-based conventional 
weapons, ballistic missiles with nuclear capabilities and much more.45
One leader in weapons development of the twenty-$rst century has been 
the United States’ Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA). 
#e self-described mission of DARPA is to ensure that the U.S. remains the 
eminent producer of defense technology.46 According to a statement by the 
43  Ibid.
44  David Martin, host, Andy Court, producer, “#e Battle Above.”
45  SPACE.com Sta", “Top 10 Space Weapons,” SPACE.com, (April 5, 2013).
46  Tony Tether, Dr., “Statement By Dr. Tony Tether Director Defense Advanced Research 
Projects Agency Submitted to the Subcommittee on Emerging #reats and Capabilities 
Committee on Armed Services United States Senate,” Defense Advanced Research Projects 
Agency, (April 10, 2002).
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director of DARPA in 2002, submitted to the United States Senate, DARPA 
is involved in the continuous transformation of military e"orts in space. 
In addition to developing more a"ordable launch capabilities for satellite 
payloads, DARPA is involved in a space surveillance and advanced warning 
systems to threats posed to necessary satellites, called the Satellite Protection 
and Warning/Space Awareness (SPAWN).47 DARPA is also working on a 
space weapon that has the ability to utilize “electromagnets to shoot a stream 
of molten metal at incredible speeds toward enemy targets.”48 #is program, 
Magneto Hydrodynamic Explosive Munition (MAHEM) “o"ers the potential 
for higher e!ciency, greater control, and the ability to generate and accurately 
time multiple jets and fragments from a single charge.”49 
While the U.S. is denying the actual weaponization of space, o!cials are 
saying one thing and doing another. In 2001, Congress attempted to pass 
the Space Preservation Act of 2001 in order “[to] preserve the cooperative, 
peaceful uses of space for the bene$t of all humankind by permanently 
prohibiting the basing of weapons in space by the United States, and to 
require the President to take action to adopt and implement a world treaty 
banning space-based weapons.”50 #e bill sought a permanent ban on the 
development and use of weapons in space and to “remove from space any 
existing space-based weapons of the United States,” indicating the possibility 
of the existence of space weapons designed by the United States.51 #e bill 
de$ned weapons as any device capable of several things, including those that 
collide with and destroy an object in space. #e bill cited the weaponization 
of space as:
#e use of land-based, sea-based, or space-based systems using radiation, 
electromagnetic, psychotronic, sonic, laser, or other energies directed at 
individual persons or targeted populations for the purpose of information 
war, mood management, or mind control of such persons or populations; 
47  Ibid.
48  SPACE.com sta", “Top 10 Space Weapons.”
49  Dr. Kevin Massey, “MAgneto Hydrodynamic Explosive Munition (MAHEM),” DARPA.
mil, (No date).
50  Dennis Kunich, 107th Congress, “Space Preservation Act of 2001,” Federation of Ameri-
can Scientists, October 2, 2001.
51  Ibid.
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or by expelling chemical or biological agents in the vicinity of a person.52
 However, despite the intentions of this bill, it did not pass and according 
to the o!cial website of the U.S. Congress, the bill received “Unfavorable 
Executive Comment” from the Department of Defense on April 19, 2002.53 
As of 2008, the United States openly opposed a ban on weapons in space, 
according to the New York Times.54 #e United Nations Conference on 
Disarmament, held in 2008, put forth a Russian-Chinese draft of an in-
ternational treaty that sought to ban weapons in space in order to prevent 
another Cold War-style arms race. #e United States rejected the ban, stating 
that the treaty would impede access to space and limit its use as well as the 
treaties lack of enforceability.55 
#e United States’ refusal to pass the Space Preservation act of 2001, and 
the refusal to support any international treaty banning the use of weapons 
in space signi$es that the U.S. does not want any inhibitors to the research 
and development of space weapons. Many weapons systems here on earth can 
be modi$ed to be used as a weapon in space, including ballistic missiles and 
DARPA’s MAHEM. In addition to MAHEM and other DARPA programs, 
there has been much speculation about space lasers. In the 1980s, the Strategic 
Defense Initiative, nicknamed Star Wars, introduced the world to a new form 
of defensive options. An article from the journal Nature discusses the reality 
and future of space weapons. #e article reports on a Boeing designed proto-
type of a laser weapon, called the High Energy Laser Mobile Demonstrator 
(HEL MD), as being only one of several laser weapon options being devel-
oped for the United States government.56 While laser programs initially faced 
setbacks from feasibility restraints, laser weapons are now moving beyond 
obstacles and optical $ber laser technology is rapidly becoming the go-to 
choice.57 Some expect that laser weapons could be put into fully operational use 
52  Ibid.
53 Dennis Kunich,“H.R.2977 - Space Preservation Act of 2001,” Congress.gov, (2001-2002).
54  Nick Cumming-Bruce, “U.N. Weighs a Ban on Weapons in Space, but U.S. Still Ob-
jects,” New York Times, February 13, 2008.
55  Ibid.
56  Andy Extance, “Military technology: Laser weapons get real,” Nature, May 27, 2015.
57  Ibid.
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for military defense in $ve to ten years.58 For space, this advancement means that 
the United States military is that much closer to establishing full dominance in all 
$elds of space development. #e U.S. continues to deny any o!cial weaponization 
of space, but actions indicate a contradiction on the matter. #e weaponization 
of space without transparency in international relations represents the $nal stage 
in achieving dominance in space technology and development. 
Rami$cations of Findings
#e research $ndings implicate that the world is headed toward a new era in 
international interaction in space. #e dominance of the United States in the 
areas of space technology and defense has been very publicly asserted. Competing 
nations, namely China, have been shown to be exploring at least the option of 
challenging that dominance. Technology programs all over the world have the 
potential to catch up and adapt to this new space age if the concerns of Space 
Command leaders are valid. At the very least, these concerns illustrate the changing 
dynamics of space as well as the potential for space to see combat. International 
regulation of space has proven incompetent to adequately resolve the possibility of 
con&ict over access to space ventures and resources. #us far, the national response 
from the U.S. has been to simply con$rm dominance through legal action and 
public displays. In each area that the U.S. has asserted dominance, the potential 
for international con&ict over the next several decades exists.
Government contracts for the development of weapons that can one day 
be utilized in space, combined with U.S. dominance in control over satellites 
operated by military forces and closely working with the privatization of space, 
will have signi$cant impacts on global politics. #e United States is imple-
menting all its power to maintain full spectrum dominance and control over 
space technology and has shown that it has both the intent and the capacity 
to accomplish a unipolar space. However, this attempt at asserting dominance 
does not entirely deter competition. Competing nations around the world will 
soon possess the ability to go up against American technology, or at least begin 
developing programs with the intent to challenge U.S. dominance. With the 
competition over access to space resources, satellites, and the development of 
weapons in space, global leaders must acknowledge the potential for con&ict 
in outer space.
58  Ibid.
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WILL OF THE PEOPLE: PUBLIC OPINION AND U.S. FOREIGN 
POLICY
Troy Gabriel
Abstract
#is research paper examines how e"ective public opinion is at in&uencing 
U.S. foreign policy and makes predictions on what this relationship will 
look like in the future.  #e research was qualitative in nature, examining 
information found in speeches and remarks made by government actors as 
well as the general public.  #e research focused on two case studies; the 
Vietnam War and the Iraq War, and found that the top decision maker in 
government at the time of each con&ict, namely the President, carried out 
policies that often disregarded public opinion entirely.  #e implications 
of this research indicate that as the U.S. attempts to retain its hegemonic 
status, future foreign policy decision will become less representative of the 
masses and will more closely resemble an oligarchy rather than a democracy.
Real World Observation
On September 10, 2014, !e New York Times reported that President Barack 
Obama had authorized a military campaign against the Sunni militant group 
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known as ISIS, or the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria.1 #e authorized cam-
paign calls for American airstrikes in Syria as well as the deployment of 475 
military advisors to Iraq.2 #ese military advisors are being sent in order 
to assist the Kurdish and Iraqi forces with more training, intelligence, and 
equipment against these $ghters.3 President Obama made it clear that these 
forces will not be used in any combat capacity, but will strictly be there to 
support U.S. allies in the region.4 #is new authorization will bring the to-
tal number of American troops in Iraq to 1,600.5 #e President also called 
on Congress to authorize the allocation of resources in order to “train and 
equip” the opposition forces $ghting the Assad regime in Syria.6 #is new 
authorization comes just two weeks after the President was criticized for 
not having a strategy to deal with the rising threat, paralleling the change 
in public opinion,7 with 53% of adults approving of the plan.8
#is rapid change in the administration’s position towards ISIS is not an 
outlier in the history of executive action, and it is important to put this most 
recent announcement into the context of recent history.  A year to the day 
before the speech President Barack Obama gave regarding ISIS, he gave a 
speech discussing America’s involvement Syria.9 In it, Obama argued the 
bene$ts of limited airstrikes in Syria,10 counter to the prevailing opinion of 
the public of noninvolvement.11 Just a few weeks earlier, Obama stated that 
1  Mark Landler, “Obama, in Speech on ISIS, Promises Sustained E"ort to Rout Militants,” 
!e New York Times, September 10, 2014.
2  Ibid.
3  Statement by the President on ISIL. #e White House, September 10, 2014.
4  Ibid.
5  Lander, “Obama, in Speech on ISIS.” 
6  “Statement by the President on ISIL.” #e White House
7  Lander, “Obama, in Speech on ISIS.”
8  “Bipartisan Support for Obama’s Military Campaign Against ISIS,” Pew Research Center 
for People and the Press, September 15, 2014.
9  Katie Zezima, “How Obama’s second Sept. 10 Syria speech in a row was di"erent this 
year – and how it wasn’t,” !e Washington Post, September 10, 2014.
10  Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation on Syria. #e White House, Septem-
ber 10, 2013.
11  “American Views on Intervention in Syria,” !e New York Times/CBS News Poll, Septem-
ber 10, 2013.
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he “will seek authorization for the use of force from the American people’s 
representatives in Congress” and not use his executive authority.12 #e choice 
by the president to defer the decision to Congress, and not use executive 
action, shows that this is not the $rst time Obama has entertained the pub-
lic’s interest in foreign policy matters. An earlier example occurred near the 
end of the Bush administration. In 2007, 63% of the public was in favor 
of their congressional representatives voting for a bill to withdraw troops 
from Iraq in the next year.13 #e following year, Bush announced that there 
would be a withdrawal of 8,000 troops by February of 2009, appearing to 
give in to the public’s will.  While Bush wielded his authority in order to 
appease the public, Obama left the decision up to Congress, or the people 
directly.14 #ese instances show that the quick policy decisions and changes 
made by executives occur regardless of the administration, and give context 
when looking at other historical examples.
#e in&uence that public opinion has on the executives who make con-
temporary U.S. foreign policy is a very important relationship study, and has 
profound implications for how we understand the formulation of American 
foreign policy.  If U.S foreign policy is always guided by the prevailing public 
opinion, polices can be shortsighted and overlook key issues. #e tendency 
for policies to not be as informed if guided by public opinion can be seen in 
a study done by Rogers, Stuhler, and Koeing in which they $nd that there 
is a “large gap” between the opinions of knowledgeable experts and that of 
the general public.15 #e researchers go on to make the assertion that the 
foreign policy opinions of experts were “speci$c, many-sided, analytical, and 
&exible,” while the general public’s opinions “tended to be vague and sporad-
ic.”16 On the other hand, if public opinion is not a part of the equation in 
U.S. foreign policy formulation, then is it still accurate to label the U.S. as a 
12  Statement by the President on Syria. #e White House, August 31, 2013.
13  “A Summer of Discontent with Washington,” Pew Research Center for the People and the 
Press, August 2, 2007.
14  Ewen MacAskill, “Bush limits Iraq troop withdrawal to 8,000 and orders ‘quiet surge’ in 
Afghanistan,” !e Guardian September 9, 2008.
15  William C. Rogers, Barbara Stuhler, and Donald Koeing, “A Comparison of Informed 
and General Public Opinion on U.S. Foreign Policy,” !e Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. 31, 
No. 2 (Summer, 1967): 242-252.
16  Ibid.
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representative democracy?  It seems as if public opinion has an e"ect on the 
formulation and path of U.S. foreign policy, but it is unclear by how much 
of a role it plays.  #is uncertainty leads me to ask the following question: 
How e"ective is public opinion at in&uencing U.S. foreign policy?
Conventional Wisdom
#e democratic ideal of a responsive, representative government illustrates 
the prevailing belief that public opinion matters in both domestic and foreign 
issues.  #is ideal is an essential part of American political culture, one that 
the public whole-heartedly believes in.  For instance, in a poll conducted 
by World Public Opinion, 81% of respondents said that when governmental 
leaders are making an important decision, they “should pay attention to 
public opinion polls because this will help them get a sense of the public’s 
views.”17  #is $nding is further backed up by the principle expressed in the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, that “the will of the people should be 
the basis of the authority of government,” with 87% of Americans agreeing.18 
In a study done by the Pew Research Center for People and the Press, polling 
data shows that the long-range policy priorities of the general public and 
the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) are similar in several key areas.19 
Both believe that protecting the U.S. from terrorism is a top priority, with 
83% of the public and 76% of the CFR. #ere is also large overlap in regard 
to preventing the spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction, with 73% of the 
public and 81% of the CFR making it a priority.20 When there is large overlap 
between the opinions of the public and those of policy elites, it seems clear 
that public opinion is e"ective at in&uencing foreign policy. However, the 
idealism of democracy is not always the reality of democracy, and it would 
be a mistake to draw such a conclusion.
#is conventional wisdom is misleading because it suggests that the general 
public has a direct role in which policies are top priorities, when evidence 
17  “American Public Says Government Leaders Should Pay Attention to Polls,” World Public 
Opinion.org, March 21, 2008.
18  Ibid.
19  “Public Sees U.S. Power Declining as Support for Global Engagement Slips: America’s 
Place in the World 2013,” Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, December 3, 
2013.
20  Ibid.
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suggests otherwise. Such evidence can be seen when looking at the public’s 
opinion on the war in Iraq. At the start of the war in 2003, public support 
was at a high of 74%.21 Yet just a few years later in 2007 public support for 
the war had dropped to 40%, with a majority of 53% of the public favoring 
withdrawal.22 Even though the majority opinion favored a change in poli-
cy, the change did not happen for another 4 years, when the war o!cially 
ended.23 If the conventional wisdom were entirely true, the timeline of the 
war would have paralleled the changes in the public opinion. #e fact that 
it didn’t show that foreign policy is not always in&uenced by public opinion, 
illustrates a &aw in the conventional wisdom.
"eoretical Paradigm
 To best understand the research question and the case studies presented, 
the research is framed using the theoretical paradigm of U.S. foreign policy 
known as group dynamics. #is theory was de$ned by Dorwin Cartwright and 
Alvin Zander as a “$eld of inquiry dedicated to advancing knowledge about 
the nature of groups, the laws of their development, and their interrelations 
with individuals, other groups, and larger institutions.”24 In regard to U.S. 
foreign policy and international relations, the theory of group dynamics is 
predicated on the belief that special interests or elites, not the state, in&uence 
political outcomes.25 #is general beliefs leads to the other core assumptions 
of the group dynamics theory.  #e $rst of these core assumptions is that 
decision-making actors are susceptible to the in&uence of groupthink.26 #e 
people in a decision-making position are constantly interacting with others 
in their respective groups.  #ese interactions in the group might “exert 
pressures for conformity to group norms,”27 an inherently bad thing, as it 
21  Scott Keeter, “Trends in Public Opinion about the War in Iraq, 2003-2007,” Pew Research 
Center, March 15, 2007.
22  Ibid.
23  “Barack Obama: All US Troops to Leave Iraq in 2011,” BBC News, October 21, 2014.
24  Dorwin Cartwright and Alvin Zander, “Origins of Group Dynamics,” Group Dynamics, 
3rd Edition, (1968): 3-21.
25  C. Wright Mills, !e Power Elite (Oxford University Press, 1956).
26  Ole R. Holsti. “Models of International Relations and Foreign Policy.” Diplomatic Histo-
ry 13, no 1. (1989).
27  Ibid.
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can “inhibit the search for information and policy options . . . suppressing 
some forms of intragroup con&ict that might serve to clarify goals, values, 
and opinions.”28 A second core assumption of group dynamics theory is 
that when it comes to the group of decision-makers, “the power elite,”29 its 
members are from small group of “political, economic, and military men.” 
30 According to this assumption, this group comes from “the upper third of 
the income and occupational pyramids,” which makes this group relatively 
unrepresentative of the majority.  It is this assumption that is most pertinent 
to the research presented in this paper.31
Group dynamics, and the assumptions stated above, is the most appropri-
ate and $tting theory to frame and explain the in&uence of public opinion 
on U.S. foreign policy.  First, group dynamics’ assumption that individuals 
or groups, not the state, in&uence political outcomes helps frame the case 
studies presented in this paper regarding decisions of Presidents during 
wartime.  #is is due to the concept of groupthink, since the policy decision 
makers are not interacting with the public on a daily basis, and do not view 
the public as their peers. #e people they do interact with daily, their peers, 
will inherently place pressures on the decision makers to appease or con-
form to the group thinking, potentially having “a signi$cant impact on the 
substance and quality of decisions.”32 #is theory has a negative viewpoint 
concerning the research question. #e fact that the decision maker group is 
separate from the public opinion suggests that they therefore do not have 
an in&uence on policy formulation. #e second assumption made by this 
theory regarding the make-up of the “power elite” further highlights its use-
fulness when framing the answer to the research question. By assuming that 
the power elite are comprised of an unrepresentative minority of industry 
leaders, the ine"ectiveness of the public opinion’s in&uence becomes clear. 
How can public opinion compete with the in&uence that this small group 
of people have, a group who are interacting with each other every day and 
developing personal relationships?  It is because of these assumptions that 
28  Ibid.
29  Mills, !e Power Elite
30  Ibid.
31  Ibid.
32  Holsti, “Models of International Relations and Foreign Policy.”
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the theory of group dynamics best frames the answer to the research question 
presented in this paper.
"e Vietnam War
#e military operation in Vietnam that lasted from November 1955 until 
April 1975 is one of notoriety in United States history.  It was a timed $lled 
with protests and civil disobedience, as well as a period in which the leaders 
of the U.S. faced the challenge of balancing policy they deemed appropriate 
and the policy the public demanded.  In retrospect, most people, public and 
policy elite, consider the Vietnam engagement as a mistake, one some deem 
an “important history lesson.”33 Yet when this was a contemporary issue, that 
sentiment was not as wide spread, with many of the policy elites deeming 
the war e"ort a righteous one based on democratic principles.34 Due to the 
contradictory relationship between the public and the policy elites during 
the Vietnam War, this period is important to consider when attempting to 
answer the research question. 
In order to study this relationship properly, it will be important to ap-
proach this case study in a chronological fashion.  By observing how the war 
developed over time, and the policy decisions that a"ected it, the cause and 
e"ect relationship between the public opinion and the policy decisions should 
become apparent. U.S. involvement in Vietnam began during the Eisenhower 
administration in November of 1955.35 Initially, U.S. involvement played a 
strictly supportive role, not a military one.  In Eisenhower’s Annual Budget 
Message to the Congress for the Fiscal Year of 1956, he proposed to “furnish 
defense support to several countries” in Southeast Asia, Vietnam included.36 
#is was in response to the general fear of Communist subversion at the 
33  “Anti-War Sentiment Dominates Talk Airwaves,” Pew Research Journalism Project, August 
30, 2007.
34  Lyndon B. Johnson: “Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union,” 
January 12, 1966. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, #e American Presidency 
Project.
35  U.S. Department of Defense. Press Operations. “Name of Technical Sergeant Richard B. 
Fitzgibbon to be Added to the Vietnam Veterans Memorial.” (November 6, 1998).
36  Dwight D. Eisenhower: “Annual Budget Message to the Congress: Fiscal Year 1956,” 
January 17, 1955. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, #e American Presidency 
Project.
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time.37 #e prevailing belief of foreign policy elites was the Domino #eory, 
which theorizes that in order to prevent $ghting at home the U.S. must 
engage the Communist ideal in foreign countries, lest the weaker states fall 
and Communism comes knocking on the U.S.’s doorstep.38 Due to this fear 
of Communism, those who were informed generally accepted the assistance 
to a number of Southeast Asian countries that Eisenhower had proposed, but 
the majority of U.S. citizens were unaware of the involvement at all.39 Due 
to this lack of an informed public, the public opinion of such a policy was 
irrelevant to the policy elites at the time, since there simply was not one.  #e 
lack of an obvious public opinion lead most policy leaders to believe that a 
policy of assistance to these countries was one that was supported by most. 
#is was seen in the next administration, when President John F. Kennedy 
informed the President of the Republic of Vietnam that the U.S. would 
promptly increase the assistance to the Vietnamese defense e"ort in 1961.40 
Yet this ambiguity of the public towards Vietnam policy would soon change.
#e development of a public opinion towards U.S. involvement in Vietnam 
took o" during the Johnson administration.  At the onset of his administration, 
President Lyndon B. Johnson followed his predecessors’ example, only gradually 
increasing the support sent to Vietnam.41  By 1965 the President was “convinced 
that the country, for the most part, [was] with him; that there [was] only a small 
minority dissent from his Vietnam policies.”42 #is belief led the President to 
continue with the Vietnam policy that he deemed appropriate, increasing the 
extent of U.S. involvement in the war by authorizing air strikes on military targets 
37  Ibid.
38  Jean Collins, “#e Domino #eory,” !e North American Review, Vol. 252, No. 3 (May, 
1967): 19-20.
39  William L. Lunch and Peter W. Sperlich, “American Public Opinion and the War in 
Vietnam,” !e Western Political Quarterly, Vol. 32, No. 1 (March, 1979): 21-44.
40  John F. Kennedy: “Exchange of Messages With the President of the Republic of 
Viet-Nam.,” December 15, 1961. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, #e 
American Presidency Project.
41  Lyndon B. Johnson, “Annual Budget Message to the Congress, Fiscal Year 1965,” January 
21, 1964. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, #e American Presidency Project.
42  Lester Markel, “Public Opinion and the War in Vietnam,” !e New York Times, August 
8, 1965.
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and increasing the U.S. $ghting force to 190,000 men.43 In the same speech, 
Johnson addressed the American people with a forceful statement; “#e days 
may become months, and the months may become years, but we will stay as 
long as aggression commands us to battle,” a statement that was a prelude to 
the arduous future of the war.44 It seems that this was an example in which 
policy elites were in&uenced by the public opinion, yet this is not the case, as 
the belief in the support of the majority that Johnson held was an inaccurate 
one.  An article published in !e New York Times on March 27, 1966 reported, 
“many thousands took part in demonstrations during the day” in a number 
of large cities throughout the U.S.45 In New York City, there were between 
20,000 and 25,000 marchers on Fifth Avenue alone.46 Protests were taking 
place in other cities around the country on that same day, likely with similar 
numbers. It would be a mistake to consider an active vocal group numbering 
in the tens of thousands as a “small minority of dissent.”47 A study done by the 
Gallup organization the following year found that a majority of respondents 
to a survey disapproved of the way that President Johnson was handling the 
situation in Vietnam,48 further showing the inaccuracy in the amount of sup-
port for President Johnson. Even as evidence was presented that suggested the 
policy choices that the President made were not following the policy decisions 
the public wanted, Johnson remained steadfast on his policy choices.  In his 
State of the Union Address in 1968, Johnson outlined how increased support 
for the war was needed and authorized the deployment of additional 13,500 
men, only weeks after he had sent about 11,000 additional Marine and airborne 
troops.49 #is decision made by the President shows just how ine"ective public 
opinion was at in&uencing U.S. foreign policy during this administration. 
43  Johnson, “State of the Union.” (1966).
44  Ibid.
45  Douglas Robinson, “#ousands on Fifth Ave. March in Vietnam Protest,” !e New York 
Times, March 27, 1966.
46  Ibid.
47  Markel, “Public Opinion and the War in Vietnam.”
48  Gallup Organization, “Gallup Poll # 1967-0742: Vietnam War/1968 Presidential Elec-
tion,” March 9-14, 1967.
49  Lyndon B. Johnson, “#e President’s Address to the Nation Announcing Steps To Limit 
the War in Vietnam and Reporting His Decision Not To Seek Reelection,” March 31, 
1968. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, #e American Presidency Project.
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As the Nixon administration took over, many members of the public hoped 
that Nixon would simply end the war immediately by ordering the U.S. 
forces home.50 Yet Nixon did not do this, stating, “I would have betrayed 
my solemn responsibility as President of the United States if I had done 
so.”51 #is is an extremely telling quote, as it gives insight into the mindset 
of foreign policy elites.  According to Nixon, adhering to the whims of the 
public opinion, concerning foreign policy, is a terrible thing for the country 
as a whole.  #is is counter to the prevailing popular belief in Democratic 
#eory, in which the public should be an important actor in governmental 
decision-making.52 If policy elites share this belief, it might explain why 
public opinion is ine"ective in in&uence U.S. foreign policy. 
By 1971, it was common knowledge among the public and policy elites that 
polling data showed an overwhelming majority of Americans wanted the troops 
out of Vietnam by the end of the year, with a staggering 75% of people reputing 
the President’s policy.53 Even with such a large majority of the American public 
calling for an end to the war in Vietnam, it persisted through the rest of the 
Nixon administration and into the Ford administration.  U.S. involvement 
in Vietnam did not end until President Gerald Ford announced on April 29, 
1975 that “the military situation in the area [Saigon] deteriorated rapidly… I 
therefore ordered the evacuation of all American personnel remaining in South 
Vietnam.”54 #e public had $nally achieved what they wanted, after voicing 
their opinion for over a decade.  It is clear that during the Vietnam War public 
opinion was at best commentary about the war, with little in&uence over foreign 
policy formulation.  Instead, the policies made by policy elites during the war 
were the policies they deemed most appropriate, regardless of the public opinion. 
President Nixon stated this in a response to a letter he received from a university 
student, “the policies we are now following re&ect our own best judgment, 
50  Richard Nixon, “Address to the Nation on Vietnam,” May 14, 1969. Online by Gerhard 
Peters and John T. Woolley, #e American Presidency Project.
51  Ibid.
52  “American Public Says Government Leaders Should Pay Attention to Polls,” World Public 
Opinion.org.
53  Reo M. Christenson, “Vietnam and Public Opinion,” !e New York Times July 3, 1971.
54  Gerald R. Ford, “Statement Following Evacuation of United States Personnel From the 
Republic of Vietnam,” April 29, 1975. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, #e 
American Presidency Project.
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based on exhaustive study of all the available evidence, of how to achieve 
that goal. To abandon that policy merely because of a public demonstra-
tion would therefore be an act of gross irresponsibility on my part.”55 #is 
sentiment would persist through many administrations, guiding executives 
like George W. Bush to continually disregard the majority public opinion 
in favor of the policy elite throughout his involvement in the Iraq War. 
"e Iraq War
#e Iraq War is another important case study to examine as it shares many 
similarities with the Vietnam War, such as a supportive public in the be-
ginning with a quick shift to public dissatisfaction as the war wore on. 
Meanwhile, policy elites and administration o!cials remained steadfast in 
their commitment to see the war through, claiming the $ghting was for 
democratic principles just as their predecessors did forty years before.56 A 
key di"erence, however, between the two con&icts is the fact the onset of the 
Iraq War was brought on by the terrorist attacks carried out on September 
11, 2001 against the United States, while there was no attack on U.S. soil 
before the Vietnam War.57 Another key di"erence is that the Vietnam War 
spanned across four di"erent administrations, while the Iraq War only 
spanned two.  It is important to shed light on these di"erences as they 
have implications on the mood of the public opinion, and therefore are an 
important aspect of this research. In order to understand the relationship 
shared between U.S. foreign policy and the public opinion it will again 
be important to continue through this case study chronologically. Again, 
this will help to illustrate the cause and e"ect relationship between public 
opinion and foreign policy decisions.
As stated before, the catalyst of the Iraq War was the 9/11 terrorist attacks 
in New York City. It was originally believed that Iraq and the Hussein regime 
55  Richard Nixon, “Letter to University Student Randy J. Dicks on the “Vietnam Morato-
rium,” October 13, 1969. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, #e American 
Presidency Project.
56  George W. Bush, “Remarks on Signing the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations 
Act for Defense and for the Reconstruction of Iraq and Afghanistan, 2004,” November 6, 
2003. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, #e American Presidency Project.
57  George W. Bush, “Address to the Nation on Iraq,” March 17, 2003. Online by Gerhard 
Peters and John T. Woolley, #e American Presidency Project.
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had supported al-Qaeda to some capacity in carrying out the attack,58 and 
that it was working to acquire weapons of mass destruction (WMDs).59 Due 
to the passage of the “Joint Resolution to Authorize the use of United States 
Armed Forces against #ose Responsible for the Recent Attacks Launched 
against the United States,” the president had the authority to “take military 
action against any nation, organization, or persons that had been involved 
in the 9/11 attacks.”60 #e Bush administration was determined to include 
Iraq in this group, and in his 2002 State of the Union Address, Bush began 
his campaign to do this.  In his speech he labeled Iraq as a member of a 
new “axis of evil” consisting of states aimed at threatening the peace of the 
world.61  He would continue to de$ne how big of a threat Hussein was to the 
United States throughout the year, until, on October 10th and 11th, Congress 
passed the “Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution 
of 2002.”62 By March of the following year, the United States had begun 
military operations in Iraq,63 and by May of that same year, President Bush 
announced that, “major combat operations in Iraq have ended” from the 
deck of the U.S.S. Abraham Lincoln.64
So what was going through the minds of the American public throughout 
this period of quick, policy decisions?  Well, in general, most of the public 
58  George W. Bush, “Letter to the Speaker of the House of Representatives Transmitting a 
Supplemental Appropriations Request for Ongoing Military and Intelligence Operations 
in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Elsewhere,” September 17, 2003. Online by Gerhard Peters and 
John T. Woolley, #e American Presidency Project. 
59  George W. Bush, “Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the 
Union,” January 29, 2002. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, #e American 
Presidency Project. 
60  Ole R. Holsti, American Public Opinion on the Iraq War (University of Michigan Press, 
November 2011).
61  Bush, “Address before a Joint Session of Congress on the State of the Union,” 2002.
62  U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. International Relations Committee. 2002. Au-
thorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002. 107th Congress, Second 
Session, October 10 – 11 and October 16.
63  George W. Bush, “Address to the Nation on Iraq,” March 19, 2003. Online by Gerhard 
Peters and John T. Woolley, #e American Presidency Project.
64  George W. Bush, “Address to the Nation on Iraq From the U.S.S. Abraham Lincoln,” 
May 1, 2003. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, #e American Presidency 
Project.
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was supportive of the policy, with Bush’s approval rating reaching a peak of 
76% after the fall of Baghdad.65 It was easy for the public to support such a 
foreign policy since the war e"ort was to prevent Iraq from acquiring WMDs, 
further the growing “global war on terrorism,”66 and promote democracy.67 
#is might suggest a causal relationship between the public opinion and the 
policy decisions made, however causality is not present.  #e policies made by 
the Bush administration at the onset of the Iraq War were not in response to 
public polling data, but rather policies the administration wanted to pursue.68 
Paul Wolfowitz, the United States Deputy Secretary during the $rst term of 
the Bush administration, stated, “We settled on [WMDs as the core reason 
to go to war because] everyone could agree.”69 It was not as though the public 
believed Iraq had WMDs and then pressured their elected o!cials to pursue a 
more aggressive policy, but rather the elected o!cials framing their policy so 
“everyone could agree.”70 However, this massive support would not last, and as 
of 2004, Bush’s approval rating began a slow, consistent, decline.71
At the beginning of 2004, public opinion for the Iraq War was positive, with 
between 54% and 58% saying that the war was not a mistake.72 Five months 
later, after the announcement that the U.S. would transfer sovereignty back to 
Iraq, polling data found that the percent of Americans in support of the war 
had fallen to 46%.73 A large majority of the public believed that the transfer 
of power was a sign that U.S. policy was failing because the transfer occurred 
before the U.S. could bring about stability in the country.74 When asked how 
long they thought the U.S. should have a signi$cant number of troops in Iraq, 
65  Joseph Carroll, “#e Iraq-Vietnam Comparison,” Gallup Organization, June 15, 2004.
66  Holsti, American Public Opinion on the Iraq War
67  Bush, “Remarks on Singing the Emergency…” 2003.
68  Holsti, American Public Opinion on the Iraq War
69  Ibid.
70  Ibid.
71  Carroll, “#e Iraq-Vietnam comparison”
72  Ibid.
73  Lydia Saad, “Americans Applaud Transfer of Sovereignty to Iraq: Have mixed expectations 
for future of Iraq,” Gallup Organization, June 29, 2004.
74  Ibid.
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the study found that a majority said less than a year.75 By the end of the year, 
a majority of people disapproved of the United States’ decision to go to war 
with Iraq.76 #e quick decline in public approval for the Iraq war is likely 
due to the lack of any evidence suggesting Iraq had WMDs and revelations 
made by the 9/11 Commission.  In October of 2003, David Kay, the head 
of the group responsible for locating WMDs in Iraq, gave a preliminary 
report to Congress in which he stated that his inspection team had failed 
to $nd any WMDs in the country.77 #e summer of the next year, the 9/11 
Commission found that there was “no credible evidence that Iraq and al 
Qaeda had cooperated on attacks against the U.S.”78 #ese $ndings showed 
that the Bush administration was incorrect when they began to formulate 
the Iraq policy that would de$ne the decade.  #ese blunders of the admin-
istration are likely what led to the quick change in public opinion.
By 2005, the growing public opinion was that the war in Iraq was going 
badly for the United States.79 Regardless, the Bush administration pushed on 
with their Iraq policy.  In an interview on CNN, then Vice President Dick 
Cheney stated, “we’ll leave as soon as the task is over with.”80 President Bush 
continued in this rhetoric when he said, “we’re not leaving, so long as I’m the 
President.”81 #e true e"ect or lack thereof, that public opinion had on for-
eign policy during the Iraq War is evident when listening to Bush’s own words 
regarding the matter, “I don’t think you’ve ever heard me say, ‘Gosh, I’d better 
change position because the polls say this or that’… I’m going to do what I 
think is right, and if people don’t like me for it, that’s just the way it is.”82 #is 
idea became practice when Bush committed an additional 20,000 American 
75  Ibid.
76 Je"rey M. Jones, “Public’s Evaluation of Iraq War Grows More Negative: Americans still 
divided over decision to go to war,” !e Gallup Organization, December 22, 2004.
77  Holsti, American Public Opinion on the Iraq War
78  Ibid.
79  Joseph Carroll, “Americans’ Views of the Iraq War Sour: President Bush’s approval ratings 
on Iraq hold Steady at 42%,” !e Gallup Organization, May 5, 2005.
80  Dick Cheney, interview by Larry King, CNN Larry King Live, May 30, 2005.
81  George W. Bush, “#e President’s News Conference,” August 21, 2006. Online by Ger-
hard Peters and John T. Woolley, #e American Presidency Project.
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troops and an additional carrier strike group to Iraq,83 even as polling data 
showed that 60% of Americans believed that originally sending troops to 
Iraq was a mistake,84 and a majority believed that U.S. troops should be 
withdrawn from Iraq within a year.85 It was not until the end of 2008 that 
Bush $nally announced a decrease in the U.S. military presence, when he 
stated, “Iraqi forces will now take the lead in security operations in Anbar, 
with American troops moving into an over-watch role.”86 
De-escalation of U.S. military involvement in Iraq began when President 
Barack Obama took o!ce in 2009.  In a speech given at Camp Lejeune, North 
Carolina, the President announced that the U.S. combat mission would end 
by August 31, 2010, leaving only transitional forces to be removed by the end 
of 2011.87 #e war was $nally over on December 15, 2011 when the President 
announced that the troops were preparing to make their $nal march out of the 
country.88 #e Iraq War is evidence of the ine"ectiveness that public opinion 
truly has on U.S. foreign policy.  For half of Bush’s Presidency, the policy deci-
sions he was making were the policy choices that the majority public opinion 
didn’t want.  Perhaps because of this, “nearly two-thirds say his administration 
will be remembered more for its failures than its accomplishments.”89
Implications
#e ine"ectiveness that public opinion has on U.S. foreign policy is telling of 
the future of how the U.S. public, and the world, views U.S. foreign policy. 
As other states make gains in catching up to the United States in terms of 
83  George W. Bush, “Address to the Nation on Military Operations in Iraq,” January 10, 
2007. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, #e American Presidency Project.
84  Je"rey M. Jones, “Opposition to Iraq War Reaches New High: Sixty-three percent say 
U.S. made mistake in sending troops,” #e Gallup Organization, April 24, 2008.
85  David W. Moore, “#ree Years of war Have Eroded Public Support: majority of Ameri-
cans want U.S. troops home within a year,” !e Gallup Organization, March 17, 2006.
86  George W. Bush, “Statement on the War on Terror in Iraq,” September 1, 2008. Online 
by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, #e American Presidency Project.
87  Barack Obama, “Remarks on Military Operations in Iraq at Camp Lejeune, North Car-
olina,” February 27, 2009. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, #e American 
Presidency.
88  Barack Obama, “#e President’s Weekly Address,” December 17, 2011. Online by Ger-
hard Peters and John T. Woolley, #e American Presidency Project.
89  Keeter, “Trends in Public Opinion about the War in Iraq, 2003-2007.”
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hegemonic power, the U.S. attempts to retain their unipolar status, most 
notably with the “pivot to Asia,” which is “aimed at increasing America’s 
in&uence in Asia” to counter a growing China.90 At the same time, the United 
States has the ongoing mission of spreading democracy and the ideals that 
are a part of it.91 #is is clear when looking at the case studies presented in 
this paper, for administrations in both the Vietnam92 and Iraq93 war claimed 
a large part of the war e"ort was to spread democracy.  Due to the fact that 
these are important policy issues for the United States, the foreign policy 
decisions made in the future will become ever important. 
#e future importance of foreign policy decisions reveal the inaccuracy of 
the conventional wisdom that public opinion should and does have a large 
amount of in&uence over U.S. foreign policy decisions.  .  It is clear from 
the research $ndings that policy elites do not adhere to the will of the people 
when it comes to foreign policy decisions, but rather, “must necessarily engage 
in the process of ‘manufacturing consent’ from the public.”94 #is “manu-
factured consent” is highlighted by Ole R. Holsti, who wrote, “policies are 
chosen beforehand, polls used to spin them.”95 #e idea presented here shows 
just how policy is formed without thinking of the public opinion.  In fact, 
according to Holsti, the only important thing that the public opinion is good 
for is learning how to sell policy decisions to the public.  #is “manufactured 
consent” is evidence that decision-making is becoming more concentrated 
in the power elite.  #e power elite is extremely under representative of the 
public, as it is comprised of industry leaders from political, economic, and 
military sectors.96 #ese members consider each other as “among those who 
count,”97 e"ectively stating that the public does not count, and therefore the 
90  David Nakamura, “On Asia trip, Obama makes the case for U.S. relevance – and his 
own,” !e Washington Post, November 15, 2014.
91  Ibid.
92  Johnson, “Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union.” 
93  Bush, “Remarks on Signing the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense 
and for the Reconstruction of Iraq and Afghanistan, 2004” 
94  Walter Lippmann, Public Opinion (New York: Macmillan, 1992).
95  Holsti, American Public Opinion on the Iraq War.
96  Wright, !e Power Elite
97  Ibid.
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public opinion does not count or matter.  As the decision makers of foreign 
policy become more concentrated in the “power elite,” the foreign policy 
decisions will become less representative of the public. #is will cause the 
future of U.S. foreign policy to resemble an oligarchy rather than a democracy, 
potentially a hindrance to the United States’ ability to spread democratic 
ideals overseas.  It is clear from the research presented that public opinion 
is not at all e"ective at in&uencing U.S. foreign policy.
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Lauren’s interest in law began with a childhood argument between herself 
and a friend, who told Lauren that she should be a lawyer. “She may not 
have meant that in a good way, but it got me thinking,” said Lauren. #is 
spark of interest followed her into high school, where she joined her school’s 
mock trial team. At that point she knew exactly what she would study in 
college. Lauren came to Cal Poly as a Political Science major and went on 
to obtain a minor in Psychology, as well as a concentration in Pre-Law, and 
by graduation she would leave a lasting legacy on campus.
Disheartened by the fact that Cal Poly had no mock trial club at the time, 
Lauren worked with Dr. Moore in her junior year to create the $rst team on 
campus. #ey went to a handful of competitions, and the experience of that $rst 
team led to the club being added as the class that students enjoy today. Lauren 
also contributed to campus by becoming a LINKS mentor in her sophomore 
year, helping at-risk freshmen with their work and guiding them through the 
challenges of their $rst year at college. She further helped students by working for 
Student Support Services as a writing advisor in the last half of her college career. 
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Cal Poly assisted Lauren by supporting her development through op-
portunities for internships, which contributed to her present successes. In 
the summer between her junior and senior years Lauren got a job at the 
Monterey County District Attorney’s O!ce in the Domestic Violence Unit, 
where she worked one-on-one with an attorney to prepare for a murder trial. 
#is internship was a great learn-by-doing moment for her and she cites this 
experience as one of the reasons she got into law school. Lauren’s favorite class 
at Cal Poly was Civil Liberties, taught by Dr. Den Otter, because it exposed 
her to the type of class she would be taking in law school and because of Dr. 
Den Otter’s lively and engaging presentation of the material.
Lauren graduated in 2008 and went directly to the UCLA School of Law. 
In between each year in law school, she acquired real-world legal experience 
from multiple jobs. Even before going to college, Lauren had worked for a 
federal district court judge as an extern (short-term intern), which gave her 
a “behind-the-scenes look” at the judiciary. While at UCLA, she worked as 
a Summer Associate at Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan, LLP, where 
Lauren currently works today. #en, about a year after graduating from 
law school and starting as an Associate at Quinn Emanuel, she took the 
opportunity to spend a year clerking for a federal judge in the United States 
District Court for the Central District of California. #is was a great learn-
ing experience for Lauren, who says, “It really helped me to understand the 
life-cycle of a case because you get to see cases at all di"erent stages.” #e 
clerkship helped her hone her skills and gave her a high degree of access to 
the decision-making process of the court, teaching her valuable lessons about 
the most e"ective way to present an argument.
Once her clerkship was over, Lauren rejoined Quinn Emanuel as an 
Associate, where she specializes in business litigation. Her responsibilities 
cover a wide range of skills, from legal research and writing briefs to prepar-
ing for settlement conferences and trials. Lauren has been back with Quinn 
Emanuel for almost two years now, and although her focus is in business 
law, she also has an interest in pro bono work.
Lauren says the most important thing for students to know before studying 
law is to be sure that a career as a lawyer is what they truly want. Student 
debt is her main worry for students today. Lauren explained that students 
should not “just go to grad school because you’re not really sure what else 
to do.” Lauren’s experiences at Cal Poly contributed to where she is today, 
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and she hopes that others seize the opportunities they have in college to get 
practical experiences in courts and law o!ces prior to embarking on a legal 
career to get $rsthand exposure to what the day-to-day operations are like. 
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Danielle Veatch
Executive Summary 
Sex tra!cking a"ects an estimated 1.4 million people worldwide, and is 
prevalent in almost every country.1 It is a gross violation of human dignity 
and directly violates an individual’s right to personal autonomy.2 #is in-
ternational crime preys upon vulnerable populations, abusing weaknesses 
and exploiting individuals for economic pro$t. Sex tra!cking is the second 
largest and the fastest growing transnational crime, with industry pro$ts of 
$31.6 billion a year.3 #is issue also greatly impacts the safety of the public 
and especially youth, as the average age of entry into sexual exploitation, 
1  Besler, Patrick. “Forced labor and human tra!cking: estimating the pro$ts.” International 
Labor Organization. 2005. http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/@ed_norm/@declara-
tion/documents/publication/wcms_081971.pdf.
2  United Nations. “United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.” 
United Nations O!ce on Drugs and Crime. 2000.
3  Global Financial Integrity. “Transnational crime in the developing world.” 2011. http://
www.g$ntegrity.org/storage/g$p/documents/reports/transcrime/g$_transnational_crime_
web.pdf.
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or child sex tra!cking, is 12 to 14 years of age.4 Within the United States, 
stakeholders at all levels must continue to collaborate and work diligently 
together to further develop e"ective solutions, including holistic prevention, 
intervention, and restoration measures. In comparison to other nations, 
the Nordic Model has and continues to show promising results for Sweden 
as well as many other countries. Within the U.S., implementation of the 
Nordic Model would decriminalize sex tra!cking victims, prosecute clients 
and tra!ckers strictly, and reduce the entry and re-entry into sex tra!cking. 
Common Interest 
Sex tra!cking is a heinous crime, as victims endure “severe physical injuries, 
including stabbings, beatings, broken bones, spinal injuries, concussions, 
and fractured skulls, and psychological impacts include clinical depression, 
self-cutting, suicide, and post-traumatic stress disorder.”5 Sex tra!cking 
poses a severe threat to the public and especially children. Using mentally 
and physically coercive techniques, tra!ckers, also known as pimps , ma-
nipulate and control victims. Within the general public anyone is a target, 
however, youth are easy to mold and in&uence, especially abused, neglected, 
and or poor youth. Interest, gifts, and or adoration from a tra!cker posing 
as a boyfriend, savior, or helper lures such individuals away from safety and 
initiates the process of sex tra!cking.6 Additionally, women and girls, unlike 
drugs or weapons that only have one to two buyers, are frequent subjects 
in multiple transactions throughout the day and throughout their time in 
tra!cking. Consequently, they are reusable assets and fetch larger pro$ts for 
tra!ckers.7 #us, increased safety of the public, and speci$cally children, 
must be at the forefront of the U.S.’s agenda in combatting sex tra!cking, 
both nationally and internationally.   
4  Polaris Project. Child tra!cking and the child welfare system. 2014. www.polarisproject.
org/storage/child-tra!cking-child-welfare.pdf.
5  Mishra, V. “Combating human tra!cking: gaps in policy and law.” Sage Publications, 
2015.
6  U.S. Department of Education. “Human tra!cking of children in the United States.” 
U.S. Department of Education. 2013. http://www2.ed.gov/about/o!ces/list/oese/oshs/
factsheet.html. 
7  Claude, K. “Targeting the Sex Buyer: the Swedish example, stopping prostitution and 
tra!cking where it all begins.” Swedish Institute. 2010. http://exoduscry.com/wp-content/
uploads/2010/07/swedish_model.pdf.
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Sex tra!cking impacts almost every nation in the world. Countries serve 
as a source and destination location for tra!cking women, children, and 
occasionally men, from one country to another. Sex tra!cking is the second 
fastest growing transnational crime and third most pro$table.8 Victims are 
displaced, and many times unable to return home due to immigration issues, 
as documents are taken away and used to control victims.9 Transnational 
Organized Crime (TOC), in relation to sex tra!cking, often “penetrates 
governments…exacerbating corruption and undermining rule of law, judi-
cial systems, free press, democratic institution-building, and transparency. 
TOC networks insinuate themselves into the political process in a variety 
of ways: through direct bribery, setting up shadow economies, in$ltrating 
$nancial and security sectors through coercion or corruption, and position-
ing themselves as alternate providers of governance, security, services, and 
livelihoods.”10 #us, the decrease of TOC is crucial in the U.S.’s objective 
to $ght sex tra!cking. 
Trends 
#e International Labor Organization estimates that between cross-border tra!cking 
and tra!cking within countries, 1.4 million people are victims of sex tra!cking.11 
Major source countries, or origin of tra!cked persons, include: Brazil, Colombia, 
Mexico, Nigeria, Morocco, Myanmar, and Vietnam.12 Major destination countries, 
where victims are brought to perform sexual services, include: United States, Canada, 
the European Union, Japan, Australia, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia.13 Sex tra!cking 
is a transnational crime, having both source and destination countries.14 As 
8  United Nations. “Tra!cking in Persons: global patterns.” United Nation O!ce on Drugs 
and Crime. 2006. http://www.unodc.org/pdf/tra!ckinginpersons_report_2006ver2.pdf.
9  Polaris Project. #e victims and tra!ckers. 2011. https://polarisproject.org/victims-traf-
$ckers.
10  National Security Council. “Transnational organized crime: a growing threat to national 
and international security.” #e White House. 2015. https://www.whitehouse.gov/adminis-
tration/eop/nsc/transnational-crime/threat.
11  Op. Cit., fn. 1
12  Op. Cit., fn. 8
13  Op. Cit., fn. 8 
14  United Nations. “Tra!cking in Persons: global patterns.” United Nation O!ce on Drugs 
and Crime. 2006. http://www.unodc.org/pdf/tra!ckinginpersons_report_2006ver2.pdf.
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illustrated in Figure 1, a large percentage of victims of source countries come 
from impoverished nations.15 Poverty signi$cantly contributes to the vulnera-
bility of individuals and increases the likelihood of being tra!cked.16 Destination 
countries are primarily $rst-world nations, where hypersexuality is more prev-
alent.17 #us showing a demand and supply e"ect. #e sex tra!cking industry 
pro$ts $31.6 billion a year and is the second most proli$c organized crime 
industry worldwide.18
Figure 1: Transnational Flow of Destination and Source Countries
15  Ibid.
16  Ibid.
17  Mickelwait, Laila. City in Focus: Los Angeles. 2014. http://exoduscry.com/prayer/city-
in-focus/los-angeles/.National Security Council. “Transnational organized crime: a growing 
threat to national and international security.”
18  Global Financial Integrity. “Transnational crime in the developing world.” 2011. http://
www.g$ntegrity.org/storage/g$p/documents/reports/transcrime/g$_transnational_crime_
web.pdf.
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In 2014, 1,350 cases of sex tra!cking involved minors. #e Polaris Project 
estimates the average age of entry into child exploitation, or child sex tra!cking, is 
12 to 14 years of age.19 In particular, homeless youth and runaways are especially 
at-risk. According to the National Human Tra!cking Resource Center (NHTRC), 
56% of prostituted women, including those that were tra!cked, were initially 
runaway youth.20 Tra!ckers prey upon youth using social media, after-school 
programs, shopping malls, bus depots, and friends or acquaintances.21 
Conditions
#e prevalence of sex tra!cking is widely contributed to the demand for sexual 
services; without a demand, supplies are not necessary. Demand stems widely 
from an overly sexualized culture, where objecti$cation of women and girls is 
normalized. Society is so excessively stimulated with sex that even Playboy made 
a decision to remove all pornographic images and videos from its production. 
#eir reasoning, “you’re now one click away from every sex act imaginable for 
free. And it’s just passe at this juncture.”22 In particular, porn creates an unrealistic 
perception of sex. A recent study shows that men who are frequent users of porn 
are also frequent users of prostitutes.23 Indeed, 80 percent of clients show por-
nographic images or videos to prostitutes, asking for the same service(s).24 Sex 
tra!cking is the most common form of human tra!cking, accounting for 79 
percent, and the victims are predominately women and girls.25 Objecti$cation 
of the female body, and the exponentially growing availability to act-out such 
objecti$cation has increased the hypersexuality of many cultures and societies, 
and has undoubtedly spawned a demand for sex; tra!ckers have taken the $scal 
opportunity to meet such demands. On the supply side, victims are often already 
victimized through abusive family environments or have endured prior sexual 
19  Op. Cit., fn. 4
20  National Human Tra!cking Resource Center. “#e Victims.” Tra!cking Resource Cen-
ter. 2015. http://www.tra!ckingresourcecenter.org/what-human-tra!cking/human-tra!ck-
ing/victims?gclid=CKbP5IHz7cgCFYM6gQodEKkMZg.
21  Op. Cit., fn. 6
22  Somaiya, R. Nudes are old news at Playboy. October 12, 2015.
23  Farley, M, and V . Vol 11 (4): 29-64. Kelly. “Prostitution: A critical review of the medical 
and social science literature.” Women and Criminal Justice 11, no. 4 (2000): 29-64.
24  Op. Cit., fn. 6
25  Op. Cit., fn. 14
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abuse.26 #is makes such individuals signi$cantly more vulnerable to the deceptive 
and coercive methods used by tra!ckers to control victims. As illustrated in Figure 
2, tra!ckers use techniques within the power and control spectrum to successfully 
manipulate and therefore exploit individuals. Understanding, in-depth, the psy-
chological trauma of such tactics in&uences stakeholders, speci$cally service pro-
viders, on how to meet the needs of victims.  Such knowledge also serves in en-
lightening stakeholders to the link between sex tra!cking and prostitution, as the 
same tactics a"ect victims of sex tra!cking as well as prostituted individuals.27
Figure 2: Power and Control Spectrum
26  Op. Cit., fn. 20
27  Farley, M. “Prostitution and tra!cking in nine countries: An update on violence and 
posttraumatic stress disorder.” Prostitution Research. 2003. http://www.prostitutionresearch.
com/pdf/Prostitutionin9Countries.pdf.
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Technology,  especially advancements in transportation, provides a strong 
bridge between supply and demand, making it easier for tra!ckers to meet 
the demands of clients. According to Exodus Cry, “with a simple click of 
a button or tap on a screen, today’s pornography can be accessed anytime, 
anywhere, and for any price, even for free.”28 Tra!ckers can now rely on ad-
vertising the available services of victims online through specialized websites, 
as well as, prominent sites such as BackPage and Craigslist.29 In many cases 
Social Media is used to reach out to youth to exploit weaknesses, such as 
family issues and insecurities that are often expressed on Social Media sites.30 
Technology has also made it possible for tra!ckers to identify smuggling 
routes, leverage communication networks, share bank accounts, and make 
wire transfers, all in an e"ort to increase business.31 Tra!ckers can now use 
modern transportation, airplanes, vehicles, and trains, to easily transfer 
victims from source nations to destination nations.32 Displacement of an 
individual  aids in a tra!ckers ability to control victims. When a victim is 
transported to a foreign nation with foreign language, customs, and culture, 
it creates a forced dependence on the tra!cker.33 Additionally, tra!ckers 
easily move victims from one location to another to avoid interference with 
law enforcement.34 
Alternatives 
Of the most e"ective approaches to dealing with the issue of sex tra!cking, 
the Nordic, or Swedish, Model has shown substantial results in reducing 
prostitution of individuals, and therefore reducing tra!cking. #e Nordic 
Model, in comparison to legalizing the industry of prostitution and decrim-
inalization of clients, shows results in decreasing the issue of sex tra!cking. 
Countries with the legalization approach, such as the Netherlands, have 
28  Op. Cit., fn. 17
29  U.S Department of State. “Tra!cking in persons report.” U.S Department of State. 2015. 
http://www.state.gov/j/tip/rls/tiprpt/.
30  Op. Cit., fn. 6
31  Ibid.
32  Ibid.
33  Ibid.
34  Op. Cit., fn. 20
paideia
96
higher rates of sex tra!cking.35 In Sweden, the Nordic Model deters tra!ckers, 
as clientele is almost non-existent. Similarly, Las Vegas, Nevada, known for 
its legalization of the prostitution industry, recovered 2,229 victims of sex 
tra!cking over the last decade.36 Legalizing the industry of prostitution does 
not prevent tra!cking; it increases it, and therefore is not a viable solution. 
#e progressive model decriminalizes prostituted individuals, as a majority 
of prostituted individuals are also sex tra!cking victims, enduring the same 
trauma, psychological manipulation, and physical abuse. In addition the 
model criminalizes johns and pimps, and promotes the value of women to 
subdue the objecti$cation of females. Victimized individuals even receive 
resources and assistance from governmental and non-governmental agencies 
towards reducing recidivism back into the industry. Since its enactment in 
1999, Sweden’s number of prostitutes decreased signi$cantly from about 
3000 to an estimated 200 individuals.37 Other countries such as Denmark, 
Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Canada are experiencing similar results since 
the enactment of laws similar to the Swedish Model.38 In Sweden, sex-buyers 
risk their careers and families, as prosecuted individuals incur $nes, and or up 
to a year in prison. #e Nordic Model altered behavior of male sex buyers, 
by decreasing purchase of sexual services from 13.6 percent to 7.9 percent.39
Such a model, if implemented within the United States, would deter buyers 
from engaging in sexual acts and therefore decrease the demand for sexual 
exploitation and sex tra!cking. For undeterred individuals, prosecution with 
$nes and or a prison sentence will increasingly prevent them from obtaining 
sexual services and defeat any future endeavors. Low demand will also deter 
tra!ckers from exploiting vulnerable individuals, and thus increase public 
and child safety. Promoting a culture in which women are not objecti$ed will 
result in less porn use and therefore a decrease in hypersexuality. A decrease 
of hypersexuality, and therefore demand, from a large source of consumed 
35  Re#ink Life. Prostitution in Canada. June 4, 2014. http://www.rethinklife.org/blog/cate-
gory/prostitution.Shryock, Kathleen. “City in Focus: Las Vegas, Nevada.” Exodus Cry. 2014. 
https://exoduscry.com/prayer/city-in-focus/las-vegas-nevada/.
36  Shryock, Kathleen. “City in Focus: Las Vegas, Nevada.” Exodus Cry. 2014. https://exodu-
scry.com/prayer/city-in-focus/las-vegas-nevada/.
37  Op. Cit., fn. 7
38  Op. Cit., fn. 7
39  Op. Cit., fn. 7
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sexual services, will ultimately reduce transnational crime, in relationship 
to sex tra!cking. 
 In addition to the cultural and legal aspects of the Nordic Model, its 
priority to supply resources for victimized individuals includes an increase 
in the current funds provided to governmental and non-governmental or-
ganizations. #e Tra!cking Victims Protection Act, which already allocates 
funds to speci$c entities involved in anti-human tra!cking work, in collab-
oration with the Nordic Model, would disperse resources to organizations 
implementing prevention, intervention, and restoration measures.40 Such 
resources would provide crucial services to victims, helping to reduce re-entry 
into tra!cking. Additionally, it would  empower individuals to re-integrate 
back into society successfully and provide them the means to become con-
tributing members of society, as well as strong advocates in the crucial $ght 
to eradicate sex tra!cking.
40  Polaris Project. Policy Advocacy: Current Federal Laws. 2014. http://www.polarisproject.
org/what-we-do/policy-advocacy/national-policy/priority-legislation.
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EXAMINING CORPORATE POWER AT HOME AND ABROAD
Ginger Jacobs
Real World Observation
On March 25, 2015 Representative Mike Pompeo (R-KS) introduced the 
“Safe and Accurate Food Labeling Act.”1 #e act proposes a new government 
certi$cation for foods free of genetically modi$ed ingredients, or GMOs. 
#is government-certi$ed label would allow companies that want to advertise 
their foods as GMO-free to do so. #e certi$cation would be completely 
voluntary.2 #is proposal is an attempt by the agricultural biotechnology 
industry to head o" recent e"orts by states to make GMO labeling man-
datory. If passed, Pompeo’s bill, would override legislation that has been 
passed in Maine, Connecticut, and Vermont that require mandatory GMO 
labeling. While the laws in Maine and Connecticut depend on similar laws 
being passed in neighboring states, the Vermont labeling law is set to go into 
1  U.S. Congress. Rep. Pompeo, Mike. H.R. 1599. Safe and Accurate Food Labeling Act of 
2015. 114th Congress, (introduced March 25, 2015). 
2  #e Associate Press, “Bill Would Create Organic-Type Labels for Nonmodi$ed Foods,” 
!e New York Times, March 24 2015. 
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e"ect on July 1, 2016.3 #e industry, which supports Pompeo, is dominat-
ed globally by a handful of agrichemical and seed companies, including 
Monsanto Co., DuPont Pioneer, Dow AgroSciences, and Syngenta.4 #ese 
companies strongly oppose the individual state e"orts to make GMO la-
beling mandatory, saying that labels would be misleading because GMOs 
are safe and labeling them would make consumers believe otherwise. #ey 
also claim that inconsistent state laws would be confusing and costly for 
consumers and for companies.5 
Since the commercialization of the world’s $rst genetically engineered 
crops in 1996, there has been an ongoing debate globally about the safety 
and e"ectiveness of GMOs.6 While the topic has always been controversial, 
concerns about GMOs in the United States have historically been a margin-
alized issue. However, in recent years this has changed. Concern regarding 
the safety of GMOs has completely exploded in the US, making GMOs 
a household term and a mainstream issue. Consumers have taken it upon 
themselves to $ght for and implement GMO legislation, as can be seen in 
Maine, Connecticut, and Vermont. In fact, GMO labeling bills have been 
proposed in some 20 states showing that these concerns are not dissipating.7 
Previously the agricultural biotechnology industry went relatively unnoticed 
by the American public, but now the industry has a lot to lose. #e intro-
duction of the “Safe and Accurate Food Labeling Act” demonstrates that 
the industry recognizes this, and it is their attempt to nationally undermine 
the legal e"orts that individuals have taken in their states. #ey are $ghting 
back, and they are winning. So far the corporations have been successful 
in fully protecting their interests by delaying or nullifying GMO-related 
legislation through lawsuits and now the proposal of this act, despite the 
fact that the people American people have already voted.
#e “Safe and Accurate Food Labeling Act” represents a power struggle 
3  Ibid.
4  #ompson Megan, “GMO seeds grow into big $ght on Kauai,” PBS NEWHOUR, 
December 23, 2013.
5  Op. Cit., fn. 2
6  REUTERS, “Factbox: GMO Crops Have History of Controversy,” !e New York Times, 
October 29 2014. 
7  Amy Harmon, “A Lonely Quest for Facts on Genetically Modi$ed Crops,” !e New York 
Times, January 4, 2014.
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between people and corporations, a power struggle that has a long tradition 
in the global political arena. Historically, sometimes the people’s interests 
have prevailed, and sometimes the corporations’ interests have prevailed. 
Resulting in a general equilibrium between the two groups’ authority and 
in&uence. Corporations have always held power, but democratic institutions 
have traditionally been able to implement legislation that re&ects the people’s 
convictions and demands. However, as we can see, corporations are gain-
ing power and in&uence both domestically and internationally. New trade 
laws of the 21st century dramatically increase the authority of international 
corporations. Such acts suggest a shift in the distribution of power between 
people’s democratic capabilities and corporate prerogatives on a global scale. 
Leading me to ask the research question: How are corporations increasingly 
overriding democratic legislation at home and abroad? 
Conventional Wisdom
#e conventional wisdom holds that many people believe that corporations 
enjoy too much power. According to a Gallup survey from January 2013, 70% 
of Democrats were very or somewhat dissatis$ed with the size and in&uence 
of major corporations, and 51% of Republicans were very or somewhat dis-
satis$ed with the size and in&uence of major corporations.8 A similar poll by 
Pew Research Center shows there is public agreement that the U.S. economic 
system unfairly favors powerful interests, and even more Americans believe 
that large corporations in this country are too powerful. #e study showed 
that 78% of people think too much power is concentrated in the hands of 
a few large companies. An additional study showed that 67% of people say 
government policies have helped large corporations at least a fair amount.9
Based on these non-partisan public opinion polls, the conventional wisdom 
on corporate power is incomplete. My research question challenges conven-
tional wisdom because while the layman’s view does think that corporations 
hold too much power, it does not take into account the bigger picture of 
how these corporations are gaining so much legal authority in democratic 
societies. #e fact of the matter is that even with growing corporations, most 
8  Saad, Lydia, “Americans Decry Power of Lobbyists, Corporations, Banks, Feds,” Gallup, 
April 11 2011.
9  “Fairness of the Economic System, Views of the Poor and the Social Safety Net,” Pew 
Research Center U.S. Politics & Policy, June 26 2014. 
paideia
102
people tend to think of states as the primary actors. However, states are 
increasingly handing over authority to corporations, giving them power to 
challenge domestic law. For example, corporations are receiving increasing 
authority through new trade laws in the 21st century. #is is in the state’s 
interest in part because it takes responsibility out of state’s hands. For example 
if Monsanto wins a lawsuit against a county or farmer, American politicians 
can say they did everything in their power but that the case was simply not 
in their control. #e public has yet to realize the extent of power that corpo-
rations hold today, and how it is a"ecting the democratic process.,  Finally, 
the public is largely unaware of the state’s  active participation in the process. 
Methodology 
I utilize qualitative methodology in order to examine my research question. 
I use three case studies to explain how corporations are gaining authority 
at home and abroad. #e $rst case study addresses the role of corporations 
domestically, with GMO movements in Hawaii and California. My second 
case study looks at the role of corporations through international trade 
agreements, speci$cally the Investor State Dispute Settlement by examining 
the role of tobacco industry leader Philip Morris in it’s current legal dispute 
with Australia and Uruguay. My third and $nal case addresses corporation’s 
relationships with states and the WTO, through the WTO Tuna Dispute: 
Mexico v United States. My research $ndings are based on primary sources 
such as nonpartisan public polls, hearing transcripts, and state and federal 
documents. I also use a wide range of secondary sources including articles 
from the New York Times, the Wall Street Journal, Forbes, and more. 
"eoretical Paradigms
#e theoretical paradigm of Marxism best frames and explains the answer to 
my research question. Founded by Karl Marx, Marxism states that society is 
based upon the material exchange of capital. Marxism’s primary assumption 
is that capitalism is exploitative. #is assumption helps to explain the actions 
taken by corporations in my research $ndings. Marx argued that change has to 
be system-driven, providing an explanation for why people’s attempts at com-
bating corporate power, as can be seen in my research, is relatively unsuccessful. 
Leo Panitch’s concept of a non-territorial empire provides an additional 
ideology to further frame and explain my research. Panitch, like Marx, focuses 
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on the spread of capitalism. He sees globalization as a form of informal im-
perialism by capitalist states. He argues that the process of globalization is 
being led speci$cally by America through organizations such at the Federal 
Reserve of the World Bank. Panitch says that this non-territorial empire was 
consciously planned and managed by states, and furthermore that multi-
national corporations have power in the world order because that power is 
given to them by capitalist states.10 
GMO Cases in Hawaii and California
Large biotech companies like Syngenta, Monsanto, Pioneer, Dow and BASF 
have long been experimenting with GMO crops and seeds in Hawaii. #ese 
companies use Hawaii to produce genetically engineered seed for mainland 
farmers as well as conduct research on new strains. While it may seem odd 
for a place blossoming with exotic fruits to focus on plant a mostly associated 
with America’s Midwest, without seasonal interruptions, research can be 
accelerated by three or four fold. Mark Phillipson, who works for Syngenta, 
and is the president of Hawaii’s seed trade group, recently reiterated this. 
He said “Something that would take– ten-to-12 years to develop, we can 
do here in three-to-four years.”11
Today, the seed industry is now the state’s largest in the agriculture sector, 
reaching a value of $243 million, double of what it was six or seven years ago 
and worth more than triple the second-largest commodity, sugar. Currently 
operations exist on Maui, Kauai, Oahu and Molokai. #e industry employs 
1,397 people in the state. In 2010, these companies, which own or lease 
25,000 acres, exported 9.7 million pounds of seed from the islands, almost 
all of it corn. Corn is used for many purposes in the US, including in the 
production of high-fructose corn syrup and cattle feed.12 Corn makes up 95 
percent of the seed produced in Hawaii.13 In total, Hawaii has received more 
permits for $eld trials, with 2,996, than any other state, making it one of 
10  Leo Panitch, “#e New Imperial State,” (accessed Jun 9, 2015).
11  Op. Cit., fn. 4
12  Tom Callis, “GMO: $243 million seed industry largest in state’s ag sector,” West Hawaii 
Today, June 9, 2013. 
13  Op. Cit., fn. 4
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the major centers for genetic research.14 #ere’s nowhere in the world like it, 
given its combination of climate and familiar laws, said Cindy Goldstein, the 
outreach manager for Pioneer Hi-Bred International, the seed $rm owned 
by Dupont Co., which has operated in the state since 1968. #e familiar 
laws, Goldstein mentions is partially in reference to patent laws.15 Working 
in the U.S., instead of a warm place in another country, allows companies 
to develop seeds under strong U.S. patent law protections.16 
Along with the rest of the country, the people of Hawaii have become 
more and more aware of the presence of GMOs, and because of Hawaii’s 
importance to the GMO industry, the islands have become the center of 
this battle. In the past few years, not just one, but three Hawaiian counties 
have proposed anti-GMO legislation #e latest initiative has been passed by 
Maui. #e initiative was originally introduced by, the Sustainable Hawaiian 
Agriculture for the Keiki and the Aina movement, or SHAKA, who successful-
ly gathered 18,000 signatures for the initiatives introduction on the ballot.17 
In the course of the intense campaign, corporate giants outspent supporters 
by a ratio of 87 to 1. In support of the bill the total amount raised from 
Committees or PACS was $64,780, with the top donors being individual 
Hawaii residents. SHAKA also raised $70,000 through a crowd funding 
campaign online. In opposition, the Citizens Against the Maui County 
Farming Ban, raised $7,896,164. #e top three donors were Monsanto, 
Dow Agro Sciences, and the Council for Biotechnology information.18 #e 
money raised is along the lines of how much seed companies have been 
spending to battle GMO-related ballot initiatives across the country, but 
is unheard-of in Hawaii politics. #e amount of money that was raised by 
these corporations comes out to more than $90 per registered voter in Maui 
County, which has a population of just 160,000.Reports $led with the Federal 
Communications Commission show that corporations had contracts for more 
14  Op. Cit., fn. 12
15  Paul Voosen, “King Corn Takes Root in Hawaii,” !e New York Times, August 22, 2011.
16  Robynne Boyd, “Genetically Modi$ed Hawaii,” Scienti$c American, December 8, 2008.
17  Audrey, McAvoy, “Maui Votes To Temporarily Ban Growing of GMO Crops,” !e Hu"-
ington Post, November 4, 2014. 
18  “Maui County Genetically Modi$ed Organism Moratorium Initiative (November 
2014)”, BALLOTPEDIA.
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than $1.3 million worth of TV spots. #at makes the Maui County initiative 
among the top 20 most expensive ballot measures in the nation for spending 
on TV advertising, according to an analysis of statewide ballot initiatives 
by the Center for Public Integrity.19 One of the group’s TV spots features a 
senior citizens’ club president warning of hundreds of job losses. Another 
shows a former county councilwoman discussing the $nancial burden the 
county would shoulder to enforce any moratorium.
Despite, the massive campaigning and spending by these corporations, 
the citizens of Hawaii celebrated a huge victory when the GMO initiative 
was passed by 51.9%, with 23,082 votes voting in favor of the initiative 
and 22,005 votes against the initiative.20 #e initiative temporarily bans the 
farming of GMO crops in Maui County until the county conducts an analysis 
of the health e"ects of genetically modi$ed farming and foods. Under this 
law, the moratorium would be lifted only after a vote by the Maui County 
Council. #e law, which doesn’t apply to crops in mid-growth cycle, was 
supposed to go into e"ect when o!cials certi$ed the election results. 
Recently, Kauai and Hawaii county councils passed similar GMO bans, 
however shortly after the bans passed the same agricultural biotech corpo-
rations sued the perspective counties, and consequently a federal judge, 
Judge Barry Kurren, overturned them both. Having carefully studied this, 
the SHAKA Movement – along with the $ve citizens – immediately $led 
legal action. #e SHAKA Movement’s legal council asked the State judge to 
order Maui County o!cials to proceed forward in properly implementing 
the GMO Moratorium Bill.21 “#e people of Maui passed this law through 
the proper ballot initiative power; the county attorneys, as public servants, 
have a duty to defend it,” said George Kimbrell, attorney with Center for 
Food Safety, in a press release. #e following day, as predicted, Monsanto 
Co. and a Dow Chemical Co. $led a lawsuit in federal court in Honolulu, 
asking a judge to immediately prevent the law from taking e"ect and to 
invalidate the measure. “#is local referendum interferes with and con&icts 
19  Liz Whyte, “Corporations, Advocacy Groups Spend Big on Ballot Measures,” Center for 
Public Integrity, October 23, 2014. 
20  Hawaii Secretary of State. Final Summary Report. “General Election 2014-State of 
Hawaii-County of Maui”.
21  Op. Cit., fn. 18
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with long-established state and federal laws that support both the safety and 
lawful cultivation of GMO plants” Jon Purcell, Monsanto Hawaii’s business 
and technology lead, said in a statement.22
#e federal judge assigned to the case, U.S. District Court Chief Judge 
Susan Mollway, granted the corporations a preliminary injunction, pre-
venting the GMO initiative from taking e"ect until the court considers its 
legal merits further. #e injunction was originally supposed to be lifted on 
March 31. Mollway then pushed back the next hearing of the motions of the 
case to June 15, 2015. Mollway based her decision to further delaying the 
implementation of the moratorium on two bills introduced in the legislature 
this session that sought to block counties from regulating agriculture. Both 
bills are e"ectively dead this year but she noted that the issue could still 
resurface. #e SHAKA Movement and the people of Hawaii are outraged.23
Despite Kauai, Hawaii, and Maui County passing legislation to ban GMOs 
in their counties in the last few years, none of them have been implement-
ed. In each case as soon as the county passed the bill, the biotech industry 
leaders sued each county, and the cases got sent to federal court. County 
councils passed the Kauai and Hawaii county cases, but the Maui initiative 
was put on the ballot by the people, and voted by people despite massive 
campaigns from the corporations. Yet, so far there is nothing to show for the 
people’s votes. #rough lawsuits these corporations have managed to delay 
or nullify the legislation despite the fact that people have clearly expressed 
their opinion on the matter. In fact, the majority of the country sides with 
the people of Hawaii, in a 2013 New York Times poll, three-quarters of 
Americans surveyed expressed concern about G.M.O.s in their food.24 As one 
of the center of GMO experiments in the world, they are worried about the 
wellbeing of their health and environment. Additionally, they are frustrated 
that exercising the correct democratic processes has yet to successfully chal-
lenge the massive corporate presence on their islands.  While hopefully on 
June 15 Mollway decides to uphold the people’s wishes, given the history of 
the Judges decision in the Kauai and Hawaii cases it seems highly unlikely. 
22  Ibid.
23  Op. Cit., fn. 7
24  Amy Harmon, “A Lonely Quest for Facts on Genetically Modi$ed Crops,” !e New York 
Times, January 4, 2014.
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Most likely, the legal system will handover another win to the agricultural 
biotech industry.
However, the fact that people of Maui were able to unite against the large 
corporations and even pass the initiative is an accomplishment in it’s own 
right. GMO labeling legislation that was proposed in California, Colorado, 
Oregon, and Washington were all defeated due to massive outspending by 
corporations on campaigns. Prop 37 in California was relatively close but 
the initiative was beat with 51.4% of people voting against it. #ere were 
6,442,371 votes against the proposition, and 6,088,714 votes for it. As of 
November 3, 2012, about $45.6 million had been donated to the “No on 37” 
campaign e"ort. #e top three donors for the “no campaign” were Monsanto 
donating $8,112,867, Dupont donating $5,400,00, and Pepsico Inc. do-
nating $2,145,400.25 Other donors included the Grocery Manufacturers 
Association, Dow, Bayer, and more.
Jayson L. Lusk and Brandon R. McFadden from Oklahoma State University 
conducted a survey in 2012 of 822 likely voters of which76.8% intended to 
vote in favor of Proposition 37. #e study found that the possible increases in 
food prices slightly diminished support.26 Additionally, the study measured 
the e"ect of advertisements used in media campaigns by supporters and 
opponents of the proposition and found that the opponent’s advertisement 
was more e"ective in swaying likely voters. Another poll by USC Dornsife 
and the Los Angeles Times showed similar results. According to the study, 
just from October to September, there was a 17-point drop in support of 
the proposition.27
Monsanto and its allies have fought the labeling of genetically modi$ed 
vigorously since 1992, when the industry managed to persuade the Food 
and Drug Administration that the new crops were “substantially equivalent” 
to the old and so they did not need to be labeled, much less regulated. #is 
represented a breathtaking exercise of both political power (the F.D.A. policy 
was co-written by a lawyer whose former $rm worked for Monsanto) and 
25  California Proposition 37, Mandatory Labeling of Genetically Engineered Food (2012), 
BALLOTPEDIA.
26  Ibid.
27  Suzanne Wu, “Support Slips for Ballot Measure to Require Labeling of Genetically Modi-
$ed Foods,” USCDornsife, October 25, 2012.
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product positioning. #ese new crops were revolutionary enough to deserve 
patent protection and government support, yet at the same time the food 
made from them was no di"erent than it ever was, so did not need to be 
labeled. It is worth noting that ours was one of only a very few governments 
ever sold on this convenient reasoning: more than 60 other countries have 
seen $t to label genetically modi$ed food, including those in the European 
Union, Japan, Russia and China.28 #is time was no di"erent #e corpo-
ration won again in California, and they didn’t even have to $le lawsuits 
as they did in Hawaii, because their money altered the vote before people 
even cast their ballots. 
Philip Morris v. Australia and Uruguay
Australia became the $rst nation in the world to require “plain packaging” 
for tobacco. #e new laws require cigarettes to be sold in olive green packs 
without trademarks and with graphic health warnings. #ey were set to be 
introduced in December 2011, but were put on hold after the major tobacco 
companies including British American Tobacco, Philip Morris, Imperial 
Tobacco and Japan Tobacco challenged the new plain packaging legislation 
in Australia’s domestic court. #e companies argued the government was 
trying to acquire their intellectual property, including trademarks, without 
proper compensation.29 However, the government argued that it was only 
trying to regulate what appears on the boxes, after studies by the World 
Health Organization showed that plain packaging discourages smoking, 
especially in adolescents.30 On August 15, 2012 Australia’s High Court 
ruled that the plain packaging law did not result in an unconstitutional 
acquisition of property and was justi$ed as a public health measure. #e 
court even ordered that the Tobacco companies pay for Australia’s legal costs. 
Attorney General Nicola Roxon said in a statement addressing the Australian 
victory, “#e message to the rest of the world is big tobacco can be taken on 
and beaten.” Australia has been lauded by the World Health Organization 
as a leading public health example for other countries to follow. !e New 
28  Michael Pollan, “Vote for the Dinner Party,” The New York Times Magazine, October 10, 
2012.
29  “High Court rejects plain packaging challenge,” ABC NEWS, August 14, 2012. 
30  “Australia’s plain packaging laws successful, studies show,” ABC NEWS March 18, 2015. 
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York Times reports the plain packaging law is popular, with 59 percent of 
Australians approving.31 Meanwhile, a Hong Kong subsidiary of Philip Morris 
launched an investor-state case under the 1993 Australia-Hong Kong BIT.32 
#is is the $rst investor-state dispute that has ever been brought against 
Australia. Phillip-Morris has not yet speci$ed the amount of compensation it 
is demanding from the government, but Philip Morris spokeswoman, Anne 
Edwards said, “we would anticipate that the compensation would amount 
to billions.”33 In the lawsuit, Phillip Morris is arguing that plain packaging 
constitutes an expropriation of its Australian investments, that Australia is 
in breach of its commitment to accord fair and equitable treatment to Philip 
Morris, and that plain packaging constitutes an unreasonable and discrimi-
natory measure. Furthermore Philip Morris Asia claims that its investments 
have been deprived of the full protection and security that the Hong Kong 
Agreement is supposed to ensure them. In response, the Australian govern-
ment denied that the plain packaging proposal breaks any laws and said it 
would not back down.34
#e arbitration is being conducted under the United Nations Commission 
on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL). UNCITRAL formulates and reg-
ulates international trade in cooperation with the World Trade Organization. 
#e tribunal hearing the case is composed of three arbitrators, one appointed 
by Australia, one by Philip Morris, and one by the Secretary-General of the 
Permanent Court of Arbitration, this arbitrator acts as the presiding arbitra-
tor.35 #e tribunal was created on May 15, 2012. At Philip Morris’s request, 
the ongoing proceedings will be largely non-transparent, with public hearings 
prohibited and the public release of most documents left up to the discretion 
of each party. While Australia had argued for open hearings and transparent 
$lings, Philip Morris refused, arguing that even releasing documents after 
31  Matt Siegel, “Tobacco Companies Fight Australian Cigarette Bill,” June 27, 2011.
32  Australia Attorney-General. Notice of Arbitration. Australia/Hong Kong Agreement for 
the Promotion and Protection of Investments. Investor:Phillip Morris Asia Limited.
33  Associated Press, “Philip Morris sues over Australian plans to ban logos from cigarette 
packets,” June 27, 2011. 
34   Australian Government. Attorney-General’s Department. Tobacco plain packaging-inves-
tor-state arbitration.
35   Procedural Order No.1 6. Philip Morris Asia Limited and #e Commonwealth of Aus-
tralia. February 23, 2015.
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the conclusion of the arbitration “would be a time-consuming process with 
minimal gains for the public interest.”36 #e case is currently pending.
However, Australia is not Philip Morris’ only investor dispute case at the 
moment. A Swiss subsidiary of Philip Morris International launched a similar 
case against Uruguay in February 2010 under the Switzerland-Uruguay BIT 
from 1991.37 Uruguay also implemented a slate of antismoking measures that 
featured a requirement that packaging for tobacco products include large, 
graphic public health warnings. Currently, tobacco companies in Uruguay 
are required to cover 80% of the area of both faces with graphic warnings 
and 100% of one side panel with text warnings. #e graphic pictures include, 
decaying teeth, premature babies and gruesome hospital scenes. Uruguay also 
said you couldn’t have any variation of a single brand sold in any store. You 
could have Marlboro, but you couldn’t have Marlboro Light or Marlboro 
Gold. #ey said terms, like “light” and “gold,” deceive consumers into think-
ing that those types are healthier than the average cigarette. In the end, Philip 
Morris had to take seven of its 12 products o" the shelves.38
In the investor case, Philip Morris is saying that the percentage of warning 
labels that are required on cigarette packs in Uruguay goes beyond what 
is reasonable to protect people from the harmful e"ects of smoking. #e 
company says that the warning labels leave no space for legally protected 
trademarks and intellectual property, and the corporation is seeking com-
pensation for lost pro$ts. #e corporation is seeking $25 million from the 
tiny country of 3 million people.39 Keep in mind, Uruguay’s GDP in 2013 
was about $55.7 billion, while Philip Morris’ revenues the same year totaled 
around $80.2 billion.40
Unlike Philip Morris, the people of Uruguay have reacted favorably to 
the Government’s aggressive anti-tobacco campaign and strong regulation 
in recent years. Uruguay’s University of the Republic, in collaboration with 
36  “Case Studies: Investor-State Attacks on Public Interest Policies,” Public Citizen.
37  Ibid.
38  “Phillip Morris Sues Uruguay Over Graphic Cigarette Packaging,” NPR, September 15, 
2014.
39  Ibid. 
40  Leon Kaye, “Philip Morris Sues Uruguay Over Anti-Smoking Campaign,” TriplePundit, 
April 13, 2015.
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a professor from Massachusetts Institute of Technology, did a study that 
showed between 2005 and 2011 smoking has reduced at the rate of 4.3% 
annually. Fewer pregnant women are smoking and the birth rate is reported 
to have gone up as a consequence. By 2012, this reduction meant that less 
than 20% of the population smoked. However, those who do smoke are 
doing so more intensely. Between 2005 and 2009, the average number of 
cigarettes smoked per day per smoker in Uruguay went up by three ciga-
rettes a day. #e increasing population is also favoring the expansion of the 
cigarette market in the country.41
#is adds to the sense of urgency for Phillip Morris with respect to the 
Uruguayan cigarette market. While sales stagnate for tobacco companies in 
developed countries, they must expand their business abroad. #e result is 
that the World Health Organization estimates that 70 percent of the 8.4 
million deaths that will be attributed to tobacco use in 2020 will occur in 
developing countries. Additionally, Philip Morris likely saw Uruguay as an 
easy target.42 #ey wanted to make an example out of Uruguay and send 
a message to the world that it is not worth the legal costs to enact stricter 
tobacco laws. “#e costs of defending these cases are enormous, so tobacco 
companies are trying to pick o" lower-income countries that can’t spend the 
money and political capital to defend themselves against industry,” Ellen R. 
Sha"er, co-director of the Center for Policy Analysis.43 #e case is expected 
to cost Uruguay up to $8 million in legal fees alone. Instead of scaring 
Uruguay into backing down, this lawsuit has drawn the attention of major 
players in global health, civil society and philanthropy circles. #is includes, 
former New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg, whose group Bloomberg 
Philanthropies has donated large amounts of money to Uruguay to help 
pay its legal fees.44 #e International Center for Settlement of Investment 
Disputes (ICSID), under the trade agreement between two countries, will 
settle the lawsuit by binding arbitration. In July 2013, the investor-state 
tribunal in this case ruled that it had jurisdiction over the case and it is now 
41  Op. Cit., fn. 35
42  Op. Cit., fn. 37
43  Carey Biron, “Worldwide, Tobacco Regulators Monitoring Philip Morris Lawsuit Against 
Uruguay,” November 24, 2014.
44  Op. Cit., fn. 35
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weighing the merits of the tobacco corporation’s arguments. #e Uruguayan 
government $led its formal defense, which reportedly runs to 500 pages but 
is not yet publicly available. 
Regardless of the $nal outcomes in these cases, already the investor-state 
system has had a chilling e"ect on tobacco control policies. A host of de-
veloping countries, are scared of being dragged into painful and expensive 
international arbitration, and are in a state of ‘policy freeze’. Additionally, 
in February 2013, New Zealand’s Ministry of Health announced that the 
government planned to introduce its own plain packaging legislation, but 
that it would wait until the investor-state case against Australia and Uruguay 
is resolved. #e United Kingdom also slowed down its plain packaging laws 
to see how these dispute plays out.45 
#e tobacco giant’s lawsuits against Australia and Uruguay are key examples 
of the growing trend of multinational companies using trade agreements as 
mechanisms to circumvent national legislation, even legislation supported 
by the people and meant to protect public health. #e investor-state dispute 
settlement (ISDS) system fundamentally shifts the balance of power among 
investors, states, and the general public, creating an enforceable global regime 
that formally prioritizes corporate rights over the right of governments to 
regulate (pc).  Under, ISDS foreign corporations and investors have the same 
status as sovereign governments. #ese corporations are empowered to go 
around domestic courts and directly sue countries when they disagree with 
their policies. #ese cases are seen before tribunals, but the tribunals deciding 
are composed of three private attorneys, not only are they unaccountable 
to any electorate, but they are also paid a lot. Using these expansive rights, 
foreign corporations have increasingly used ISDS to attack a wide array of 
tobacco, climate, $nancial, mining, medicine, energy, pollution, water, labor, 
toxins, development and other non-trade domestic policies. #e number of 
such cases has been soaring. While treaties with ISDS provisions have existed 
since the 1960s, just 50 known ISDS cases were launched in the regime’s 
$rst three decades combined. In contrast, corporations have launched more 
than 50 ISDS claims in each of the last three years. And unlike the victory 
for the citizens of Australia in domestic court, many governments have lost 
these suits and have already paid corporations billions of dollars. #ere is 
45  Op. Cit., fn. 34
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no limit to the amount of taxpayer money that the tribunal can order the 
government to pay the foreign corporation. Ecuador was ordered to pay 
Occidental Petroleum $2.3 billion.46 Additionally, #ere is a trend of these 
corporations picking on developing countries. In total, over the past years 
at least 89 governments have responded to one or more investment treaty 
arbitration: 55 developing countries, 18 developed countries and 16 countries 
with economies in transition.47 #e pending cases in Australia and Uruguay 
have mass amounts of public support against the corporations because they 
deal with the highly politicized issue of smoking and it’s dangers. Because 
of this, it is likely that the tribunals will act in favor of the countries, but 
this won’t always be the case. #is level of corporate power needs to be 
addressed and questioned. Especially as ISDS provisions have recently been 
proposed in many international trade deals, including the suggested Trans-
Paci$c Partnership. 
WTO Tuna Dispute: Mexico v United States 
If one looks at almost any can of tuna sold in the U.S. he or she will $nd 
a tiny stamp. For more than 20 years, that stamp has certi$ed that no dol-
phins were harmed or killed when the tuna was caught. For nearly that long, 
Mexico and the U.S. have been $ghting over that label. In the 1990s, the 
U.S. declared Mexico’s tuna, dolphin-unsafe. As many as 100,000 dolphins 
a year were dying due to Mexico’s large net $shing tactics that encircles the 
dolphin pods to get to the huge schools of tuna swimming below. But over 
the years, those numbers have dropped signi$cantly. Fishermen now use 
techniques so the mammals can escape. #ey’ve banned night $shing. And 
all boats in Mexico’s tuna &eet have independent observers onboard. Mexico 
says it’s made great strides protecting dolphins and that the U.S. now unfairly 
blocks Mexican tuna from its markets.48 Speci$cally, Mexico contends that 
the way the US de$nes “dolphin safe” tuna unfairly restricts trade.
#e United States de$nition of dolphin safe tuna requires the $sh are 
caught without using a huge net, known as a purse seine net, to encircle 
46  Op. Cit., fn. 34
47  “Latest Developments in Investor-State Dispute Settlement,” United Nations Conference 
on Trade and Development. N. 1 April 2012. 
48  Carrie Kahn, “Trade Dispute With Mexico Over ‘Dolphin-Safe’ Tuna Heats Up,” NPR 
October 3, 2013.
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dolphins and that no dolphins are killed or seriously injured in the process. 
#at is more restrictive than the internationally accepted de$nition, which 
does not mention the use of purse seine nets. #e Mexico Fishing industry 
is the largest users of purse seine nets. Mexican o!cials want the U.S. gov-
ernment to broaden its dolphin-safe rules to embrace Mexico’s long-standing 
$shing technique of chasing dolphins that swim above tuna in the eastern 
tropical Paci$c Ocean and capturing the tuna in large encircling nets.49 
Mexicans are not the only ones who say they’re being judged more harshly 
than other $shermen in the world. #e World Trade Organization agrees. It 
ruled the U.S. discriminates against Mexico and must open its markets to 
Mexican tuna, or face possible retaliatory trade sanctions.50 However, the 
U.S. still refuses to allow Mexican tuna with a dolphin safe label on store 
shelves. Mexico s is prepared to retaliate with trade sanctions on U.S. imports. 
#e California-based Earth Island Institute, which monitors the tuna indus-
try to ensure it follows U.S. dolphin-safe practices, disputes the eco-friend-
liness of Mexico’s $shing methods. Even if no dolphins are killed during 
the actual chasing and netting, some are wounded and later die from shark 
predation, says Mark Palmer, associate director of the institute’s International 
Marine Mammal Project. He says Mexico should be treated di"erently than 
other $shermen since they refuse to give up a $shing practice that chases, 
harasses and kills more than a thousand dolphins every year.51 Over the last 
decade, the Earth Island Institute has become a de facto global regulator 
of the $2 billion-a-year canned-tuna industry. Its 14 monitors track tuna 
$shermen worldwide for “dolphin safe” practices, and those who are caught 
with so much as one dolphin in their nets get taken o" the Earth Island list 
of “certi$ed” companies. Getting taken o" the list can kill a tuna business.
Meanwhile in Mexico, several canneries have gone out of business and more 
than a third of the $shing &eet has been sold o" due to not being considered 
“dolphin safe”. Jose Carranza, owner of Mexico’s biggest tuna processor, 
Pescados Industrializados S.A., in the Paci$c coast city of Mazatlan, says 
49  Tom Miles, “WTO Rules For Mexico in Tuna Dispute,” BanderasNEWS, May 17, 2012. 
50  United States – Measures Concerning the Importation and Sale of Tuna and Tuna Prod-
ucts. World Trade Organization. Dispute DS381.
51  Tim Carman, “Tuna, meat labeling disputes highlight WTO control,” !e Washington 
Post, January 10, 2012.
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yearly sales to Europe have fallen from 90,000 tons in the late 1980s to less 
than 10,000 tons today because the buyers are afraid of Earth Island. Others 
see a more dire force at work. “Earth Island is an arm of StarKist to control 
the markets,” says Carlos Hussong, president of Mexico’s $shing-industry 
group. “#is is a protection of the U.S. industry.” StarKist and Earth Island 
say that’s nonsense and write it o" as a conspiracy theory.52
Even a change in U.S. trade policy will not alter the buying practices of 
the tuna industry, because the U.S. government is not the $nal authority 
here. “None of our companies would buy from anybody not on the Earth 
Island list,” says David Burney, head of the U.S. Tuna Association. “We don’t 
want any problems. Earth Island is powerful.” Gavin Gibbons, spokesman 
for the National Fisheries Institute’s Tuna Council, which represents three 
processors (Bumble Bee, StarKist and Chicken of the Sea) that collectively 
sell more than 80 percent of the canned and pouched tuna on the U.S. 
market, says that it American companies still would not buy Mexican Tuna 
even if it is deemed safe. Gibbons says, the companies these days buy mostly 
skipjack tuna, whose populations remain healthy, not the yellow$n caught 
by Mexican &eets in the eastern tropical Paci$c. #e other question facing 
the U.S. tuna industry is whether it would continue using the dolphin-safe 
label if it were revised to include the chasing-and-netting techniques. 
US consumer rights group “Public Citizen” said the WTO decision dealt 
a major blow to consumers’ ability to make informed decisions about their 
food”. #is latest ruling makes truth-in-labeling the latest casualty of so-
called ‘trade pacts,’ which are more about pushing deregulation than actual 
trade,” Todd Tucker, research director for Public Citizen’s Global Trade 
Watch, said in a statement. “Members of Congress and the public should be 
very concerned that even voluntary standards can be deemed trade barriers.” 
#e Earth Island Institute reiterated this sentiment and said the WTO put 
trade above the environment with this decision. 
On June 5, 2015 the WTO said it received notice from U.S. of an appeal 
on the WTO decision. #e United States said it thought the WTO panel 
report in the case was based on an incorrect legal interpretation.53 #us the 
52  Newsweek Sta", “#e Earth Island Rules,” Newsweek, May 5, 2002.
53  REUTERS, “U.S. appeals part of WTO ruling on dolphin-safe tuna labels,” June 5, 
2015.
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debate continues. While the debate on whether the U.S. is discriminating 
against Mexico, and the debate on Mexican $shing techniques, are both 
fascinating within themselves, it is not the most signi$cant aspect of this 
WTO dispute. #e signi$cance of this dispute is that this is not a dispute 
between the U.S. and Mexico. #is dispute between the U.S. tuna industry 
and the Mexican tuna industry, and like all industries their interests. While 
a portion may lie in dolphin safety, more so lie in pro$t. #e safe dolphin 
label promotes sales for the U.S. tuna industry, and including Mexican tuna 
in those sales would take away pro$t. #e Mexican tuna industry is tired of 
being iced out by the big U.S. tuna companies and Earth Island. #e bottom 
line is that even a dispute that appears to be a trade issue between states 
that is being arbitrated through an international organization, is yet another 
instance of industries discovering new avenues in which they can further 
their interests. In this case, the states are acting on behalf of the industries 
because a higher pro$t for the industry means a stimulated economy for 
the state. #is case of industry and states working together to further their 
interests further examines the shift in power distribution today and the 
increased opportunity that industries have to achieve power and authority 
through international trade agreements.
So What?
#e massive shift in power from people to corporations has alarming rami$-
cations for world politics. Corporatio s ability to sue not only counties, but 
also countries, when the people’s positions do not align with their corporate 
pro$t models has the ability to severely compromise democracy and sover-
eignty. Traditionally, it was the people who were placed with power within 
a democratic society. Each of my case studies had to do with a concern of 
public health: GMOs, tobacco, and tuna regulation. Each of these items are 
things that a"ect people. People consume them and experience the health 
rami$cations of them, yet in each of my case studies people had no control 
over these issues despite their best e"orts to advocate their opinions and 
beliefs. Monsanto and the agricultural biotechnology companies found ways 
to delay or nullify legislation, either through massive campaign spending, 
lawsuits, or the proposal of new acts. Philip Morris has managed to battle 
plain packaging legislation by utilizing BITs signed years ago by Australia 
and Uruguay. By signing those trade agreements, these states handed over 
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this investor’s right to Philip Morris, whether they realized it or not. #e 
tuna industry in Mexico utilized both its state and the WTO to advance its 
agenda. Not only are people losing power and corporations gaining them, 
but states are often assisting the process.
Joseph Stiglitz of Columbia University describes this as ‘the secret corporate 
takeover’ of trade agreements. He continues by saying “In the future, if we 
discover that some other product causes health problems rather than facing 
lawsuits for the costs imposed on us, the manufacturer could sue govern-
ments for restraining them from killing more people.”54 #e truth is that 
this future is not far away. While this increase of lawsuits by corporations is 
a relatively new trend today, I worry, like Stiglitz, about the possibilities and 
opportunities that this opens up for corporations going forward, especially 
with the multitude of trade agreements that are currently being considered 
globally. #e world is currently engaged in a great debate about corporate 
power and we stand at a unique moment in time where states can decide to 
continue to empower these corporations, or they can decide to reign them 
in and give the people back their voice.
54  Joseph Stiglitz, “#e Secret Corporate Takeover,” Project Syndicate, May 13, 2015.
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Michelle Cristobal 
Michelle Cristobal’s $rst feeling toward Cal Poly was typical of most college 
students, nervousness. #ere was a large degree of uncertainty because this 
was the only in-state school she applied to, but those fears were quickly 
subdued. Now a $nancial analyst for the Mozilla Corporation, Michelle 
utilizes the critical-thinking and analysis tools she learned while at Cal Poly 
and in the Political Science department.
Coming to Cal Poly in 2006 as a Political Science major, Michelle appre-
ciated the way her classes were taught. #e Socratic-style teaching she expe-
rienced really opened up discussions and kept the professors down to earth. 
“#e professors were at the same level as the students,” she said. “Everyone 
had an equal responsibility for the class experience every day.” Michelle also 
enjoyed the project-based structure to most of her classes, where Cal Poly’s 
learn-by-doing motto shined through. Along with an American Politics 
concentration, Michelle took on psychology as a minor. #is minor would 
come into play when it came to for her to choose a senior project, as she was 
able to focus on political psychology. She wanted to better understand the 
“people”, and what governs the choices that are made every day.
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After college was when Michelle ran into most of her challenges. At $rst, 
her main goal was to attend law school right after graduation, but the 2008 
economic crisis and the stories of even Ivy League law graduates having 
trouble $nding work changed her mind. #e other problem Michelle ran 
into was a lack of a professional network to help in her job search. “Other 
than the internships that I had, I didn’t have in&uential connections or an 
in&uential network right out the gate,” said Michelle. She wasn’t discour-
aged, however, and started a career pivot by sending out many applications 
until she got a bite.
While at Cal Poly, Michelle worked for Campus Dining for four years in 
the procurement department, learning some of the ins-and-outs of logistics 
and $nances. Once Michelle realized that a career change was needed, she 
used the experiences she had while working for Campus Dining in addition 
to political science skills to apply for jobs. Eventually she received a job o"er 
from Anderson Audio Visual, and from then on things became less arduous. 
“It just got better from there, as soon as I got more experience,” she said. 
After Anderson AV, Michelle moved to Avnet where she worked in procure-
ment and customs regulations, overseeing the imports and exports of the 
company’s goods and services. #ese experiences contributed to landing her 
current job as a Financial Analyst at Mozilla Corporation, where Michelle 
focuses on budgeting and forecasting for the marketing department and 
internal operations. 
Michelle also had advice prepared for current students. She sees getting out 
into the “real world” early as incredibly helpful and something she wishes she 
had done more of. For the recently graduated, being stalwart and persistent 
is instrumental when trying to land interviews. She said, “#ere’s nothing 
that can stop you when you’re in person. As much as you can look good on 
paper, none of that is as compelling as just showing up.” Finally, Michelle 
says to truly take advantage of Cal Poly’s learn-by-doing approach. #e ex-
periences she had here stayed with her, and continue to help her even now. 
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PUNISHING CRIMINAL ATTEMPTS: THE ROLE OF HARM IN 
CRIMINAL SENTENCING
Kevin Deely
Abstract
#is paper is about how the severity of criminal punishment is often based 
on the resultant luck of the criminal. For example, a failed attempt at murder 
is punished with a lesser sentence than a successful attempt. Primarily, this 
paper dives into the various scholarly opinions regarding the role that “moral 
luck” plays in criminal sentencing. Moral luck essentially refers to the fact 
that society often makes moral judgments of people based on how a crime 
turns out, and not on the nature of the criminal attempt itself.
Moral Luck
One of the most controversial debates among philosophers has revolved 
around whether or not it is justi$able that our criminal justice system pun-
ishes failed criminal attempts less severely than successful criminal attempts. 
One of the reasons that this aspect of our legal system is so controversial 
is because many philosophers have insisted that the success or failure of a 
criminal action depends on factors that are beyond the criminal’s control. 
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While our criminal justice system is commonly thought of as a re&ection of 
humanity’s moral values, it is reasonable to infer that humanity has a tendency 
to morally judge people on how their actions turn out. If one agrees with 
the position that criminals are not in control of the harm that they cause, 
it is reasonable to conclude that whether or not a criminal will be morally 
judged as good or bad is a matter of luck. Another controversial debate has 
revolved around whether or not a criminal who in&icts harm upon his victim 
is more morally blameworthy than a criminal fails to cause harm. #ese two 
controversial debates surrounding the punishment of criminal attempts have 
provided a wide range of philosophical arguments.
#omas Nagel’s “Moral Luck” is an essay that presents a platform for 
a bevy of philosophical arguments regarding the di"erential punishment 
of successful and failed criminal attempts. #e purpose of this essay is to 
compare and contrast the opinions of $ve authors who have di"ering beliefs 
on punishment. Barbara Herman’s “Feinberg on Luck and Failed Attempts” 
and Michael S. Moore’s “Causation and Moral Blameworthiness” aim to 
justify our unequal punishment of successful and failed attempts. Sanford H. 
Kadish’s “#e Criminal Law and the Luck of the Draw” and Joel Feinberg’s 
“Equal Punishment for Failed Attempts” aim to show that our legal sys-
tem needs to be re-evaluated. David Lewis’ “#e Punishment that Leaves 
Something to Chance” aims to rationalize our current system of punishment, 
although Lewis admits that he is unsure if his rationalization is justi$able. 
Before I analyze what these $ve authors have to say, it is necessary to lay out 
the basis of #omas Nagel’s controversial argument.
#omas Nagel suggests that Immanuel Kant’s philosophy regarding luck’s 
relationship to morality, which is that “good or bad luck should in&uence nei-
ther our moral judgment of a person and his actions, nor his moral assessment 
of himself,” is often contrary to how society forms moral judgments.1 Nagel 
observes that although the success or failure of our actions often depends 
on many factors that are beyond our control, our actions are nevertheless 
preceded by a societal and self-re&ective moral judgment that assesses our 
goodness or badness as people. Since much of what we do depends on 
factors that we have no control over, and we make moral judgments about 
1  Nagel, #omas. “Moral Luck.” Philosophy of Law. By Joel Feinberg, Jules L. Coleman, and 
Christopher Kutz. 9th ed. (Boston: Wadsworth, 2014), 750. 
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people anyway, “moral luck” can be described as the good or bad luck that 
comes from these uncontrollable factors and their e"ect on the subsequent 
assessment of our moral standing. While highlighting four kinds of moral 
luck, and simultaneously suggesting that we do not have control over our 
luck, Nagel’s essay examines the paradoxical nature of moral luck and the 
dilemma it causes when trying to hold someone morally responsible for 
their actions.
Nagel insists that “what we do is limited by the opportunities and choices 
with which we are faced, and these are largely determined by factors beyond 
our control.”2 #e absence of control that is inherent in our actions seems to 
make it impossible for us to hold anyone morally responsible for what they 
do. However, Nagel states that the condition of control cannot be ignored 
because it is simply a natural consequence of moral assessment. When we 
consider that one of the conditions of moral assessment involves observing 
the lack of control humans have over their actions, it becomes apparent 
that the idea of moral luck is paradoxical. It is paradoxical because although 
Nagel’s intuition is that the absence of control rules out people being held 
morally responsible for most things, a man’s moral standing will always 
come down to the lucky or unlucky nature of external in&uences that are 
beyond his control. Nagel suggests that although the absence of control seems 
to eliminate moral responsibility, society can still assess people as morally 
good or bad, as long as we accept that moral luck is a paradox. If society 
were to excuse everyone’s actions as being the product of a lack of control, 
we would be unable to hold anyone morally responsible, which would be a 
major dilemma for society. 
Nagel describes four kinds of luck that can in&uence our moral standing 
in society. #e $rst kind of luck that Nagel discusses is “luck in the way 
one’s actions and projects turn out,” which is also commonly referred to 
resultant luck.3 As stated in Nagel’s example, a drunk driver can be said to 
have received moral good luck if he swerves onto a sidewalk and there are 
no pedestrians. If there had been pedestrians on the sidewalk and he had 
killed them, we would view this man as morally worse than a drunk driver 
who simply crashed his car. #e driver has no control over whether or not 
2  Nagel, “Moral Luck.” 751.
3  Nagel, “Moral Luck.” 752.
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there are pedestrians present, so the vehicular manslaughter would be con-
sidered a case of bad moral luck for the man. Nagel also demonstrates luck 
in the way one’s actions turn out by considering cases where decisions are 
made under uncertainty. For example, a rebel leader waging war against the 
government could not be morally assessed until we observed the results of 
his battle. If many of his people died and su"ered, which is a consequence 
determined by uncontrollable luck, than we would assess him as morally 
bad. Nagel states that how things turn out tends to “in&uence culpability or 
esteem in a large class of unquestionably ethical cases ranging from negligence 
through political choice.”4
#e second kind of luck is constitutive luck, which Nagel describes as “luck 
in the kind of person you are,” and luck in “your inclinations, capacities, 
and temperaments.”5 Nagel states that our personal characteristics, such as 
being envious or conceited, are subject to moral condemnation even if these 
characteristics are “beyond the control of the will.”6 In other words, even if 
we are sincerely motivated to control these impulses and cannot, people are 
often nevertheless morally “assessed for what they are like.”7 While we can 
control our own will, we cannot control these traits and personal character-
istics. Next, Nagel describes what he calls circumstantial luck. He describes 
this luck by stating that “things we are called upon to do, the moral tests we 
face, are importantly determined by factors beyond our control.”8 For exam-
ple, citizens of Germany who joined Hitler’s regime during the Holocaust 
are judged as morally bad. Citizens of the United States may have joined 
the regime if they were in similar circumstances, but we do not morally 
judge them because they never had to make the choice, which is a matter of 
circumstantial luck. Lastly, Nagel describes “luck in how one is determined 
by antecedent circumstances.”9 Everything about what we do and who we 
are is determined by previous events and circumstances. Nagel points out 
that this fact theoretically makes it impossible to hold people responsible, 
4  Nagel, “Moral Luck.” 753.
5  Nagel, “Moral Luck.” 752.
6  Nagel, “Moral Luck.” 755.
7  Ibid.
8  Ibid.
9  Nagel, “Moral Luck.” 752. 
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even for our evil motives and intentions, because who we are is dependent 
on previous circumstances that we have no control over. Nagel points out 
that this aspect of moral luck threatens to undermine all moral judgment, 
and this is why the concept of moral luck seems to make it di!cult to hold 
people responsible. 
Nagel states that the responsible self will disappear if all that is focused 
on is factors that are not in one’s control. However, Nagel states that since 
humans cannot take an external view of themselves, we end up judging people 
as morally good or bad anyway, just as we would ourselves. Since focusing 
on the absence of control would alleviate all of human moral responsibility, 
we cannot operate from this view. Nagel introduces a complex philosophical 
problem for which he provides no solution. While stating that the human 
race often bases moral responsibility on factors that we have no control over, 
he seems to simultaneously conclude that our current legal system is unjust. 
While Nagel’s essay examines the problematic paradox of moral luck, David 
Lewis provides an argument that aims to rationalize our legal system’s way 
of punishing criminal attempts, while also acknowledging the existence of 
resultant luck. 
David Lewis aims to articulate the nature of our current legal system with-
out making it sound as if it is contradictory to the principle of proportional 
punishment, which states that the severity of a criminal’s sentence should 
be in proportion to what he deserves. While Lewis concedes that it is un-
just to punish failed attempts less severely than successful attempts, as both 
deserve equal punishment for their equally dangerous conduct, he suggests 
that the only way we can rationalize our current system is by making a case 
that we are punishing successful and failed attempts equally. Speci$cally, 
Lewis’ essay is concerned with our judicial system’s unequal punishment of 
murder and attempted murder. Lewis aims to justify our judicial system by 
suggesting that criminals metaphorically subject themselves to a penal lottery 
every time they attempt to murder their victims, and although whether or 
not the victim dies is a matter of resultant luck, our judicial system may be 
punishing all attempts equally because it is the criminal who has voluntarily 
subjected himself to varying levels of punishment.
Before Lewis explains his unique way of rationalizing punishment, he 
objects to a few other arguments that aim to accomplish the same goal. One 
rationale that Lewis addresses is that a criminal who successfully completes 
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a crime deserves a more severe punishment simply because he is unlucky, 
which is an idea that invokes the debate of moral luck. In other words, while 
admitting that the di"erence between successful and failed attempts often 
comes down to luck in the way things turn out, this rationale insists that 
our justice system can cite luck as it’s reasoning for di"erential punishment. 
Lewis states that resultant luck cannot be the factor that justi$es di"eren-
tial treatment of successful and failed attempts, as we have no control over 
anything that occurs beyond the moment of our actions. Lewis insists that 
the luck involved in how our actions turn out has no bearing on how “the 
lucky and unlucky are,” and makes no di"erence to “how they act.”10 While 
Nagel suggests that the nature of our personality and the actions that we 
perform are matters of constitutive and circumstantial luck, Lewis states 
that we have control over who we are and how we act, and it is justi$able 
to punish someone accordingly. As this rationale cites luck as the primary 
reason for di"erential punishment, Lewis aims to $nd a rationale that can 
better justify our unequal punishment of attempts.
Another rationale that Lewis addresses insists that it is justi$able to punish 
successful attempts more severely because they require stronger whole-heart-
edness, as whole-hearted attempts require “stronger wicked desires,” and 
subject the victim to greater risk because they are more likely to succeed.11 
Lewis objects to this rationale because he does not believe that success can 
be the only measure of whole-heartedness, although he states that it is just 
to punish whole-hearted attempts more severely and to “proportion the 
punishment to the heartedness of the attempt.”12 Lewis associates hearted-
ness with the amount of risk that is in&icted on the victim of a crime. Lewis 
proposes a new rationale that he deems comparable to our present judicial 
system, in which successful attempts are punished more severely. He admits 
that it is most likely not just, but that it makes “at least a prima facie case” 
that our system is just.13
 Lewis states that our current legal system can be compared to a “disguised 
10  Lewis, David. “#e Punishment #at Leaves Something to Chance.” Philosophy & Public 
A"airs 18.1 (1989): 56, accessed May, 2015, JSTOR. 
11  Lewis, “#e Punishment #at Leaves Something to Chance.” 56.
12  Lewis, “#e Punishment #at Leaves Something to Chance.” 57.
13  Lewis, “#e Punishment #at Leaves Something to Chance.” 58.
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form of a penal lottery.”14 A penal lottery is a hypothetical form of judicial 
process in which every man who attempts a crime is brought to court and 
subsequently “subjected to a risk of punitive harm.”15 In this system, the court 
must decide if the defendant has knowingly and wrongfully subjected his 
victim to a risk of death. If the court $nds that this is the case, the defendant 
is found guilty and is subjected to a lottery. After a guilty verdict, the court 
must determine how much risk the victim has been subjected to (a measure 
of heartedness), and the defendant’s chances of winning the lottery are 
proportioned to the amount of risk he has in&icted on his victim. Whether 
or not the criminal is successful in his attempt, he will be sentenced to a 
lottery that leaves his punishment to chance. In this way, the lottery punishes 
successful attempts and failed attempts equally, because both criminals are 
sentenced to the same lottery. 
Lewis insists that our current judicial system can be best characterized as an 
“impure” penal lottery, in which there is a guarantee of certain harm for both 
winners and losers. #e winners of this lottery get a short prison sentence, 
while the losers are sentenced to death. In this system of punishment, it is 
known at once whether or not the defendant will win or lose if he is found 
guilty and sentenced to the lottery. #e reason that the result of the lottery 
is immediately known is because the actual crime that has occurred serves as 
it’s own way of determining the result. If the victim dies, the criminal will 
be sentenced to death. If the victim lives, the criminal will receive a short 
prison sentence. #erefore, the crime of attempted murder can be thought 
of as a penal lottery because whether or not the victim dies is a matter of 
chance. Since both successful and unsuccessful criminals face the prospect 
of punitive punishment, and both have subjected themselves to the same 
lottery, a case can be made that we are punishing them equally. #e fact that 
we punish failed crimes less severely than completed crimes does not mean 
that an unsuccessful criminal should be described as less guilty, it just means 
that he has been fortunate in his resultant luck. Criminals subject themselves 
to a disguised form of a penal lottery every time they take the chance of 
in&icting varying levels of harm to their victims. Although the death of the 
victim is a matter of chance, the defendant is the one who has voluntarily 
14  Ibid.
15  Ibid.
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subjected the victim to this risk of death. Lewis’ argument is that our current 
judicial system may be punishing attempts equally, as the criminal’s chance 
of receiving severe punishment is proportional to the chance that he has 
taken while in&icting a risk of death upon his victim.
Although he presents an argument that aims to justify our current system 
of punishment, Lewis admits that he is on the fence about whether or not 
this aspect of our legal system is just. Sanford H. Kadish o"ers an argument 
that is far more opposed to unequal punishment for failed and successful 
criminal attempts. 
Kadish’s essay revolves around its criticism of the role that resultant luck 
plays in our punishment of criminal attempts. Kadish states that our current 
judicial system is in accord with the “harm doctrine,” which is a doctrine 
that “reduces punishment for intentional wrongdoers if by chance the harm 
they intended or risked doesn’t occur.”16 Kadish acknowledges that humanity 
consistently factors in this resultant luck when we morally judge people and 
their actions, and that criminal law is essentially a re&ection of humanity’s 
moral viewpoints. Nevertheless, he states that the harm doctrine cannot be 
rationally defended, although “its adoption by the law” is rational because 
humanity’s moral judgments are irrational.17 Although this essay acknowl-
edges the paradox of moral luck, it is far more concerned with why the harm 
doctrine is not rationally defensible in terms of its application to criminal 
law. Kadish states that the harm doctrine is not rationally supportable be-
cause it “does not serve the crime preventive purposes of the criminal law,” 
and because it cannot be supported by the any relevant principle of justice, 
as punishment’s moral function is to sentence criminals based on what they 
deserve, and resultant luck has no in&uence on desert.18
Kadish argues that governing in accordance with the harm doctrine does 
not facilitate crime prevention because the doctrine does not aid in “prevent-
ing further acts by the o"ender” or “discouraging criminal acts by others.”19 
16  Kadish, Sanford H. “#e Criminal Law and the Luck of the Draw.” !e Journal of Crim-
inal Law & Criminology 84.4 (1994): 679, accessed May, 2015, Academic Search Premier 
[EBSCO].
17  Kadish, “#e Criminal Law and the Luck of the Draw.” 681.
18  Kadish, “#e Criminal Law and the Luck of the Draw.” 680.
19  Kadish, “#e Criminal Law and the Luck of the Draw.” 684.
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To begin his argument, Kadish articulates why he believes punishing failed 
attempts less severely does not help prevent further acts by the criminal. 
Kadish argues that in cases where the criminal has intentionally attempted to 
commit a crime, the actual occurrence of a harm is not relevant in assessing 
the criminal’s dangerousness to society, and that punishment is supposed 
to be a “response to the threat” that criminals impose on society.20 Kadish 
exempli$es this argument by considering a case in which a man who is a 
given a short prison sentence for attempted murder has his sentence reversed 
to life in prison, simply based on the fact that the victim happened to die 
months later. #e dangerousness of the man has been shown by his attempt 
to kill his victim, and the victim’s death should not impact the man’s prison 
sentence because it is a factor beyond his control. Kadish also states that 
resulting harm should have no bearing on criminal sentencing in cases of 
culpable risk creation. For example, a man who kills a person while playing 
Russian roulette is equally as dangerous as a man who, by luck, does not end 
up killing his victim. Kadish suggests that this is logic also applies to cases 
of impossibility, because the defendant’s dangerousness to society has been 
exempli$ed despite the fact that a crime could not have possibly occurred. 
Continuing his argument, Kadish addresses his statement that the harm 
doctrine does not aid in discouraging others from committing criminal acts. 
To develop his argument, Kadish deconstructs two possible arguments that 
suggest lesser punishment for failed attempts would actually aid in the general 
deterrence of crime. #e $rst argument states that by punishing attempts less 
severely than completed crimes, “we do not lose deterrence, because people 
who try to commit a crime expect to succeed, and if the punishment for 
success does not deter them, an equal punishment for failure certainly will 
not.”21 Kadish objects to this theory by arguing that in cases where a criminal 
knows there is a better chance of being caught and punished if he fails, as 
is the case during consensual narcotic sales, equally severe punishment for 
attempts would more e"ectively deter crime. #e second possible argument 
states that “the harm doctrine would serve crime preventative purposes by 
o"ering the prospect of lesser punishment as an inducement for the defendant 
20  Ibid.
21  Kadish, “#e Criminal Law and the Luck of the Draw.” 686.
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to desist.”22 In response, Kadish states that this argument cannot be applied 
to cases of culpable risk creation, as it is too late to desist from an action 
once a risk is taken. Furthermore, Kadish states that in cases of attempt, this 
argument does not apply to criminals who believe that they have taken the 
last step towards completing a harm. Even for criminals who believe they 
have more to do, Kadish states that a change of heart is unlikely once they 
have committed themselves to a “substantial act towards carrying out the 
crime,” a condition that is required in the law of attempts.23
As previously stated, the second element to Kadish’s reasoning on why 
the harm doctrine is not rationally defensible is that it cannot be defended 
by a relevant principle of justice. Kadish suggests that the “principle of des-
ert,” which insists that punishment should be limited to “what the o"ender 
deserves,” is not in accord with the harm doctrine.24 His reasoning is that 
criminals deserve to be punished based on the nature of their wrongful acts, 
and the resulting harm from a criminal act has no relevance to what the 
criminal deserves. Kadish raises a few possible arguments that attempt to 
justify the lesser punishment of failed attempts in terms of what the criminal 
deserves. #e $rst argument that Kadish addresses is Lewis’ concept of a penal 
lottery, which insists that a criminal deserves to be evaluated and punished 
based on what he has caused because he is the one who has voluntarily sub-
jected his victim to a risk of death. Kadish rejects this concept because he 
cannot fathom how, in cases of an attempted killing, it is justi$able to leave 
the sentences of two equally deserving o"enders to the chance of whether 
or not the victim dies or lives. #e second argument that Kadish addresses 
suggests that one who succeeds at causing harm makes him a worse person. 
In response to this commonly held suggestion, Kadish states that the prin-
ciple of proportional punishment requires that the severity of punishment 
should be proportional to the defendant’s blameworthiness, not what he 
has “become in some existential sense,” as the argument suggests.25 In other 
words, the blameworthiness of a defendant should be determined strictly 
based on the nature of his action. Lastly, Kadish addresses the retributive 
22  Kadish, “#e Criminal Law and the Luck of the Draw.” 687.
23  Ibid.
24  Kadish, “#e Criminal Law and the Luck of the Draw.” 688.
25  Kadish, “#e Criminal Law and the Luck of the Draw.” 692.
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justi$cation of punishment that views punishment as restoring a loss that 
has been bestowed upon the victim and the victim’s family. Kadish argues 
that punishing a criminal does not restore anything at all, and the concept 
of restoration does not have any relation to the amount of punishment that 
a criminal should receive. 
Since irrational laws that are in accordance with the harm doctrine are 
re&ective of our intuitive moral judgments, Kadish insists that changing 
these laws would be risky, as it would essentially cast doubt upon humanity’s 
ability to assess what is right or wrong. Kadish sums up our irrational system 
of punishment with a quote from Isaiah Berlin, which states that “out of the 
crooked timber of humanity no straight thing was ever made.”26
So far, we have been introduced to Lewis’ argument, which aims to ra-
tionalize our lesser punishment of attempts while maintaining that it may 
not be just, and Kadish’s argument, which completely objects to our system 
of punishment due to the role that resultant luck plays in the causation of 
harm. In contrast, Michael S. Moore argues that it is justi$able to punish 
failed attempts less severely than completed crimes, because the criminal 
who succeeds at a crime is more morally blameworthy than one who fails. In 
this view, our current system is in accord with the principle of proportional 
punishment and the principle of desert. 
In his essay on the role that harm plays in our assessment of moral blame-
worthiness, Michael S. Moore argues that successful attempts are more 
morally blameworthy than failed attempts. Before articulating this view, 
Moore aims to show that we have more control over the harm that we cause 
than Nagel’s theory of resultant luck gives us credit for. Moore suggests that 
a resulting harm is not a matter of luck, and that we not only have control 
over our circumstances and the choices that we make, but also the harm 
that results from our choices. After deconstructing Nagel’s control principle 
and the idea of resultant luck, Moore argues that harm plays a crucial role 
in moral blameworthiness because a criminal who in&icts harm will have 
a much stronger sense of moral guilt than a criminal who does not in&ict 
a harm, and this harsher sense of guilt correctly translates to a more severe 
verdict during criminal sentencing. 
Moore starts with his deconstruction of resultant luck, suggesting that 
26  Kadish, “#e Criminal Law and the Luck of the Draw.” 702.
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the term “luck” is not a proper representative of the true moral issue that 
is at stake regarding the debate on whether or not the causation of harm is 
relevant to moral blameworthiness.  #is is because our common use of the 
word luck is at odds with the way that Nagel uses the term when describing 
the causation of harm. For example, our society would describe a shooter as 
being lucky if his bullet hits his intended target, and Nagel would incorrectly 
deem this shooter as being unlucky due to his increased moral blamewor-
thiness. Moore suggests that the “issue is better cast straightforwardly in 
terms of causation.”27 In other words, we should only be concerned with 
identifying the factors that are involved with the causation harm, such as the 
criminal’s control over his actions and the subsequent result of his actions. 
In Moore’s view, none of these factors involve anything we would commonly 
think of as luck.
After deeming luck as an irrelevant factor in the causation of harm, Moore 
addresses the common argument that we are only responsible for our actions, 
and that the resulting harm that occurs from these actions is beyond our 
control. Moore exempli$es that there is a serious problem with this notion 
by pointing out that the two premises of this argument are contradictory. 
#e $rst premise to this argument uses a “compatibilist sense of control,” 
which suggests that “we do not need to control every factor making a result 
possible; we only need a reasonable chance to have avoided the result.”28 In 
other words, this premise suggests that we have control over the results of 
our actions whenever we control the chances of bringing them about. Under 
this premise, it would seem that a shooter should be held responsible for 
the death of his victim because he is in control of the risk he is presenting 
to his victim. #e second premise, as Moore states, uses an “incompatibilist 
sense of control,” which suggests that “we control some result only when 
we can make causally e!cacious choices about every factor that could cause 
or prevent this result.”29 In this sense of control, we are not even in control 
of our choices or intentions because we are not in control of every factor 
27  Moore, Michael S. “Causation and Moral Blameworthiness.” Causation and Responsibility: 
An Essay in Law, Morals, and Metaphysics. By Michael S. Moore. N.p.: (Oup Oxford, 2015), 
23. 
28  Moore, “Causation and Moral Blameworthiness.” 25.
29  Ibid.
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that leads to them, such as our genetic make-up. #e incompatibilist sense 
of control seems to correlate with Nagel’s instances of constitutive, circum-
stantial, and antecedent luck, as it deems almost every aspect of who we 
are and how we act as being beyond our control. Moore immediately rules 
out this incompatibilist sense of control, as he states that we most certainly 
have control over our choices, intentions, and actions. Moore is concerned 
with whether or not it is possible to argue that in a compatibilist sense of 
control, we are in control of our intentions and actions, but not the results 
of our actions. 
Moore points out that three philosophers by the names of Morse, Ferzan, 
and Alexander argue that even in the compatibilist sense of control, we are 
in control of our choices, intentions, and actions, but not their subsequent 
result. #eir argument is that since “the only form of control a responsible 
actor needs is the general capacity to be guided by reason…compatibilists 
have good reason to draw the line at human action because only action can 
be guided by reason.”30 Moore cannot wrap his head around this logic, and 
he exempli$es his counter-argument by introducing a situation where a 
man puts a gun to his victim’s head, pulls the trigger, and kills him. Moore 
states that since the man has control over the choice to kill his victim, and 
this choice is guided by reason, he must also have control over the choice’s 
intended e"ect of murdering his victim, because the act of shooting was 
guided by reason. For Moore, the suggestion that we only control what we 
directly cause is “too narrow a notion of control.”31 
It is obvious that not every criminal act is one in which the criminal has 
complete control over every possible factor that could interfere with the 
outcome. As Moore points out, many philosophers conclude that there are 
di"erent degrees of control that we can have over the “real-world e"ects” of 
our choices.32 In other words, we can’t always predict the result of an intended 
action, no matter how likely it may seem to occur. Moore states that this 
notion of unpredictability is irrelevant because, as he has stated previously, 
our causation of harm is guided by our reasoning, thereby making us fully 
in control of the harm that we have caused.
30  Moore, “Causation and Moral Blameworthiness.” 27.
31  Moore, “Causation and Moral Blameworthiness.” 28.
32  Moore, “Causation and Moral Blameworthiness.” 29.
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#us-far, Moore has simply deconstructed the common reformist notion 
that we are not in control of the harm that our actions have caused, and 
has stated that it is certainly not a matter of moral luck. However, Moore’s 
rebuttal fails to state anything regarding why a criminal who causes a harm is 
more morally blameworthy than one who fails at an attempt to cause harm. 
Moore’s argument regarding moral blameworthiness suggests that criminals 
who in&ict harm upon their victims are more blameworthy because they 
are likely to feel a stronger sense of guilt than criminals who fail to cause 
harm. Moore states that when we fail to in&ict a harm that we have either 
tried to cause or have unreasonably risked, our feeling of guilt is likely to 
be self-focused, and will most likely be combined with a sense of relief that 
a harm did not occur. When we cause a harm, we are likely to feel severe 
guilt that is not only self focused, but also focused on the su"ering of the 
person that we have harmed. Moore concludes that when we cause harm, 
“the reason we feel so guilty… is we are so guilty.”33 Although Moore admits 
that some may condemn the fact that he is basing a moral argument around 
personal feelings, he says he “cannot see how to do moral philosophy if one 
puts aside the emotions.”34 
Moore completely objects to the notion that we do not have control over 
the harm that we cause, and insists that the harm that we cause has a sub-
stantial e"ect on our moral blameworthiness. In sharp contrast, Joel Feinberg 
views harm as a matter of resultant luck, and his essay aims to provide a new 
way that our penal code could go about articulating criminal behavior so 
that the caused harm is completely left out.
 In his essay “equal punishment for failed attempts,” Feinberg takes what 
he classi$es as a “reformist” position on how to treat successful and failed 
attempts of murder. #e reformist position proposes a new way that our 
criminal justice system should treat crimes of murder and attempted mur-
der, whereas a “retentionist” philosopher such as Moore would argue that 
our current system of punishment should remain. Essentially, the reformist 
position demands equal punishment for failed and successful attempts, 
insisting that moral blameworthiness is not in&uenced by the actual harm 
caused, as the harm caused is often a matter of resultant luck. #is equal 
33  Moore, “Causation and Moral Blameworthiness.” 30.
34  Ibid.
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punishment would deem our legal system as being in accordance with the 
principle of proportional punishment, as this principle insists that the se-
verity of punishment should be proportional to the moral blameworthiness 
of the criminal act. Feinberg states that punishing defendants based on their 
resultant luck brings arbitrariness into our legal system, and that “arbitrariness 
is to a legal system what corrosive rust is to machinery.”35 Resultant luck 
is arbitrary because it is too general of a concept to accurately explain why 
we punish successful and failed attempts di"erently. By objecting to some 
popular retentionist arguments, Feinberg demonstrates his position that 
the equal punishment of both failed and successful attempts would rid our 
legal system of arbitrariness, and that this reformist position would correctly 
adhere to the principle of proportional punishment.
Feinberg begins his essay by proposing that we reform the wording of our penal 
code by eliminating the causal condition in the de$nition of completed crimes. 
For example, the crime of killing would instead be de$ned as “wrongful homicidal 
behavior,” and the penal code would contain no clause that requires the “victim to 
actually die.”36 Feinberg states that our penal code should be worded to insist that 
“any act of killing or attempted killing or the faulty or the faulty or blameworthy 
creating of an unreasonable risk of killing, whether or not the actor was aware of 
that risk, is an act of wrongful homicidal behavior.”37 #is de$nition is meant to 
leave out the causal condition of the actual harm and adhere strictly to the actus 
reus and mens rea elements involved in the act. Since blameworthiness is composed 
of many factors, the draftsmen of this hypothetical penal code could di"erentiate 
between $rst and second-degree wrongful homicidal behavior by assessing factors 
such as the criminal’s intentions and the circumstantial conditions surrounding 
the crime. In this system, the causal condition of harm would have no a"ect on 
criminal sentencing, as the severity of the sentence would be assessed by factors 
that are relevant to deciding the criminal’s actual blameworthiness. 
After articulating his reformist proposal, Feinberg introduces and subse-
quently refutes a few common retentionist arguments. #e $rst argument 
35  Feinberg, Joel. “Equal Punishment for Failed Attempts: Some Bad but Instructive Argu-
ments Against It.” Arizona Law Review 37.1 (1995): 118, accessed May, 2015, LexisNexis 
Academic [LexisNexis]. 
36  Feinberg, “Equal Punishment for Failed Attempts.” 119.
37  Ibid.
paideia
138
comes from the liberalist perspective that acts should only be punished if 
they cause harm to other people, as it is not the government’s business to 
regulate acts that they simply disapprove of. Feinberg states that this argu-
ment is obviously inapplicable to the crime of attempted murder, because 
the dangerousness of the criminal needs to be accounted for even if no harm 
is caused. #e second argument that Feinberg refutes insists that a murderer 
is more blameworthy than a man who fails at attempting murder because he 
has caused more harm, therefore his punishment should be proportional to 
the amount of harm he has caused. Feinberg suggests that this argument is 
ill-advised because it views criminal law as being similar to tort law, which is a 
system of law that requires criminals to pay reparations that are proportional 
to the amount of damage they have in&icted on the victim. Feinberg insists 
that the purpose of criminal law is to punish defendants based on what they 
deserve, and to discourage society from performing dangerous conduct.
Lastly, Feinberg addresses “the argument from moral emotions,” which sug-
gests that a criminal o"ender who fails to in&ict harm on another person is 
likely to feel far less guilty than an o"ender who causes harm, therefore making 
the successful o"ender more guilty in terms of criminal law.38 #is argument, 
which is the basis of Moore’s argument, suggests that a man who merely attempts 
murder but does not succeed would likely feel a sense of shame, as opposed to 
guilt. In response, Feinberg states that based on the way the English language 
uses the word guilt “even for acts and thoughts that are morally innocent in the 
judgment of others,” the criminal who fails at a crime would surely feel a strong 
sense of guilt due to the fact that his behavior has violated the basic moral values 
that society has engrained in him.39 If the man who misses his shot due to mere 
luck does not feel a strong sense of guilt, than there is something wrong with his 
psychological wiring. Feinberg states that one is unlikely to feel shame in this 
case, because shame is something that one feels when we embarrass ourselves 
in our own eyes. #erefore, as Feinberg states, Moore’s argument is irrational 
because a feeling of guilt is something that failed attempts can trigger just as 
easily as successful attempts. 
Feinberg concludes his argument by re-presenting his reformist position. 
He states that our penal code should be worded in a way that articulates 
38  Feinberg, “Equal Punishment for Failed Attempts.” 126.
39  Feinberg, “Equal Punishment for Failed Attempts.” 128.
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whether or not a criminal has acted purposely, negligently, knowingly, or 
recklessly toward a harmful result. After the court establishes these factors, 
which determines whether or not the act is wrongful homicidal behavior, 
the sentence can be adjusted based on the criminal’s moral blameworthiness. 
Blameworthiness is composed of factors such as the criminal’s motivations, 
his intentions, and the circumstances involved with the crime. For example, 
if a criminal premeditatedly shoots a woman for rejecting him, the criminal 
may receive a harsher sentence than a criminal who impulsively shoots a man 
during an argument. While the reformist position demands equal punishment 
for failed and successful attempts, this position also insists that the severity 
of punishment should be based on the blameworthiness of the o"ender. By 
demanding equality, Feinberg is simply demanding that resultant harm of 
a crime should not play a role in the punishment of crime. 
In response to Feinberg’s essay, Barbara Herman develops an argument that sug-
gests that there “might be good reasons to treat attempts separately.”40 Although 
she doesn’t de$ne herself as a retentionist, Herman’s argument o"ers a way of 
looking at criminal attempts that highlights factors other than moral blame-
worthiness, which is a perspective that makes the di"erential punishment of 
successful and failed attempts appear to be more rational than reformists such 
as Feinberg would like to believe.
Herman insists that in cases of failed criminal attempts, “we are sometimes 
unsure that the causal explanation for the failure is an external interven-
tion.”41 #is statement alludes to Moore’s theory that we have a certain 
degree of control over the results of our actions. Herman suggests that it 
is reasonable to believe that attempts may fail for many reasons, such as 
“a partial with-holding of will, an ambivalence of motive,” and “a lack of 
whole-hearted dedication to the goal.”42 While giving a vote of con$dence 
to human-agency, Herman also insists that although what occurs beyond our 
moment of action is often beyond our control to some degree, “whether or 
not the world cooperates in our e"orts…is not a matter of luck.”43 Herman 
40  Herman, Barbara. “Feinberg on Luck and Failed Attempts.” Arizona Law Review 37.1 
(1995): 143, accessed May, 2015, LexisNexis Academic [LexisNexis].
41  Herman, “Feinberg on Luck and Failed Attempts.” 144.
42  Ibid.
43  Herman, “Feinberg on Luck and Failed Attempts.” 147.
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is suggesting that the ability of our world to interfere with the success of our 
actions is something that every rational human being is aware of prior to 
committing a criminal act. As it is reasonable to believe that our actions will 
go as planned and not be interfered with, we are not lucky when our actions 
succeed. Herman insists that referring to the real world’s interference with our 
actions as luck deems luck as morally irrelevant. In Herman’s eyes, we are re-
ceptive of good or bad luck only when things occur that are not in accordance 
with we intend. #erefore, a criminal who tries to kills someone cannot state 
that he is either morally lucky or unlucky if he succeeds or fails, as the result 
of his action is simply a possible outcome of his action. While every criminal 
is equally likely to receive fortunate or unfortunate real-world e"ects during 
or after his act has been committed, Herman suggests that criminals cross a 
moral thresh-hold when they engage in dangerous behavior, and the causation 
of harm that this behavior brings about is imputable to them.
While Herman suggests that criminals should be held responsible for 
the harm that they cause, she does not dissect the notion that harm has an 
e"ect on moral blameworthiness. She is simply trying to show that it may 
be a good idea to place unsuccessful criminal attempts in a separate category 
because criminals are responsible for the harm that they cause, and harm 
is not a case of resultant luck. Herman also suggests that some criminal 
attempts are, by nature, di"erent than the commonly used hypothetical 
scenario where a criminal shoots his intended victim. For example, in cases 
of rape, penetration must occur in order there to be any kind of rape. In 
shooting cases, a criminal can be said to have attempted murder whenever 
he pulls the trigger, whereas it is di!cult to distinguish what would clas-
sify as an attempted rape. Herman states that in cases such as attempted 
rape, “we may want to preserve the distinctness of the attempt…to mark 
our conviction that we deeply care about the di"erence between rape and 
attempted rape…”44 Herman also insists that there is often a wide range of 
possible reasons for failure in cases of attempt, and it most likely wise that 
our legal system accounts for this range of possible failure. Some cases of 
attempt require multiple stages of action, and not all cases involve a temporal 
action such as shooting a gun. 
While the common topic of discussion regarding attempts is often revolved 
44  Herman, “Feinberg on Luck and Failed Attempts.” 146.
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around whether or not the causation of harm has any in&uence on moral 
blameworthiness, Herman’s argument suggests that we may want to take a 
deeper look at the di"erent factors involved with attempts. One factor that 
Herman states needs an explanation is the element of control that a criminal 
has over the harm that he intends to cause. Herman insists that when it comes 
to “contributions to the success” of our actions, we often have much greater 
control over certain things outside of our bodies than we have over ourselves.45 
For example, when we are writing an essay, the computer we are using is generally 
more responsive to our goal of $nishing the essay than we are, as our own laziness 
can interfere with our goal. #is example is meant to demonstrate that in cases 
of attempted murder, the notion that the bullet hitting the victim is a matter 
of luck is irrational, as we have “a baseline sphere of e"ective agency” over our 
murder weapon.46 Furthermore, when criminal actions do not go as planned, 
one cannot say that luck plays a role in this because every criminal action is 
equally likely to be interfered with by a multitude of possible mishaps. In the 
case of a man who is carefully and legally driving his car down the street, if an 
inadvertent skydiver falls directly in the path of the man’s car and is killed, the 
driver of the car could make a case that he has been a recipient of moral bad 
luck, as his behavior has not been dangerous. 
Herman insists that since criminals who intend to commit crimes are re-
sponsible for the harm that they cause, a case can be made that it is justi$able 
to punish criminals who do not bear the responsibility of in&icting harm less 
severely. Herman states that when we engage in dangerous behavior, we cross 
a moral threshold and become eligible for punishment that is based on “what 
our actions have brought about.”47 Whether or not criminals are actually more 
morally blameworthy when they in&ict a harm is a philosophical question that 
Herman does not address. 
It is apparent that the two main controversial issues that surround the 
concept of successful and failed attempts involve the amount of control we have 
over what our actions produce, and whether or not the causation of harm in&icts 
a greater amount of moral blameworthiness on us. David Lewis aims to justify 
our unequal punishment of successful and failed attempts while admitting that 
45  Ibid.
46  Ibid.
47  Herman, “Feinberg on Luck and Failed Attempts.” 147.
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the causation of harm is a matter of resultant luck, and also that the causation 
of harm has no e"ect on a criminal’s moral blameworthiness. Kadish suggest 
that our current system of punishment cannot be justi$ed because of these 
reasons, and the unequal punishment of attempts does not facilitate the deter-
rent purposes of criminal law. Moore and Herman seem to suggest that we 
have far more control over how our actions turn out than Nagel’s concept of 
resultant luck gives us credit for. #ey believe that there is a certain amount 
of human agency that plays a role in the causation of harm, and blaming 
everything that our actions produce on luck is not a rational line of thought. 
Moore seems to take the strongest retentionist position, as he believes that the 
causation of harm actually has a signi$cant e"ect on moral blameworthiness. 
Feinberg rejects Moore’s notion that we should decide moral blameworthi-
ness based on the emotional feeling of guilt that a criminal may or may not 
feel after his crime. Furthermore, Feinberg is of the belief that we do not 
control what occurs beyond the moment of our actions, and our penal code 
should be worded to re&ect the signi$cant factors that contribute to moral 
blameworthiness, such as our motives and intentions. 
I cannot fathom how one can come to the conclusion that we are not in control 
of the harm that we cause. While there may be factors that either facilitate the 
intended outcome of an action or interfere with the intended outcome, I believe 
that Moore has taken the correct stance by insisting that since our actions are 
guided by reason, the intended outcome of an action is a matter of our reasoning, 
which we have full control over. However, this is not why I believe that successful 
criminal attempts should be punished more severely than failed attempts. #e 
deconstruction of the “lack of control” argument seems to only serve the purpose 
of falsifying the notion that successful criminals have been unfortunate in their 
resultant luck. However, one who takes this position could also argue that despite 
the fact that criminals are in full control of the harm that they cause, successful 
and failed criminal attempts should be punished equally because we should base 
our punishment on the morally heinous nature of the action itself. Feinberg has 
rejected the argument that criminals should be punished proportionally to the 
amount of harm that they cause, as this ideology should only apply only to tort 
law. Feinberg states that punishing a criminal does not restore anything, which I 
completely object to. 
In my opinion, we should completely ignore the concepts of control, luck, 
and moral blameworthiness when it comes to deciding the proper punishment 
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for a criminal. When we hand out a severe sentence to a criminal who has mur-
dered his victim, it is common to see the victim’s family crying and hugging in 
the courtroom, as if they are relieved that justice has $nally been served. We can 
dissect the philosophical nature of attempts all we want, but we cannot ignore 
the fact that the causation of harm has far greater consequences for the emotional 
stability of many people. When a mother loses a son, part of her has essentially 
been broken. How can we say that these factors should have no in&uence on what 
the defendant is deserving of? A man who attempts murder and fails will in all 
likelihood serve a substantial amount of time in prison, and we should trust that 
this sentence will deter him from ever trying to commit murder again. I also think 
it is irrational to say that unequal punishment of successful and failed attempts 
does not aid in the general deterrence of crime. When one commits a crime, his 
intention is to be successful at it! If the threat of a punishment that stems from a 
successful attempt does not deter the criminal, than nothing will. Furthermore, I 
believe that when we punish a man less severely for failing at an intended crime, 
we are justi$ed in doing so because he is deserving of the opportunity to repent 
for his actions, as his actions did not in&ict any harm to another person. When 
a victim dies, the criminal should serve a harsher punishment because he should 
not be a"orded the opportunity to repent for his crime, as his victim has not 
been a"orded the opportunity to live another day.
To conclude, I believe that the people who have constructed our criminal jus-
tice system are perfectly aware that both successful and failed criminal attempts 
are equally heinous. However, I believe that the draftsmen could not ignore the 
impact that harm has on many people, and they must’ve felt that it was their 
duty to re&ect the atrocity of harm and it’s emotional repercussions in criminal 
sentencing. In response to reformists who believe that criminals who fail at at-
tempts deserve equal punishment based on their equally dangerous and heinous 
actions, I would like to re-introduce a quote from Isaiah Berlin: “Out of the 
crooked timber of society, no straight thing was ever made.”48 
48  Kadish, Sanford H. “#e Criminal Law and the Luck of the Draw.” !e Journal of Crim-
inal Law & Criminology 84.4 (1994): 702, accessed May, 2015, Academic Search Premier 
[EBSCO].
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NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND INDIGENOUS PEOPLES LAND 
RIGHTS
Luisa Tembo
Abstract 
As the Western world gradually depletes their own lands, they migrate to 
developing nations and appropriate their resources. Sub-Saharan Africa is 
one of the most vulnerable regions in the world due to instability in the 
region. Globalization has perpetuated a cycle of exploitation that has made 
us increasingly interdependent on one another for survival. International 
organizations such as the IMF and the United Nations have attempted to 
aid indigenous peoples from corporations who take advantage of the over-
whelming number of African governments that desperately desire to develop 
and advance their broken and corrupt nations. However, the structure of 
these institutions are incredibly duplicitous. In order to achieve sustain-
able development, there needs to be a fundamental change in the system.1 
Nonetheless, intervention by these international organizations are vital for 
indigenous people’s protection from corporate greed. 
1  John Perkins. Confessions of an Economic Hitman. (New York: Plume, 2005). http://resistir.
info/livros/john_perkins_confessions_of_an_economic_hit_man.pdf
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In Samsara (2011), there is a scene in a Sub-Saharan African village in Namibia 
that shows indigenous women from the Himba tribe, wearing very little cloth-
ing, lavish ornaments, and body paint made out of a mixture of red ochre and 
butterfat. #ey are surrounded by many smiling children who are also minimally 
clothed. In the background, you can see their huts made out of neatly piled 
branches and mud. To the average American living in an industrialized mod-
ern society, these living conditions may seem severely challenging. Although 
it may appear that they are living in extreme poverty, the Himba people are 
living a self-sustaining lifestyle. #e following scene was a manmade landscape 
consisting of a double decker freeway system full of modern automobiles in 
North America. #e drastic di"erences in lifestyles would lead one to believe 
that these scenes were taken centuries apart, however; these scenes were hap-
pening simultaneously in the 21st century. What historical premises lead to 
such drastic di"erences between these two regions? Speci$cally, how has their 
symbiotic relationship with nature been a"ected by their government’s national 
development policies? 
 #e Himba are an indigenous people that lead a semi-nomadic pastoral way 
of life. #ey are located in North-West Namibia, in the Kunene region, with a 
population size ranging from twenty-$ve to $fty thousand.2 Contrary to pub-
lic misconception, they live in highly functioning, self-sustaining societies. By 
their standards, the Himba are a wealthy people, who enjoy a rich culture and a 
satisfying lifestyle. #ey live in an egalitarian society based on a bilineal family 
structure, shared ethnicity, and shared linguistics. Although they have no formal 
system of government or political organization, they have a traditional system of 
government based on chiefdoms, where head chiefs decide day-to-day matters.3 
#e Himba are considered to be some of the most successful and economically 
independent subsistent farmers in Africa. #eir strategies for food security have 
proven successful even in times of severe drought. #is is important because 
Namibia has an extremely dry climate that often leads to severe water shortages in 
2 Henning Melber. “Re-examining Liberation in Namibia: Political Cultures since Indepen-
dence.” (Uppsala: Nordic Africa Institute, 2003), 48.
3 Sidney L. Harring. “God Gave us this Land: #e OvaHimba, the proposed Epupa Dam, 
the independent Namibian state, and law and development in Africa.” Georgetown Interna-
tional Environmental Law Review, 14(1) (2001): 35-106, accessed December 2, 2015, http://
search.proquest.com/docview/225506935?accountid=10362.
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many parts of the country for often long periods of time.4 Pastoralism is common 
in Himba society as the Himba “economy” is based on cattle trade, with herds 
averaging 100 per family and reaching at least 500 for some wealthy families. 
Owning many livestock such as cattle, sheep, and goats, is a sign of a'uence.5
To understand the complexity of their recent environmental problems, an 
examination of Namibia’s history is necessary. Namibia, like many other Sub-
Saharan African countries, has a long history of colonial rule. It was under 
German colonial rule from 1883 to 1915. After Germany su"ered a loss in 
WWI, Namibia was under the control of the League of Nations, then the 
United Nations. Under the mandate, the territory, called South West Africa at 
the time, was administered by South Africa, who was under British and Dutch 
rule.6 #e colonial powers of South Africa institutionalized racism through 
racially discriminatory apartheid policies that a"ected the social, political, and 
economic lives of the black minorities. Governmental attempts at reforming 
civil society were motivated largely by political and ideological concerns. For 
example, the creation of an all-white Advisory Council in 1921 to advise the 
South African-appointed Administrator, the introduction of English and Dutch 
as o!cial languages, and Roman-Dutch Law as the common law in Namibia, 
land policy, education policy, as well as the active encouragement of white 
settlement, were all concentrated e"orts in recon$guring the public sphere in 
Namibia so as to contain the movement of the majority black population.7 
#e colonizers main goal was to utilize the resources of the colonies for pro$t. 
Private ownership of land was highly restricted and incredibly rare; the locals 
4  Ibrahima #omas, and Moses Chakanga, “Role of Planted Forests and Trees Outside For-
ests in Sustainable Forest Management” FAO Corporate Document Repository, 2001, May 
21. http://www.fao.org/docrep/009/j5838e/J5838E10.htm. 
5 Sidney L. Harring. “God Gave us this Land: #e OvaHimba, the proposed Epupa Dam, 
the independent Namibian state, and law and development in Africa.” Georgetown Interna-
tional Environmental Law Review, 14(1) (2001): 35-106, accessed December 2, 2015, http://
search.proquest.com/docview/225506935?accountid=10362.
6  James Anaya. “Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: #e 
Situation of Indigenous Peoples in Namibia.” United Nations Human Rights Council, June 
25, 2013, http://www.iwgia.org/iwgia_$les_news_$les/0921_2013-report-namibia-a-hrc-
24-41-add1-en.pdf. 
7  Ibrahima #omas, and Moses Chakanga, “Role of Planted Forests and Trees Outside For-
ests in Sustainable Forest Management” FAO Corporate Document Repository, 2001, May 
21.  http://www.fao.org/docrep/009/j5838e/J5838E10.htm. 
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were disposed of their lands and many indigenous people lost their lands as 
well. #e Himba’s herds were an economic threat to South African interests. In 
response the colonial administrators placed restrictions on livestock and cut o" 
opportunities for trade and wage labor. #ey controlled the border with Angola 
by forbidding Angolan traders in the territory, and by attempting to stop the 
Himba and their cattle from freely crossing the border.8 #e impact of closing 
these borders was devastating to the Himba because most of their traditional 
trade routes were no longer available. South Africa's intent was to destroy the 
Himba pastoral economy in order to force them into signing migrant labor 
contracts and working in South African mines.9 #e Portuguese, who had 
colonized Angola, also restricted the economic activists of the Himba on the 
Angolan side of the Kunene. With these few exceptions, the Himba lived in 
relative isolation apart from colonial rule in comparison to other Namibians. 
As a result, the Himba have been able to preserve their way of life because the 
Himba deliberately stay distinct from Namibian society.10
Desperate for liberation, Namibians petitioned the United Nations against 
South African rule and a concentrated e"ort towards independence began. In 
1988, South Africa $nally agreed to end its administration, and on March 13, 
1990, Namibia $nally gained its independence.11 #ey established a multiparty 
constitutional democracy, and became the $rst African country to incorporate 
protection of the environment into its constitution.12 Today, it still remains 
one of the few countries in the world who has put such an emphasis on pro-
tection of natural resources and habitat conservation in their constitution. 
#e Namibian government was successful in repealing many of their previous 
colonizers oppressive laws. However, the Namibian constitution states that all 
8 Ibid.
9 Sidney L. Harring. “God Gave us this Land: #e OvaHimba, the proposed Epupa Dam, 
the independent Namibian state, and law and development in Africa.” Georgetown Inter-
national Environmental Law Review, 14(1) (2001): 26, accessed December 2, 2015, http://
search.proquest.com/docview/225506935?accountid=10362.
10 James Anaya. “Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: #e 
Situation of Indigenous Peoples in Namibia.” United Nations Human Rights Council, June 
25, 2013, http://www.iwgia.org/iwgia_$les_news_$les/0921_2013-report-namibia-a-hrc-
24-41-add1-en.pdf. 
11 Ibid.
12  “Namibia,” World Wildlife Fund. n.d. http://www.worldwildlife.org/places/namibia.
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land, water, and natural resources of Namibia belong to the state.13 #is policy 
is extremely re&ective of their European colonizers way of thought, and further 
perpetuates inequity in society. #ere are also no speci$c rights to indigenous 
peoples as all traditional communities are considered indigenous to Namibia 
under its constitution, which completely undermines the necessary regard 
needed of indigenous minorities as well as their special needs.14
Nonetheless, the government does provide assistance to disadvantaged groups 
in many ways. One of the most substantial programs it passed was its legislation 
on communal conservancies. Communal conservancies are a legally registered 
area with clearly de$ned borders and a constituted management body run by 
the community for the development of residents and the sustainable use of 
wildlife and tourism. #ey are a key development strategy for rural Namibia as 
they cover 17% of the country, and approximately one in four rural Namibians 
now belongs to a registered conservancy.7 #e Himba, as well as other indig-
enous groups in the area are recognized as particularly marginalized by the 
Namibian government and there are laws and policies particularly devoted 
to their needs.15 Additionally, tourism is a growing industry, contributing to 
20% of the country's GNP, and is used as a lever for economic growth within 
African conservancies.16 One of the country’s main concerns is how to sustain 
the environment while developing ecotourism. However, because the Himba 
live within communal areas, the tourist industries encourage visiting the in-
digenous tribes, and sometimes paint an inaccurate depiction of these tribes by 
using phrases such as “historically disadvantaged people” as a selling point.17
#e dispute of the Himba people’s land and natural resource rights was 
13 Henning Melber. “Re-examining Liberation in Namibia: Political Cultures since Indepen-
dence.” (Uppsala: Nordic Africa Institute, 2003), 48.
14  Ibid.
15 James Anaya. “Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: #e 
Situation of Indigenous Peoples in Namibia.” United Nations Human Rights Council, June 
25, 2013, http://www.iwgia.org/iwgia_$les_news_$les/0921_2013-report-namibia-a-hrc-
24-41-add1-en.pdf. 
16  Anene Ejikeme, Culture and Customs of Namibia. (Westport: Greenwood Publishing 
Group, 2011), 23.
17  A.P. Davis, “Consequences of ‘conservation’: A Critical look at Namibian Com-
munal Conservancies,” 2011, https://dlc.dlib.indiana.edu/dlc/bitstream/han-
dle/10535/7179/%20Namibia.pdf?sequence=1.
paideia
150
discussed because of the government’s desire, as a newly independent country, 
to develop. In the mid 1990s, the Namibian government wanted to invest in 
development in order to become a global player capable of writing their own 
course. #e Himba and the government have competing interests when it comes 
to the use of the Kunene River. #e Kunene River is one of three permanently 
&owing rivers that supports a unique ecosystem in the North-West border of 
Angola and Namibia.18 It is the largest body of water by the Himba people, 
who get their livelihood from the river. In order to help supply energy to its 
people, the Angolan and Namibian government proposed a hydropower scheme 
called the Epupa Dam project. Namibia had an increasing need for power and 
considered the river as a gift from nature that needed to be utilized to build a 
hydro-electric power dam. #ere was a lot of controversy as to whom this dam 
would bene$t most because most of the energy was being distributed to the 
urban areas, which was less densely populated than the rural areas.19 NamPower, 
Namibia’s main energy supplier advocated for the dam as it was importing up 
around 50% of its power from South Africa, and wanted to diminish its de-
pendency on foreign powers for energy.20 #e feasibility study was supported 
and funded by Norway and Sweden. #e project would have two sites: at the 
Epupa river and the Baynes river. #e Namibian government insisted that the 
dam be built at the Epupa Falls site on the Kunene River instead of the Baynes 
site because it has greater use value than the Baynes site, regardless of the fact 
that research showed that the environmental and social costs on the Himba 
would be much greater.21 
18 Sidney L. Harring. “God Gave us this Land: #e OvaHimba, the proposed Epupa Dam, 
the independent Namibian state, and law and development in Africa.” Georgetown Interna-
tional Environmental Law Review, 14(1) (2001): 35-106, accessed December 2, 2015, http://
search.proquest.com/docview/225506935?accountid=10362.
19 Andrew Corbett. “A Case Study on the Proposed Epupa Hydropower Dam in Na-
mibia.” Prepared for !ematic Review I.2: Dams, indigenous people and vulnerable 
ethnic minorities, December 1999, http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?-
doi=10.1.1.196.5858&rep=rep1&type=pdf.
20 Ibid.
21 Sidney L. Harring. “God Gave us this Land: #e OvaHimba, the proposed Epupa Dam, 
the independent Namibian state, and law and development in Africa.” Georgetown Inter-
national Environmental Law Review, 14(1) (2001): 26, accessed December 2, 2015, http://
search.proquest.com/docview/225506935?accountid=10362.
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#e Eupa site is signi$cant because it is utilized by the Himba for survival.22 
#e Himba opposed the proposed dam as the consequences would have been 
severe. First, there would be a &ooding of the heart of their lands with a res-
ervoir, which would result in a loss of biodiversity. Second, there would be a 
disruption of their lives and culture. Although the Himba are nomadic, some 
families are well established in some areas. #e Epupa site would have &ooded 
110 permanent dwellings of the Himba, resulting in the displacement of many 
people. It would also a"ect the drought strategies of many Himba people, as 
it is a crucial source of grazing and browsing in dry seasons and in times of 
drought.23 One of the main reasons for opposition towards the dam would 
be that of culturally-important ancestral graves. #e graveyards have a diverse 
array of functions and signi$cance in Himba society. #e Himba believe that 
their culture will be at risk as the graveyard is far more than just the physical 
remains of a deceased person; it is the focal point for de$ning identity, social 
relationships, and relationships with the land, as well as being the center for 
important religious virtues.24 #e graves are also a way of determining land 
“tenure” which is based on continuity of settlement, and allows those who can 
demonstrate the longest connection with the land the strongest say over land-re-
lated matters such as rights of access and control over resources.10 Because of 
their inferior position to the state, the Himba’s traditional leaders got lawyers, 
and won the case against the state. Ultimately, the situation caused mistrust 
between the government and the Himba for misleading them, ignoring them, 
and for trespassing on their lands without acknowledging their rights.25 
A prolonged period of colonization and slavery have had a debilitating e"ect 
on Sub-Saharan Africa. #roughout the continent, the European colonizers 
changed ethnic relations by drawing political boundaries, patterns of social 
organization, and exploiting their natural resources. It has resulted in a huge 
22 Andrew Corbett. “A Case Study on the Proposed Epupa Hydropower Dam in Namibia.” 
Prepared for !ematic Review I.2: Dams, indigenous people and vulnerable ethnic minorities, 
December 1999, 
23 Ibid.
24 Ibid.
25 Sidney L. Harring. “God Gave us this Land: #e OvaHimba, the proposed Epupa Dam, 
the independent Namibian state, and law and development in Africa.” Georgetown Interna-
tional Environmental Law Review, 14(1) (2001): 35-106, accessed December 2, 2015, http://
search.proquest.com/docview/225506935?accountid=10362.
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development gap between colonial masters and their former colonies. #e 
colonizers saw no need to invest in development in their colonies unless it 
served their needs. Because the economy was based on export agriculture, 
all good arable lands were controlled by wealthy colonial landowners.26 #e 
decolonization process was extremely violent but successful because the states 
gained autonomy. However, gaining independence didn’t level the playing $eld, 
as they were highly disadvantaged and left in a state of disorder. Governments 
faced economic, social, and political problems due to limited experience, ev-
idently resulting in corrupt governance. #e Epupa Dam proposal is one of 
many examples of the clash between traditionalism and modernism in the 
developing world. Furthermore, it demonstrates how hydropolitics and resource 
management has become a central issue in the developing world. Due to such 
disparities in economic and political development, foreign intervention is al-
most always necessary to help accelerate development because the developing 
countries lack the means to obtain the ends. Unfortunately, the result is an 
extension of the colonial development relationship, which tends to result in 
the pushing of a Western agenda on people not yet fully integrated into the 
global capitalistic system.27
Although it’s a combination of a prolonged period of colonization, physical 
geography, corrupt governance, and poor policies, ever-evolving international 
structures are perpetuating inequity in the global economy.28 A leading prob-
lem in less developed countries (LDCs) is that they are resource rich countries 
but they are growing much slower than resource scarce countries due to the 
exploitation of those resources by more developed countries (MDCs) who have 
a large appetite for resources. #ey are also extremely vulnerable because we 
have become such a global economy, making them susceptible to world mar-
ket prices. #erefore, they must invest in development within their countries, 
however; they lack the $nancial ability to do so. In today’s world, development 
is associated with Western, capitalistic style economies.
26 Lester Rowntree et al., Diversity amid globalization: World regions, environment, develop-
ment (6th Edition). (New York: Pearson, 2014).
27 A.P. Davis, “Consequences of ‘conservation’: A Critical look at Namibian Com-
munal Conservancies,” 2011, https://dlc.dlib.indiana.edu/dlc/bitstream/han-
dle/10535/7179/%20Namibia.pdf?sequence=1.
28 Donald M. Snow. Cases in International Relations (6th Edition). (Upper Saddle River:  
Prentice Hall, 2014), 222. 
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 International organizations such as the World Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) both assist developing countries in times of economic 
instability and $nancial crises by granting loans that are tied to a set of lending 
conditions.29 Although they serve a great purpose, these organizations are 
far from innocuous as they serve the interests of the core countries in the 
world. Although they make sizable loans to developing countries as to sup-
port sustained economic growth, their Structural Adjustment Programmes 
have been heavily criticized and received great opposition by the developing 
world.30 #ese structural adjustment policies have a Western agenda that 
promotes liberal values in an attempt to democratize these nations. Nicoll 
(1997) states that “#e World Bank, which is not involved in funding the 
Epupa project, has a long and dismal history of $nancing large scale develop-
ment projects in the #ird World that are modeled on western conceptions of 
development, run up huge debt, and do great damage to indigenous peoples 
and the environment.” #e large funding of these international organizations 
by wealthy states also causes a con&ict of interest as they can highly in&uence 
policies.13 Such was the case in South America, which lead to the Bolivarian 
Revolution in the early 2000’s in Venezuela lead by Hugo Chavez, that also 
in&uenced leaders in Argentina and Bolivia to rebel against neo-imperialism. 
It was a leftist socialist movement that was against neocolonialism, a new 
world order birthed from globalization that promotes global capitalism.31 We 
also saw a similar rise in land reform from the Zapatistas in Mexico who rose 
in 1994 in response to the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), 
which was detrimental to small farmers in Mexico as it increased corporate 
in&uence in agriculture and trade. #e Zapatistas were alter-globalization 
and no longer wanted to be subservient to the Western powers.32
In modern times, Indigenous peoples are granted various rights under 
international law, including a right to their traditional lands, to maintain 
their cultures, and some measure of local sovereignty to protect those lands 
29 Robert Paarlberg. Food politics: What Everyone Needs to Know (2nd Edition). (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2013), 209.
30 Ibid.
31 Oliver Stone. South of the border. (June 25, 2010) https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tv-
jIwVjJsXc.
32 Ibid.
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and cultures.33 #ere have also been new international laws concerned with 
the displacements of indigenous peoples displaced by the construction of 
large dams.  #ey state that no government should do harm to poor peoples 
in order to advance particular schemes of national development. World Bank 
standards now requires both careful and systematic study of the impact of 
large dams on local populations, as well as additional standards requiring 
that forced removals not occur unless the displaced peoples can be relocated 
without loss of their culture in a position where they are at least as well o" 
economically as they were before relocation.34 In 1993, the United Nations 
Commission on Human Rights adopted a resolution condemning forced 
evictions as "a gross violation of human rights."35 
Globalization is making humanity increasingly interdependent on one 
another socially, politically, and economically. Although globalization af-
fects everyone, there are vast di"erences in societies because countries have 
developed at di"erent rates. #e economic disparities between the LDCs 
and MDCs are emphasized in this new world order, and it is quite evident 
that not everyone reaps the same bene$ts from globalization.12 One of the 
de$ning factors that separates the MDCs from the LDCs are the amount 
of investments that the government makes in human development.  #is 
includes investments in land reform, and often times, indigenous societies 
are underrepresented and marginalized because of Western ideology of de-
velopment, and therefore, “economies based on indigenous technologies 
have been viewed as backward and unproductive because of the distorted 
concept of patriarchal productivity.”36 
33 Nicoll Ruaridh. “Himba drowning in their desert Eden Namibia's hydro power scheme is 
endangering an ancient nomadic tribe,” !e Observer (1997)  http://ezproxy.lib.calpoly.edu/
login?url=http://search.proquest.com/docview/250406608?accountid=10362.
34 Ibid.
35 Ibid.
36 A.P. Davis, “Consequences of ‘conservation’: A Critical look at Namibian Com-
munal Conservancies,” 2011, https://dlc.dlib.indiana.edu/dlc/bitstream/han-
dle/10535/7179/%20Namibia.pdf?sequence=1.
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Lindsey Constantino
Lindsey Constantino did not waste any time while she attended Cal Poly. 
From being a member of Kappa Alpha #eta to multiple internships, she 
took full advantage of the opportunities available. Originally, Lindsey did 
not have any aspirations in the $eld of politics. She came to Cal Poly as a 
History major, but after witnessing the 2008 presidential election and the 
beginning of President Obama’s $rst term in o!ce, Lindsey found her in-
terests shifting and decided to major in political science. #is passion would 
lead her to take on various jobs, each providing her with a unique experience.
#e class structure at Cal Poly greatly bene$ted Lindsey. Discussions made 
her more comfortable with public speaking, which has been a great aid in 
conference calls and meetings with o!cials and coworkers. She could make 
sure that her opinions were heard without any embarrassment. Also, critical 
thinking skills allowed her to analyze large amounts of information with ease. 
One of her best experiences at Cal Poly was with the school’s Model United 
Nations Team (MUN). “#is class takes Cal Poly’s motto of learn by doing to 
heart, as you are able to practice what you learned in the classroom in New 
York City,” she said. Lindsey participated in MUN multiple times. Her east 
coast adventures familiarized Lindsey with the area, and ended any fears she 
had about moving to the east coast after graduation. #ese were not her only 
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trips outside of California. Lindsey was also a White House Intern in the fall 
of 2012. #is internship has continuously had a positive impact in her career 
searches, and she still participates in the White House Internship through an 
Alumni Professional Development Committee. #e White House has even 
invited her to return recently as a part of an “Internship Homecoming.” 
Lindsey also spent time in Italy as part of the CSU’s study abroad program. 
Lindsey’s work experiences have been equally as varied as her experiences 
at Cal Poly. Only 3 days after graduation she started working as an intern 
for Net Optics, a Silicon Valley company. Here she was able to grow her 
professional network by forging close relationships with sta", as well as ac-
quire knowledge outside the usual con$nes of politics. From Net Optics, she 
moved on to become a Program Coordinator for the Institute of International 
Education (IIE). Of the multiple programs she worked on at IIE, one of her 
proudest was working with the Brazilian government to provide 100,000 
Brazilian university students an opportunity to study in the U.S. #ese work 
experiences expanded Lindsey’s skills in one particular way or another and 
they are all responsible for helping her acquire her current job with the U.S. 
government. 
Lindsey now works under contract for the U.S. Department of Transportation’s 
Pipeline and Hazardous Material Safety Administration (PHMSA) as a 
Program Associate. She is responsible for communicating with stakeholders 
and writing briefs for the O!ce of Hazardous Material Safety, and also works 
on federal projects. Lindsey is currently helping execute Fixing America’s 
Surface Transportation (FAST) Act. #e FAST Act’s purpose is to advance 
important transportation projects, and speci$c mandates that Lindsey over-
sees involve the safe transportation of energy products, such as crude oil. 
Lindsey has always had a passion for public service, but she is still trying to 
narrow down her interests. Within the next few years she plans to further 
her education by attending graduate school, and from there the possibilities 
for such a distinguished alum are endless. 
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AN EXAMINATION OF THE DEBATE SURROUNDING CORE 
CURRICULUM STATE STANDARDS IN AMERICAN EDUCATION 
REFORM
Kristen Henry
Core Curriculum State Standards in American Education Reform
#e creation and implementation of the Common Core State Standards 
(CCSS) has been a heated topic of debate in American politics, garnering 
attention from teachers, school administrators, and parents across the country. 
Many states have adopted these guidelines, which are a set of learning objec-
tives for students at each grade level in Mathematics and English-language 
arts.1 Since its original implementation, however, support for CCSS has been 
wavering, with criticism coming from both Republicans and Democrats.2 
Many supporters of Common Core State Standards argue that implementa-
tion will create a uniform level of comparison between states and ensure that 
1  Williams, Cheryl S. “Just the Facts: Common Core State Standards.” Educational Horizons 
90.4 (2012): 8-9.
2  Guillory, John. “#e Common Core And #e Evasion Of Curriculum.” PMLA: Publica-
tions Of !e Modern Language Association Of America 30.3 (2015): 666-672.
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the nation adequately prepares students for life beyond high school, while 
critics address the program’s associated costs and inability to target the real 
issues behind education inequality. Whether or not this program is the best 
path for America’s education system moving forward is still up for debate.
#e Common Core Standards themselves were designed by the National 
Governors Association for Best Practices (NGA) and Council of Chief State 
School O!cers (CCSSO), and are aimed to “prepare students for college, 
career, and beyond.”3 In addition to the NGA and the CCSSO, private groups 
were involved in the development as well.4 #e most notable contribution 
came from the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, a large and powerful 
philanthropy group.5 Additional support and funding came from many ed-
ucational interests including ACT, Microsoft, #e College Board, McGraw-
Hill Education, and Pearson Education.6 #e standards were developed with 
contributions from these private groups whose relevant interests may impede 
on their ability to make impartial policy choices. In 2009 the Department of 
Education announced a fund called the Race to the Top, which encouraged 
“states to compete for $4.35 billion by earning points based on education 
reform plans,” which they would have the chance to adopt.7 #e program 
made it clear that to be competitive, a state must include “internationally 
benchmarked standards and assessments that prepare students for success 
in the workforce and college,”8 which was another way of saying they must 
adopt CCSS and its respective assessments.9 In 2010, forty-six states applied, 
twelve of which received federal funding.10 As of Fall 2014, four states had 
3  Burks, Brooke. “Adapting To Change: Teacher Perceptions Of Implementing #e Com-
mon Core State Standards.”Education 136.2 (2015): 253-258.
4  Crowder, Zan. “From #e Editorial Board: #e Politicization Of #e Common Core.” 
High School Journal 98.1 (2014): 1-4.
5  Ibid.
6  Ibid.
7  Frye, Kristopher. “Can #e Common Core Counter Educational Inequity? International 
Legal Lessons On Closing #e Achievement Gap.” Indiana International & Comparative Law 
Review 25.3 (2015): 493-540.
8  Toscano, Michael. “#e Common Core: Far From Home.” Academic Questions 26.4 
(2013): 411-428.
9  Op. Cit., fn. 7
10  Op. Cit., fn. 8
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withdrawn from their commitment due in part to the high costs associat-
ed.11 As the program develops, states are continuing conversations about its 
e"ectiveness for educational reform.
Supporters of the Common Core State Standards maintain that implementation 
will create a consistent level of comparison between states and e"ectively 
prepare students for an international job market. A uniform set of stan-
dards “would address the problem of curriculum variation in the United 
States.”12 #is consistency between state education systems would “promote 
educational equity” and allow for accurate comparative assessments between 
states.13 #e wide variability that exists within a less centralized system of 
state-generated guidelines makes such a comparison nearly impossible. A 
common core system would also be especially bene$cial to families who 
move between states by reducing repetition or gaps in their K-12 education. 
Another area that is often cited in support of CCSS is one of the program’s 
main objectives: to “prepare students to compete in the ever-changing job 
market and the global economy.”14 According to a 2013 study conducted by 
the US Department of Education, 20% of college freshmen reported that 
they had been enrolled in a remedial course during their $rst year in higher 
education.15 Burks argues that CCSS will reduce the need for these course 
o"erings at colleges and universities, and better prepare students for col-
lege-level coursework.16 Supporters of CCSS reason that these standards will 
raise levels of expectation and transparency throughout American education, 
and will also provide students with “a certain set of educational skills one 
must have to be successful in academia or business.”17 #is central skill set 
is crucially important for students everywhere, and the uniform tests would 
allow policymakers to make accurate comparisons between states. 
Critics of CCSS argue that the federal government is reaching too far 
with the program, that it does not adequately address the real issues within 
11  Op. Cit., fn. 4
12  Op. Cit., fn. 3
13  Op. Cit., fn. 7
14  Op. Cit., fn. 3
15  Op. Cit., fn. 3
16  Op. Cit., fn. 3
17  Op. Cit., fn. 7
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education, and that the associated costs are too high. Toscano writes that 
the biggest &aw of state standards is due to their disordered relation to 
social spheres and the “full reordering of American education away from 
families and local communities.”18 He argues that the actions of the federal 
government were unilateral, merely concealed as being in the interest of the 
states, and primarily focuses on the overpowering involvement of the Bill 
and Melinda Gates Foundation.19 He argues that their “aggressive spending 
power” and incentive structure made it di!cult for states to turn down the 
chance to seek funding.20 Although the decision to adopt CCSS was non-
compulsory, states with struggling education budgets would be hard-pressed 
to turn down such an opportunity. Whether or not the path to common core 
was the most democratic, there are still criticisms regarding other aspects of 
the program, particularly how CCSS addresses the e"ect of poverty. 
Supporters claim that CCSS is necessary to compete internationally, and 
they often cite America’s comparatively poor performance on standardized 
assessments. Upon closer inspection, research indicates that “analyses of our 
international test scores … are nowhere nearly as bad as critics claim and that 
they have not declined.”21 Scholars like Stephen Krashen of the University of 
Southern California have found through “longitudinal international stud-
ies…that low test scores are largely clustered in the poorest school districts, 
while middle-class American students in well-funded schools score at the 
top of the world on international tests.”22 #is is a crucial discrepancy to 
acknowledge, especially since poverty levels play a big part in education both 
through both student distribution and state funding. A study conducted at 
the College of William & Mary found that “economic segregation in pub-
lic schools is higher than expected [when compared to] the distribution of 
poverty across neighborhoods.”23 #is is especially concerning because the 
18  Op. Cit., fn. 8
19  Ibid.
20  Ibid.
21  Krashen, Stephen. “#e Common Core.” Knowledge Quest, 2014: 36-45.
22  Wexler, Alice. “Reaching Higher? #e Impact Of #e Common Core State Standards 
On #e Visual Arts, Poverty, And Disabilities.” Arts Education Policy Review 115.2 (2014): 
52-61.
23  Saporito, and Sohoni. “Mapping Educational Inequality.” Social Forces 85, no. 3 (2007).
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same study indicated a “strong correlation between school-level poverty rates 
and the academic achievement of individual students."24 Implementing a 
common set of guidelines across the nation overlooks the e"ect of poverty 
levels on educational achievement, primarily when they exist within the 
states themselves. #e overbearing focus on CCSS over more serious issues 
detracts resources from signi$cant programs like food security, healthcare, 
and access to books, that impact school performance.25
 #e additional costs associated with CCSS are another area of concern. 
#e new assessments require computer hardware and software, and a new set 
of learning objectives requires new textbooks.26 #is is especially concerning 
for students in high poverty schools since “the size of the gaps in achievement 
among schools and districts suggests that the additional costs will be high.”27 
Many districts struggle with budgets and providing attractive teaching sal-
aries, resulting in less experienced teachers who serve high proportions of 
minority students and students living in poverty.28 #e addition of more 
costs and required resources would put an even larger strain on communities 
with fewer instructional resources to begin with, and may perpetuate the 
educational gap the program aims to remedy.
After examining the Common Core Standards laid out by the federal 
government, it is hard to disagree with the objectives. Preparing students 
for college and the workforce, staying competitive among other nations, and 
creating an education system that can be benchmarked are all respectable 
goals. #e biggest issue within CCSS, however, is not the stated guidelines, 
but the oversimpli$cation of underlying problems that the standards claim to 
improve. Toscano states that the “Common Core…is a product of major mis-
diagnosis of what ails American schooling”29 and that “[e]ducational success…
is dependent upon the child’s ability to participate in healthy families and 
24  Ibid.
25  Op. Cit., fn. 21
26  Ibid.
27  McPartland, James M, and Barbara Schneider. “Opportunities To Learn And Student 
Diversity: Prospects And Pitfalls Of A Common Core Curriculum.” 1996: 66-81.
28  Hammond, Adamson, and Darling Hammond. “Funding disparities and the inequita-
ble distribution of teachers: Evaluating sources and solutions.” Education Policy Analysis 
Archives 20 (2012).
29  Op. Cit., fn. 8
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communities.”30 #is distinction puts children in poverty, and by extension 
a high population of minority children back at the starting line, or possibly 
worse. CCSS has a heavy emphasis on assessment to track the development 
of the program, and Wexler points to research that says “the social e"ects 
of poverty…are factors that contribute to learning…and, inevitably, low 
performance on standardized tests.”31 #is speaks to the greater problem 
that CCSS fails to address, which “is the child outside of school.”32 Children 
with unstable living situations, estranged families, or who do not receive their 
proper meals are not able to concentrate at the level necessary to succeed in 
the classroom. One other overarching issue that makes the argument for 
CCSS even less compelling is the process by which the standards came about. 
Criticism has arisen from many experts, including James Milgram, professor 
emeritus of mathematics at Stanford. Milgram was a member of the Common 
Core Validation Committee, and refused to sign o" on the standards. He 
noted the high risks associated with implementation, and claimed “[with the 
CCSS] we are dealing with an experiment on a national scale.”33 Others have 
called for the public to “demand that experiments and descriptive studies of 
groups of students be carried out so that the standards and measure can be 
evaluated.”34 #is argument is especially critical since one of the overarching 
goals of CCSS is to increase educational equity.35 
At this point, more research is necessary to evaluate whether or not the 
Common Core State Standards will have the positive e"ect they are intended to. 
#e goals themselves are respectable, however the program must take on a more 
holistic view of underlying issues such as poverty and funding discrepancies. 
Policymakers and researchers should utilize their resources to conduct testing 
on a smaller scale before implementing the program nationwide.  It is not clear 
whether or not CCSS is the best solution for America, but supporters and critics 
can both agree that e"ective and lasting educational reform is long overdue.
30  Ibid.
31  Op. Cit., fn. 22
32  Op. Cit., fn. 22
33  Op. Cit., fn. 8
34  Op. Cit., fn. 21
35  Op. Cit., fn. 1
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Philip Kibbey 
A Political Science degree always seemed to be a perfect $t for Philip Kibbey, 
whose inmate interest in political theory led to the creation of an independent 
study within the department that synthesized political theory with pre-law. 
Philip credits his fascination with political theory partly as a direct link to 
the concentration’s counterintuitive ability to remain practical both in the 
classroom and in a professional setting, in addition to its theoretical under-
pinnings. As Philip entered his career, his Political Science degree allowed 
him the con$dence to handle any task asked of him. 
After graduating in 2010, Philip pursued a life in Washington, D.C., 
where he landed a job as an assistant with the Senate Select Committee on 
Ethics, helping manage the Senate’s public $nancial disclosure system. A 
job that began with completing administration tasks led to two and a half 
years working as a legal assistant, focusing on $nancial disclosure. After the 
European Finance Crisis in 2012, Philip became interested in $nance, which 
led him to embark upon a position $rst as an analyst, and then as a Team 
Lead at Cambridge Associates, where he managed a team of six analysts 
helping clients with their $nances and analyzing their hedge funds. Philip 
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spent more than year at Cambridge Associates until the Ethics Committee 
asked him to return as a Financial Disclosure Specialist where he spends half 
of his job $guring out disclosures and working with senators. Meanwhile, 
the other half is spent creating software for an electronic $nancial disclosure 
system (eFD) for which he is the product owner. Philip recalls being asked 
to return to the Ethics Committee at such a young age as a signi$cant ac-
complishment in his life. Currently, Philip spends his time corresponding 
with senators about their $nancial disclosure, continuing to develop the eFD 
application, assisting senators with their $nancial reports, and reviewing 
their amended $nancial reports. 
Philip has always appreciated the practicality of the degree as it teaches 
students how to think, write e"ectively, and approach and execute problems. 
One of Philip’s largest obstacles that he faced in his career occurred while 
he was helping a Cambridge Associates client with a very sophisticated and 
large $nancial report. Devotion to such a project meant logging long hours 
and working with large sums of money. #is job meant having to learn 
advanced $nancial products concepts on the spot with the pressure to not 
make any mistakes. While a task like that could be quite daunting, Philip 
felt prepared to reach success through both his experience at Cal Poly and 
his political science classes. 
Philip’s career at the Ethics Committee developed through his enjoyment 
of constituent work, which led him to move to Washington, D.C., and apply 
for work in the Senate. For students who also have aspirations of working in 
government and even in following Philip’s footsteps in the future, he advises 
to begin with internships. Internships are bene$cial in helping to narrow 
down one’s interests, which is why it is important to take them seriously. 
Fortunately, the government provides opportunities to discover internships 
and build networks. Even something as simple as talking to someone in 
government to see what they do can help with networking and illustrate the 
array of di"erent options out there for career paths. Another excellent way to 
help secure a foot in the door of a government job is to work on a political 
campaign as they can also lead to permanent opportunities. Whichever path 
is chosen, student should remember to focus on being a strong worker as 
employers notice strong workers, especially in small o!ces. 
For Cal Poly students as a whole, Philip would like to remind students that 
it is okay to be unsure of the future at this moment in their lives. Extensive 
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pressure is placed on young people to know what they want to do, but it is 
okay to explore interests and change one’s mind while one is young. Moreover, 
it is okay to try out di"erent things, even if failure results. Follow all passions 
and embrace any fears of the unknown. #is is the time to have fun, experi-
ence great things, meet people, make connections, try new adventures, and 
take advantage of di"erent opportunities. Finally, enjoy life and enjoy the 
university while there because it will be missed after graduation. 
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Abstract
Understanding how laws are adjudicated on a local level can be just as sig-
ni$cant as understanding their origins. Crime rates and how they &uctuate 
relative to policing policies can reveal trends that can be traced back to social, 
economic, and cultural in&uences. When comparing China, Mexico, and 
Russia, we $nd that the similarities and di"erences can enlighten criminal 
behavior by contrasting statistics with national identity. When taken into 
the context of political development, e"ective policing policy could be ex-
trapolated and identi$ed.
To Protect and Serve
China, Mexico and Russia are constantly in the mainstream media, with 
evocative occurrences dominating contemporary discussion. In the United 
States, reports of police abuse $ll the news cycle consistently. Regardless of 
how one may feel about each report individually, it is an undeniable symptom 
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that a problem exists with the culture on either side of the badge. Some 
think that the problem is institutional, but perhaps culture is the causal link 
to public safety instead. A comparative look at the police forces in other 
countries may shed some light. Mexico is constantly wracked by drug cartel 
violence and general unrest. Russia, for most intents and purposes, appears to 
have a relatively sound internal situation, yet an aggressive foreign strategy. 
China is thrusting itself onto the world stage, proclaiming its adequacy and 
controlling its domestic involvement. Policy implementation and adjudi-
cation at the lowest level, known as law enforcement, is clearly executed 
better in China than in Russia, which is then better than Mexico. Why is it 
that Mexico has experienced an institutional failure, while Russia has been 
able to maintain a relatively ethical hold on its police force, and China has 
been able to drastically reduce its crime? #e answer lies in the political 
development of the states, namely how their power dynamics have changed 
recently. In Mexico, where bribes and exploitation of power are the norm, 
the development of the country has led to the same systemic corruption that 
is being fought in Russia. China uses corruption to its advantage. Mexico’s 
system generates a higher per capita murder rate than Russia, as well as other 
key crime statistics. #e ability to combat these criminal numbers lies within 
the strong authoritarian power of the contemporary Russian government. 
#e Russians are attempting to mitigate the same problems that Mexico 
has encountered because they have the ability to reform their police force.
Some may argue that a country’s ability to $ght crime simply relies on a 
high police force per capita. After all, Mexico has 371.2 police o!cers per 
100,000 people compared to Russia’s 522.0, as of 2013. In Mexico, there 
were 18.9 murders per 100,000 people in 2013, compared to the 9.0 ratio 
of Russia.1 However, China possesses 120 police o!cers per 100,000 in 
2007, with a 1.2 ratio of the same metric. #at same ratio was 2.0 in 2002, 
and 0.8 in 2012.2 An argument can be made that the problem of ine"ective 
policing is not due to an ine!ciency of resources, but that it is tied to the 
citizenry and to the development of the country. Even though these countries 
1  United Nations O!ce of Drugs and Crime. n.d. UNODC Statistics. Accessed November 
2, 2015. https://data.unodc.org/.
2  Xinhua News Agency. 2007. China to Unify Police Identity Card from Jan. 1. January 1. 
Accessed November 30, 2015.
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have recently taken a departure from authoritarian governments, except for 
China, which has only just departed from an ‘authoritarian’ economy, the 
Russian social and political culture stands out as a more stable, law-abiding 
society compared to Mexico. Mexican political development is character-
ized by three concepts relevant to law enforcement: unstable change, a mix 
of interest articulation, and a weak society and weak state. Compared to 
Russian political development, which consists of a strong society and state 
and relatively strong interest articulation, (political changes in Russian history 
are somewhat stable, though not always) Mexico opens a window for self-in-
terested parties to manipulate the system. Chinese political development is 
focused on a hierarchical structure of society, where one must ‘keep his/her 
station’. Previously, Russian interest articulation was heavily “…regulated by 
the Communist Party, and there could be no open, active competition among 
political parties or interest groups for support…”3 #is level of control is 
similar to how China’s dual-rule system operates today. More recently, after 
perestroika and glasnost, as well as the fall of the Soviet Union, Russians 
have been more vocal about their ideologies, while still advocating for strong 
state control. Russian activists now believe “… [that] institutionalism of 
state power is a prerequisite for civil society development…”4 #is allows for 
stronger participation in the political, and thus law making process. “… ‘[T]
rust in the [national] political system’ has the strongest in&uence on police 
attitudes in nine Latin American countries… with citizens… [not expressing 
con$dence] in the less well-performing democrac[y]… of Mexico.”5 Mexico 
is hindered by their lack of trust in a system that they cannot participate 
in fully. Why should they continue to vote, rally, and caucus if someone is 
going to sweep in by force and declare themselves the winner? “#e…(in)
formal rules of municipal governance [in Mexico] result in a lack of horizontal 
3  Remington, #omas. n.d. Politics in Russia. 7. New York: Routledge. Accessed November 
2, 2015.
4  Taylor, Brian D. 2006. “Law Enforcement and Civil Society in Russia.” Europe-Asia Stud-
ies 58 (2): 193-213. Accessed November 2, 2015.
5   Walker, Lee Demetrius, and Richard Waterman W. 2008. “Elections as Focusing Events: 
Explaining Attitudes toward the Police and the Government in Comparative Perspective.” 
Law & Society Review 42 (2): 337-366.
paideia
176
accountability and reform continuity.”6 #is distrust has generated a caustic 
political outlook that cannot be sustained long-term.
China complicates this argument. #eir authoritarian government is e"ec-
tively accepted by the citizenry and social harmony is a core tenet of Chinese 
culture. While one may argue that having a strong central power is what 
keeps Chinese crime in check (crime meaning homicide rates in this case, 
obviously there is a broad range of crimes to be compared, but for the purpose 
of this paper, homicides will be used as a general indicator) asserting that 
it is both an increase in economic prowess and overall Chinese culture that 
maintains the low crime rates. #e core beliefs of Confucianism necessitate 
a rule of morality and benevolence. In contrast to Russian and Mexican cul-
tural history, which typically generates a more violent sociological response. 
While Chinese political history has hardly been paci$stic, Confucius created 
a now ingrained idea of a harmonious hierarchy and social unity that brings 
the Chinese people to behave more peacefully in their daily interaction with 
one another compared to what we see in Russia and Mexico. One is expected 
to live with the good of the society in mind, not in a self-serving way that 
commonly breeds crime. #is leads to the argument that moral obligations 
could be the source of the di"erences in crime rates, not because of institu-
tional guidance, but because of the public cultural psyche.
Corruption further hinders law enforcement in all areas. In Mexico the 
police o!cers on the ground are part of an institution of corruption, one that 
is focused on a self-centered mindset, not rule of law. #is again stems from 
a mistrust in the government; that one should take any and all precautions to 
help oneself, because the political system is unreliable. While Russian police 
forces have historically used extortion and bribery in their enforcement, the 
economy of Russia has grown, allowing for economically supported change, 
as well as less incentive for the Russian o!cers to line their own pockets. In 
2011, the Russian government overhauled its police force by $ring 170,000 
allegedly corrupt o!cers and raising the remaining o!cers’ salaries.7 Aimed 
6  Pansters, Wil G. 2013. “Reviewed Work: Police Reform in Mexico. Informal Politics 
and the Challenge of Institutional Change by Daniel M. Sabet.” European Review of Latin 
American and Caribbean Studies / Revista Europea de Estudios Latinoamericanos y del Caribe 
(Centrum voor Studie en Documentatie van Latijns Amerika (CEDLA)) 95: 128-131.
7  Russia Today. 2011. “Russia’s rebranded police initiated with major layo"s.” Russia Today. 
March 1. Accessed November 2, 2015.
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at combating corruption, this reform was sweeping in its e"orts to address 
the chronic enforcement issues identi$ed by the government. #is can only 
happen in a country with strong interest articulation. When the citizens 
are dissatis$ed, they voice their opinions to elected o!cials or through 
their votes; which, in Russia’s case, created a need for police reform. It is no 
coincidence that this is happening now in the post-Cold War era. #e now 
strong, reorganized variant of Russian law enforcement is a sharp contrast 
from the decentralized and unregulated policing of Mexican law enforcement.
Yet, China has comparatively weak interest articulation compared to Russia, 
as the political agenda is tightly controlled by the Communist party. However, 
this grip on policy allows for e"ective change to be implemented quickly. As 
such, gun restrictions, regulations, and penal codes can adapt to a changing 
social landscape faster than it can in Russia and Mexico, which holds as 
another reason for low crime rates in China. To expand, China’s &ourishing 
economy causes Russia’s to pale in comparison. #e corruption that persists 
in Chinese governance and enforcement can allow economic growth to con-
tinue and the authoritarian hold on policy making to subsist. #is can then 
cycle back into itself, as “the survival of a relatively strong state, in turn, can 
help to prevent the worst types of corruption from dominating society and 
market activities.”8 Policing to ensure social harmony is a key aspect of law 
enforcement in China. In 1991 (China stopped reporting police sta!ng in 
1992), 34.9 percent of #e People’s Police were “social order police” and 
only 20.4 percent of o!cers were tra!c or criminal police.9 While one could 
argue the semantics of the di"erent types of police o!cers, it is clear that 
law enforcement is used just as much as a social tool as it is a peace one.
However, after Mexico’s PRI party was removed from presidential power 
in 2000, how come Mexican democratization did not improve conditions 
in law enforcement? According to Daniel Sabet, the current political cul-
ture in Mexico creates “…a lack of horizontal accountability between the 
municipal president and the city council and… a lack of reform continuity 
across administrations… these two factors generate systematic obstacles to 
8  Sun, Yan. 1999. “Reform, State, and Corruption: Is Corruption Less Destructive in China 
than in Russia?” Comparative Politics 32 (1): 1-20.
9  Wong, Kam C. 2002. “Policing in the People’s Republic of China: #e Road to Reform in 
the 1990s.” !e British Journal of Criminology 42 (2): 281-316.
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institutional change.”10 #ese accountability problems $nd their beginnings 
in the cultural disassociation that the Mexican people have with government, 
seated in a history full of revolution, dissent, and a strong caudillo system 
that exists throughout Latin America. While the Russians have had almost 
30 years removed from their authoritative ruling party, the Mexicans are 
still dealing with the recent repercussions of a paradigm shift, as well as 
internal violence from organized crime. China, more authoritarian than 
either of the other two countries, has been capable of a tranquil domestic 
existence, thanks to the cultural upbringing of the population. #erefore, 
di"erences in policing originate from cultural and system wide con&icts, 
not simply numbers.
By connecting the examples explored, we can conclude that Mexico’s 
police ine!cacy is tied to the developmental shortcomings, identi$ed as a 
lack of political involvement on the local level and little incentive to im-
prove, thanks to the government’s impotence. Furthermore, Russia’s marked 
improvement in the $eld of law enforcement is linked to its increase in 
interest articulation, as well as its stronger horizontal accountability and 
civic involvement. Until the Mexican government and nation are able to 
address the blockages in the system by changing the culture of policing 
and aversion towards rule of law, organized crime will continue to &ourish, 
with Mexico as its casualty. China has been successful in maintaining a safe 
social society, while contributing to the development of a civil one. Are 
the costs to democracy, despite political legitimacy worth it? For now, the 
Chinese people agree. Despite arguably similar ideologies in authoritarian 
governments, the political development of China, Russia, and Mexico has 
led to di"erent outcomes in policy enforcement.
10  Sabet, Daniel M. 2012. Police Reform in Mexico: Informal Politics and the Challenge of 
Institutional Change. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
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